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ABSTRACT
Three Essays on the Economics of International Migration
by
Caroline Barclay Theoharides
Co-Chairs: Susan Dynarski and Dean Yang
International migration is a key labor market option in many developing countries.
This dissertation investigates three questions about the effects of international mi-
gration on migrant sending countries. In the first chapter, I investigate the effect of
migration on investment in origin-country human capital. Using an original dataset
of all new migrant departures from the Philippines between 1992 and 2009 matched
to the migrants’ province of origin, I examine the effect of migration demand on
province-level secondary school enrollment rates. To isolate exogenous changes in de-
mand, I create a Bartik-style instrument that exploits variation in destination-specific
migrant networks across local labor markets. Analysis at the local labor market level
accounts for effects of migration on both migrant and non-migrant households. I find
that secondary enrollment increases by 2.1% in response to an average year-to-year
percent increase in province-level migration demand. For each additional new mi-
grant, 2.8 more children are enrolled. Private school enrollment increases by 10.1%,
while the effect on public school enrollment is near zero. These effects can occur
through two channels: the income channel or the wage premium channel. Exploiting
variation in gender-specific migration demand, I test their relative importance and
xi
conclude that the income channel is dominant. I provide complementary evidence
of the results by analyzing a natural experiment that led to the closure of a major
migration channel for Filipinos.
In the second chapter, coauthored with David McKenzie and Dean Yang and pub-
lished in the American Economic Journal : Applied Economics, we use an original
dataset of migrant departures from the Philippines to identify the responsiveness of
migrant numbers and wages to GDP shocks in destination countries. We find a large,
significant response of migrant numbers to GDP shocks at destination, but no sig-
nificant wage response. This is consistent with binding minimum wages for migrant
labor. This result implies that labor market imperfections that make international
migration attractive also make migrant flows more sensitive to global business cycles.
Difference-in-differences analysis of a minimum wage change for maids confirms that
minimum wages bind and demand is price sensitive without these distortions.
Finally, the third chapter estimates the effects of constraining emigration flows
due to destination country immigration policy. Despite the prevalence of restrictions
on migration flows, the literature is largely silent on the implications of these barriers
on migrant-sending countries. To estimate a causal effect of migration barriers on la-
bor market choices of individuals in the migrant-sending country, this paper exploits
a policy change that led to the halt of the largest migration channel for Filipinos. In
2005, in response to accusations from the United States of human trafficking, Japan
dramatically changed the requirements for Filipinos migrating as overseas performing
artists (OPAs), resulting in a decline from 71,108 to 6,696 workers. Certain areas of
the Philippines historically sent a larger share of OPAs, and I employ a difference-in-
differences estimation strategy that uses OPA migration in some base year to define
the treatment dosage. International migration falls in response to the policy change
by 1.2%. The effect on international migration is larger than the policy change itself
would suggest, indicating that the importance of spillovers across migrant occupa-
xii
tions. Domestically, more children are employed, and adults are more likely to be
unemployed, looking for additional hours, or engaged in short term work. These
results suggest that eliminating controversial migration channels has major repercus-
sions for labor market choices in migrant-sending countries.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Manila to Malaysia, Quezon to Qatar:
International Migration and Its Effects on
Origin-Country Human Capital
1.1 Introduction
International migration is a key labor market option for many individuals from
developing countries. These labor market opportunities are typically characterized by
large gains in wages for both skilled and unskilled workers (Clemens, 2011; Clemens,
Montenegro and Pritchett, 2008; Gibson and McKenzie, 2012). Such wage gains
often result in increased income in the migrant-sending country through the receipt of
remittances, which lead to substantial increases in both investment and consumption
(Clemens and Tiongson, 2013; Yang, 2008). One type of investment that may respond
to increased income is human capital. Unlike other investments, however, increases
in migration opportunities may also affect human capital investment by changing the
expected wage premium for education. Depending on the education level necessary
to acquire jobs abroad, the education wage premium may either increase or decrease,
and individuals will change their optimal level of educational investment accordingly.
Thus, migration can affect investment in human capital in the origin country through
1
two main channels: the income channel and the wage premium channel.1
Due to data and research design limitations, most previous studies are unable
to examine the net effect of migration on human capital, but rather estimate the
partial effect operating either through the income channel (Ambler, Aycinena and
Yang, 2013; Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Yang, 2008) or the wage premium chan-
nel (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2007; Chand and Clemens, 2008; Shrestha, 2012).
The handful of studies that do estimate the net effect focus exclusively on migrant
households (Clemens and Tiongson, 2013; Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Kandel and
Kao, 2001; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011). As a result, they are not able to capture
the potential spillovers that occur within a local economy due to migration. For ex-
ample, non-migrant households may also benefit from the receipt of remittances or
their multiplier effects in the local economy as well as from changes in the expected
wage premium. Therefore, estimates focusing exclusively on migrant households un-
derestimate the effects on human capital in the economy as a whole. Furthermore,
none of the aforementioned studies are able to distinguish the relative importance of
the income channel versus the expected wage premium channel.
In this paper, I estimate the net causal effect of international migration on province-
level secondary school enrollment rates in the Philippines. The net effect of migration
on human capital at the local labor market level is a key parameter of interest for
policymakers in migrant-sending countries in order to predict the level of human cap-
ital in the future labor force. My results provide the first estimates of this effect.
Further, following predictions set out in a basic theoretical framework, I examine the
relative importance of the income channel and the wage premium channel on sec-
ondary school enrollment decisions. This is the first paper to attempt to disentangle
the effects of these two mechanisms. Identifying the dominant mechanism has the
1Ambler (2013) finds that information asymmetries in migrant households matter for resource
allocation. Thus, migration may also affect human capital investments by geographically splitting
households and changing bargaining power. However, Clemens and Tiongson (2013) find that re-
mittances overwhelmingly dominate effects from splitting households.
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potential to guide the design of policies with the goal of increasing the human capital
stock.
I estimate the effect of the province-level migration rate on secondary school en-
rollment decisions in the province. However, the observed province-specific migration
rate will confound changes in the demand and supply of migrants. To isolate exoge-
nous changes in demand for migrants, I collected a unique, individual-level, admin-
istrative dataset on all new migrant departures from the Philippines matched to the
migrant’s province of origin to create a plausibly exogenous instrument for local migra-
tion demand following Bartik (1991). This Bartik-style instrument exploits variation
generated by shocks to destination country-specific migration networks across local
labor markets in the Philippines. Migrant networks are an important determinant
of where migrants move and the occupations in which they are employed (Munshi,
2003). As a result of these networks, provinces will vary in the degree to which they
are affected by changes in demand from a given destination country. The instrument
predicts the number of migrants in each province-year, and is defined as the interac-
tion of the destination-country composition of migrants in each province at baseline
and destination-specific total national migration. Due to the unique nature of my
micro data, this is the first instance where a Bartik-style instrument is applied to the
international migration literature. In previous studies, the historic migration rate is
often used to instrument for the contemporaneous migration rate (see McKenzie and
Rapoport (2010); Woodruff and Zenteno (2007), among others), and the use of both
the Bartik-style instrument and panel data is a substantial improvement in terms of
causal identification.
To identify the relative importance of the income channel versus the expected
wage premium channel, I exploit differences in gender-specific migration demand. For
instance, a change in demand for female migrants should only affect the wage premium
for females. Thus, female enrollment may respond to this change in demand through
3
the expected wage channel while male enrollment should not. The income channel,
on the other hand, may or may not affect male and female students equivalently in
response to a change in female migration demand. If I find that a change in female
migration demand impacts male and female enrollment equally, then this suggests
that the income channel is the dominant channel. If, on the other hand, I find the
effects are different, then both channels may matter. To test the effects of demand
by gender, I create separate Bartik-style instruments for male and female migration.2
I find a strong and statistically significant positive relationship between secondary
school enrollment and total migration demand. Total secondary school enrollment
increases by 2.1% in response to an average year-to-year percent increase in province-
level migration demand. This means that for each additional migrant, there are 2.8
more students enrolled in secondary school. Private school enrollment increases by
10.1% for an average change in migration demand. While there is a near-zero effect on
public school enrollment, when combined with the large effect on private school, one
interpretation is that students switch from public to private school while others are in-
duced from no school into public school. Demand for female migrants leads to similar
increases in both male and female school enrollment, which leads me to conclude that
the income channel is the dominant channel through which migration affects educa-
tion. I also examine heterogeneity of enrollment responses by grade level to identify
the location of marginal students in the education distribution. While enrollment
increases for all grade levels, the largest effect is on first year enrollment, suggest-
ing that increased migration demand induces students to enter secondary school who
otherwise would not have enrolled.
I provide complementary evidence using a natural experiment. In 2005, Japan
imposed barriers to hiring Filipino overseas performing artists (OPAs) in response
2Migrant occupations from the Philippines are highly gender-specific, as shown in Section 2.1.
However, as I discuss in Section 5.3, exogeneity of the gender instruments does not require that
gender composition is stable over time or that occupations must be exclusively male or female.
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to allegations of human trafficking from the United States. Because OPAs are 98%
female, this led to a large, exogenous decrease in demand for female Filipino migrants
(Theoharides, 2014a). Exploiting differences in the rate of OPA migration across
provinces using a continuous difference-in-differences methodology, this decline in
migration opportunities caused a statistically significant decrease in public school
enrollment. The effects on enrollment are similar for both male and female students,
which provides further evidence in favor of the income channel.
The Philippines provides an excellent setting to address the effect of migration on
education. As the first country to adopt temporary overseas contract migration on
a large scale, approximately 2% of the Philippine working-age population migrates
for employment each year in a wide variety of occupations and destinations. Further,
substantial heterogeneity in the gender and skill composition of overseas migrants
allows me to test the relative importance of changes in income versus the wage pre-
mium. From a policy perspective, the Philippines has served and continues to serve
as a model for many other Asian countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Sri
Lanka in the establishment of temporary contract labor programs (Asis and Agunias,
2012; Rajan and Misha, 2007; Ray, Sinha and Chaudhuri, 2007; World Bank, 2011a).
Understanding the implications of such a program on school enrollment decisions
in the migrant-sending country is thus increasingly important for policymakers in
these countries as they seek to understand the future level of human capital in their
domestic workforce.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses back-
ground on migration and education in the Philippines. Section 1.3 presents a basic
theoretical framework relating migration to education. The data are presented in
Section 1.4, followed by a discussion of the empirical strategy in Section 1.5. Section
1.6 discusses the main results, mechanisms, and magnitudes of the estimates. Section
1.7 provides complementary evidence using the natural experiment in Japan, and
5
Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Migration from the Philippines
As the first country to adopt temporary overseas contract migration on a large
scale, the Philippine government created an overseas employment program in 1974
in response to poor economic conditions in the Philippines. The program has grown
dramatically; in 2011, 1.3 million Filipinos departed overseas on labor contracts (rep-
resenting 2% of the working age population).3 Approximately 517,000 of these mi-
grants were new hires with first time labor contracts. Based on the perceived success
of the migration program in the Philippines, several other countries, such as Indone-
sia, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan, have adopted or are in the process
of adopting similar migration programs (Asis and Agunias, 2012; Rajan and Misha,
2007; Ray, Sinha and Chaudhuri, 2007; World Bank, 2011a).
Filipinos migrate to a wide range of destination countries, as shown in Table
1.1. Saudi Arabia is the largest destination country, and the majority of migration
is to the Middle East or within Asia. Almost 50% of male migrants work in Saudi
Arabia, whereas female migrants are split more evenly across Japan, Saudi Arabia,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United Arab Emirates. Filipinos also migrate in a
variety of occupations. Table 1.2 shows the top 20 occupations for migrants from
the Philippines. Occupations tend to be highly gendered, and occupations that are
over 50% female are shaded in grey. Of the top 10 occupations, domestic helpers,
performing artists, caregivers, and medical workers are all over 80% female. Plumbers,
engineers, and laborers are almost exclusively male occupations while production
workers, cooks and waiters, and building caretakers are much more evenly split across
3This figure is for land-based workers only and excludes seafarers.
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genders.
Contract migration is largely temporary and legal by way of licensed recruitment
agencies. There are numerous fees associated with the migration process. Legally, re-
cruitment agencies may only charge a placement fee equivalent to one month’s wages
(Orbeta, Abrigo and Cabalfin, 2009). The worker satisfies this debt upon receipt
of the first month’s wages. However, in addition to the placement fee, a number of
additional costs are incurred by potential migrants such as travel to Manila and room
and board prior to overseas deployment. Migrants commonly resort to predatory
lenders to cover these expenses (Barayuga, 2013). The Philippine Overseas Employ-
ment Administration (POEA) regulates recruitment and verifies work contracts prior
to employment. One of the main regulatory functions of POEA is to set occupation-
destination specific minimum wages for overseas contracts. McKenzie, Theoharides
and Yang (2014) find that these minimum wages are binding. In the absence of
a minimum wage policy, an increase in demand for migrants should lead to both
an increase in the quantity and wages of these workers. However, given that these
minimum wages are binding, McKenzie, Theoharides and Yang (2014) find that des-
tination countries respond to economic shocks by changing the quantity of overseas
workers rather than altering the wage.
The rate of new hire migration varies substantially across the Philippines.4 In
2009, the average new hire migration rate across provinces for new labor contracts
was 0.54% of the province population. However, this varied from a maximum of 1.3%
of the population in Bataan province to just 0.07% of the population in Tawi-Tawi
province. This suggests that migration is a more important labor market option in
4I examine how much of the movement in province-level migration rates is common across
provinces versus how much is province specific. Following Blanchard and Katz (1992), I regress
the log migration rate in province p on the log total migration rate separately for each province.
The adjusted R2 for each regression provides an empirical estimate for how much province-level
migration rates move together from one year to the next. The average adjusted R2 across all 83
province-level regressions is 0.22. Therefore, the majority of the movement in province-level migra-
tion rates is not explained by movement in the overall aggregate migration rate.
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certain parts of the country than others. Figure 1.1 shows the new hire migration rate
in 1993 in each province. While higher rates of migration are largely concentrated on
the northern island of Luzon, there is substantial variation throughout the country
as a whole. Even among high migration provinces, provinces specialize in certain oc-
cupations and destinations, resulting in substantial heterogeneity in the composition
of migrants across the Philippines. Figure 1.2 shows province-level migration rates in
1993 for migrants to Hong Kong compared to migrants to Saudi Arabia. Migration to
Hong Kong is concentrated in the northern part of Luzon, whereas migration to Saudi
Arabia is more heavily concentrated around Manila and in Mindanao, the southern
part of the Philippines.
I exploit this variation in the destination composition of migrants across provinces
in order to identify the causal effect of migration demand on secondary school en-
rollment. While no legal barriers prevent workers from other provinces from acquir-
ing these jobs, the reliance on social networks in choosing recruitment agencies and
obtaining jobs abroad creates rigidities across local labor markets. In personal inter-
views with POEA staff, Barayuga (2013) states that migrants rely on family members
and friends who have previously migrated to choose recruiting agencies and find jobs
abroad.
1.2.2 Migration and Education
The effect of migration on human capital through the expected wage premium
channel depends on whether jobs abroad require more or less education than jobs
at home. To determine the sign of the wage premium effect in the Philippines,
it is important to note the location of Filipino contract workers in the education
distribution among all Filipino workers. Borjas (1987) argues that workers migrating
from countries with high income inequality to countries with lower income inequality
are negatively selected, and so one might expect an increase in migration demand to
8
reduce human capital investment due to low skill, high wage opportunities abroad.
While earnings inequality in the Philippines is high, Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk
(2007) suggest that emigration from the Philippines is positively selected. However,
their study is limited to OECD destinations. As shown in the previous section, the
majority of contract migrants work in non-OECD countries in the Middle East and
Asia. To establish if this finding holds for non-OECD countries, in Figure 1.3 I follow
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and plot the education distribution of all migrants and
non-migrants in the 2000 Philippine Census.5 Panel A shows the distributions for all
migrants and non-migrants between the ages of 18 and 65. The share of migrants
with less than a high school education is smaller than the share of non-migrants
with less than a high school education. The opposite is true for high education
levels, especially for training programs. Training programs are vocational degrees that
require a high school diploma for enrollment, and in many occupations, a training
program is required to be eligible for overseas contract migration. Based on Panel A,
it appears that migrants from the Philippines are positively selected.
Panel B shows the same figure for individuals located in the ten provinces with
the highest rates of migration.6 Provinces that send a large number of migrants
may be more educated overall, and thus the apparent positive selection in Panel A
might be driven by the fact that migrants are from more educated provinces. While
the degree of positive selection in Panel B is somewhat less pronounced, migrants
are still more educated than non-migrants in high migration provinces. Panels C
and D examine the distribution separately by gender and indicate that both male
and female migrants are positively selected, though the degree of selection appears
to be slightly higher for male migrants than for female migrants. One additional
concern is that differences in cohort may confound the distributions. Since migrants
5Unlike Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), because the Philippine Census includes temporary contract
migrants, I can create the education distributions based on a single data source.
6There are 80 provinces in the Philippines and 4 districts of Manila, which I count as provinces.
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are younger than the overall population, if younger cohorts get more education than
older cohorts, the apparent positive selection may simply be a result of comparing
different cohorts. Panels E and F show the education distribution for workers less
than 35 years of age and workers greater than 35 years of age. Both younger and
older workers appear positively selected, though the degree of positive selection is
somewhat less for younger workers.
While there is no overall required level of education for contract laborers mandated
by either the Philippine government or employers, Figure 1.3 suggests that employers
screen on education. McKenzie, Theoharides and Yang (2014) argue that there is
an excess supply of Filipino workers who seek overseas employment. Given this, it
is not surprising that employers can be quite selective in terms of the workers that
they hire for overseas contracts. Beam (2013) collects data on job vacancies from
a popular job-posting website in the Philippines and finds that potential migrants
without at least a high school education are qualified for very few jobs. While certain
occupations may not require the skills of a college-educated worker, when hiring
workers internationally, employers may rely on education to signal that the worker is
a high ability type.
1.2.3 Education in the Philippines
To understand the margin along which individuals may alter their investment in
schooling, it is important to note some key features of the Philippine education system.
Primary education in the Philippines consists of six years of schooling, and secondary
education is four years, thus totaling ten years.7,8 Public primary education is free
and compulsory, whereas secondary education is free but not compulsory (Philippine
7According to the Department of Education, children must enter school by age six. However,
using household survey data, Maligalig et al. (2010) find that fewer than half of six year olds are in
school.
8In 2011, the Philippines passed a bill to switch to a K-12 education system. The addition of
grades eleven and twelve will not occur until the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 school year and thus is
not relevant for this analysis (Philippine Republic Act 10533, 2013).
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Republic Act 6655, 1988). Despite the fact that secondary education is officially free,
in addition to the opportunity cost of schooling, households must also cover the cost
of miscellaneous fees, uniforms, school supplies, transportation, food allowances, and
textbooks (World Bank, 2001).9,10 Approximately fifteen percent of students drop out
of secondary school,11 and evidence from household survey data indicates that they
do so mostly to work or because the cost of schooling is too high (Maligalig et al.,
2010). Because on-time graduation occurs at age fifteen or sixteen and the minimum
age to work abroad is eighteen, only domestic wages are relevant for an opportunity
cost calculation.12
Private school education is a common alternative to public school, and eighteen
percent of students enrolled in secondary school attend private school.13 The fees
for private school are substantially higher than the costs of attending public school.
While Filipinos perceive the quality of private school to be higher than public school
and cite sending children to private school as a major motivation for international
migration (Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas, 2012), there is little evidence to support the
perception that the quality is higher in private schools (Yamauchi, 2005).
9Officially, miscellaneous fees may not bar a student from public school (Philippine Republic Act
6655, 1988). However, households cite these as major barriers to public school enrollment, suggesting
that this policy is not enforced (World Bank, 2001).
10In 2008, the Department of Education implemented a no uniform policy (Philippine Department
of Education Order 45, 2008) as an attempt to reduce the barriers to poor children attending public
school.
11This number is an underestimate of the true dropout rate as it only counts students who ever
enrolled in secondary school. 8.5% of students drop out of primary school (Maligalig et al., 2010),
and there are certainly some children who never enter school at all.
12Using household survey data from the 2006 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES)
and the 2007 Labor Force Survey (LFS), I calculate that direct education costs are approximately
15,000 Philippine pesos per year (USD350), and indirect costs are 35,000 pesos per year (USD810).
I calculate indirect costs as the average annual wages earned by children between ages twelve and
seventeen, conditional on working.
13These are predominantly Catholic schools.
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1.3 Theoretical Underpinnings
In this section, I develop a theoretical framework that describes the secondary
school enrollment decision when international contract migration is a labor market
alternative. The model provides predictions to help distinguish between the income
channel and the expected wage premium channel. The basic framework is similar to
McKenzie and Rapoport (2011), but I extend their model so that schooling decisions
are sequential due to uncertainty surrounding potential labor market outcomes and
the household budget.14,15
1.3.1 Optimal Education Choice Without Migration
First, consider the education decision when migration is not a labor market op-
tion. At the completion of primary school, a risk neutral benevolent household dic-
tator (the parent) chooses whether to enroll a child in high school by maximizing the
discounted present value of expected lifetime earnings net of education costs. Edu-
cation costs include both direct costs of schooling such as school fees or uniforms,
and indirect costs such as foregone income or alternative investments. I assume there
are imperfect credit markets,16 and the parent cannot borrow against a child’s future
earnings. Therefore, all direct costs for a year of schooling must be paid from the
household’s current budget at the time of enrollment. As a result, there are two types
of households: unconstrained and constrained. Unconstrained households will invest
in the optimal level of schooling for children, whereas constrained households invest
in education until the liquidity constraint binds.
14See e.g. Keane and Wolpin (1997) or Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006) for surveys on uncer-
tainty and the returns to education.
15While ideally I would use individual-level panel data to test a dynamic model of the annual
enrollment decision, such education data are not available in the Philippines. However, individual-
level decisions have implications for the stock of students enrolled in secondary school, so instead
I use a panel of aggregate province-level data to test the response of the stock to these aggregate
changes.
16I later relax this assumption.
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A child’s expected wage is conditional on educational attainment. I assume that
the parent expects the child to receive this wage for his or her entire working life.
For simplicity, I consider two levels of schooling, high school graduate, hs, and less
than a high school education, lhs.17 I assume the expected wage is increasing with
schooling, such that E[whs] > E[wlhs], where E[whs] is the expected wage earned by
a high school graduate, and E[wlhs] is the expected wage earned with less than a high
school education. The wage premium for a high school education is defined as:
Wage Premium =
E[whs]
E[wlhs]
(1.1)
The parent’s optimal choice of schooling is based on a forecast of household income
and expected returns to education when the child enters the labor market. At the
start of each school year, the parent receives updated information on household liq-
uidity and the expected returns to schooling. In response, they may revise their
enrollment decision for the child. In the event that expected household income was
higher than realized income, the household may not be able to enroll the child in
school. Alternatively, if realized income is greater than expected household income,
the parent may enroll a child who would otherwise not be enrolled. For constrained
households, the constraint will either no longer bind or bind less strongly, and the
child is enrolled in school. Unconstrained households may also increase enrollment in
response to higher income by purchasing normal goods that complement education
(e.g., electricity, books, better healthcare), such that now the investment in educa-
tion is worthwhile. Changes in the wage premium may cause parents to revise their
optimal level of schooling choice. If the expected returns to education have fallen,
children may receive less education, whereas if the returns have increased, children
may now receive more education.
17I discuss heterogeneity by grade-level enrollment in Appendix A.
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1.3.2 Optimal Education Choice With Migration
Now suppose individuals have two potential labor market options: work at home
or work overseas.18 Introducing migration as a labor market alternative changes the
expectation of wages for a given level of schooling and thus the wage premium for a
high school education. Specifically, conditional on searching for an overseas job, an
individual’s expected wage is:
E[ws] = E[wa,s] ∗ pa,s + E[wd,s] ∗ (1− pa,s) for s = {hs, lhs} (1.2)
where pa,s is the probability that an individual with schooling level s will acquire
a job abroad, a. E[wa,s] is the expected wage overseas (net of migration fees) for
schooling level s, and E[wd,s] is the expected wage for schooling level s domestically, d.
I assume individuals are employed with probability 1.19 I also assume that individuals
can renew their overseas work contracts for as many periods as they choose, and thus
may be a contract migrant for their entire working life.20 Thus, the present discounted
value of earnings is calculated assuming that a parent expects a child to earn E[ws]
for his or her entire working life. I assume that 1) Migration is positively skill-biased
so pa,hs > pa,lhs; 2) Expected wages, both at home and abroad, are increasing in
education; and 3) For a given level of education, domestic wages are assumed to be
lower than wages earned abroad, E[wa,s] > E[wd,s].
Now consider an economic shock in a destination country that results in a change
in demand for migrants. This change affects the parent’s optimal choice of schooling
18Recall that one must be at least eighteen years of age to migrate. Since on-time graduation from
high school in the Philippines is at age 15 or 16, international migration will not induce individuals
to drop out in order to immediately migrate. Approximately twelve percent of eighteen year olds
are currently enrolled in secondary school (2007 LFS and author’s calculations).
19Loosening this assumption and allowing for unemployment as a third alternative with probability
pu,s changes the value of the wage premium quantitatively but not qualitatively. I assume that
pu,hs < pu,lhs and E[wu,s] = 0. Thus, E[whs] > E[wlhs] still holds, and all predictions will remain
valid.
20Yang (2006) states that most contracts are open to renewal. Contracts are typically two years,
and on average each contract is renewed for 6 years (POEA and author’s calculations).
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for children in the household through two channels—a change in income or a change
in the expected high school wage premium—and may cause households to revise the
optimal level of schooling as outlined above.21 I will discuss each of these channels
below and predict what each implies for the empirical results. Because households
are unlikely to alter expectations in response to a transitory shock, I assume that the
change in migration demand is perceived to be persistent.
1.3.3 Two Channels: Income and the Wage Premium
Three types of households may respond to the change in demand for migrants:
1) Households that have at least one child of secondary schooling age, but experi-
ence no change in income in response to migration demand; 2) Households that do
not have children of secondary schooling age, but receive remittances or benefit from
multiplier effects due to the increase in migration demand; and 3) Households that
receive remittances or benefit from multiplier effects and have secondary school-aged
children.22 Parents in the first and third types of households may change their en-
rollment decision based on the change in the expected wage premium. The second
and third types of households will experience a change in income due to the receipt
of remittances or their multiplier effect. For the second type of households, this in-
crease in income has no effect on school enrollment decisions. For the third type of
household, a change in income can lead to a revision of the school enrollment decision.
Thus, Type 1 households may change enrollment decisions due to the wage premium,
and Type 3 households may change enrollment decisions due to both the income and
21Migration may also affect households by changing household structure. Cortes (2013) provides
evidence that children with migrant mothers are more likely to lag behind in school than children
with migrant fathers. However, Clemens and Tiongson (2013) find that the effects of migration
are largely through remittances rather than changes in household structure amongst migrant house-
holds. In addition, changes in household structure are a less important channel when examining the
effect of migration at the local labor market level since only a small fraction of households have an
international migrant. As a result, I abstract away from household structure, but the predictions of
the model for a change in household structure are qualitatively the same as a change in income.
22Type 3 households include both migrant households and non-migrant households that benefit
from remittances.
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wage premium channels.
Changes in income may affect the enrollment decisions of both unconstrained and
constrained Type 3 households. For unconstrained households, enrollment may rise
in response to the higher household income level through the direct purchase of more
education or the purchase of normal goods that complement education.23 Previously
constrained non-migrant households can get closer to or attain the optimal level of
schooling, resulting in increased school enrollment. For constrained migrant house-
holds, the effects on enrollment decisions depend on their ability to borrow to pay
for migration and education. Consider the case where credit markets are imperfect
for both migration and education.24 While households may want to send a migrant
overseas, they are liquidity constrained and do not have the ability to borrow. In re-
sponse, parents may reallocate household resources to invest in sending a household
member abroad. While the household budget could be reallocated in a number of
ways, one potential option is that parents might invest in a lower level of education
for children in the household. Once the migrant is earning income abroad and the
household begins to receive remittances, the liquidity constraint loosens. Children
may be reenrolled in school, and the negative effect on enrollment is only temporary.
Thus, unconstrained and remittance-receiving non-migrant households should experi-
ence an increase in enrollment in response to higher income levels, whereas the effect
on constrained migrant households is ambiguous and depends on the reallocation of
household investments.
In a standard labor market setting, an increase in migration demand may affect
the expected wage (and thus the expected wage premium) in two ways: 1) By chang-
ing the expected probability of migrating, pa,s, or 2) By changing the expectation
23For every migrant, there are four households in the Philippines that receive remittances, sug-
gesting that many non-migrant households benefit from changes in income as well (2006 FIES, 2007
LFS survey, and author’s calculations).
24Alternatively, if credit markets exist, otherwise constrained households are able to borrow to
finance migration and education costs. Thus, children will receive the optimal level of education.
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of the overseas wage, E[wa,s].
25 However, due to binding minimum wages (see Sec-
tion 1.2.1), pa,s will respond to a change in migration demand, while wa,s (and thus
E[wa,s]) cannot.
26 pa,s affects enrollment in Type 1 and 3 households in the following
way: given that a household perceives the change in demand as persistent, they will
update the expected probability, pa,s, that a child will work overseas in the future
for a given level of education, s. Depending on the household’s initial expectation of
pa,s and whether the change in demand for overseas labor is for high or low skilled
workers, the expected wage premium could either increase or decrease.
Interpretation 1: A persistent increase in migration demand affects enrollment through
both the income and wage premium channels. A positive effect could be due to in-
creased remittances or an increase in the wage premium. A negative effect could be
due to the reallocation of household resources to pay for migration costs or a decrease
in the expected wage premium.
1.3.4 Gender-Specific Migration Demand
As discussed above, a change in migration demand may affect enrollment decisions
through the income channel, the wage premium channel, or some combination of the
two. To determine the relative importance of these two channels, I exploit the fact
that occupation and destination patterns differ strongly between male and female
migrants, as shown in Section 1.2.1. As a result, there may be separate shocks to
migration demand for male and female migrants which has important implications for
the theoretical framework outlined thus far. If there is no sex preference in terms of
25Because migration is positively skill biased, an increase in migration demand may result in a
decrease in the supply of educated labor in the local labor market. As a result, there are fewer
educated workers, and the labor supply curve for educated workers shifts back. Wages should rise
domestically for educated workers, and the wage premium for a high school education increases.
26An increase in migration demand may also change the wage premium through E[wa,s] due to
changes in information about wages. Several studies show that individuals underestimate wages
overseas (McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 2013), though the expectation in the Philippines is on
average fairly accurate (Beam, 2013).
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the educational investment, male and female school enrollment should respond equiv-
alently to any change in income.27 However, it is also possible that male and female
enrollment might not respond equivalently to a change in income. For instance, if
households are constrained after the change in income and have children of different
genders, enrollment effects may differ by gender as parents are forced to choose which
child to enroll. In terms of the wage premium channel, an increase in demand for
migrants in predominantly female occupations should only change the wage premium
for females.28 Thus, female enrollment should respond to increased demand, but male
enrollment should not.
Interpretation 2: If male and female enrollments respond equally to gender-specific
migration demand, then the income channel is dominant. If enrollment responds dif-
ferentially, this could be due to the income channel, the wage premium channel, or
some combination.
1.3.5 Expectations Formation
Empirical evidence suggests that individuals in the developing world form expec-
tations using social networks, community outcomes, and neighbors’ outcomes (Dela-
vande, Gine and McKenzie, 2011). Jensen (2010) examines the labor market returns
perceived by 8th grade Dominican youths and finds more than seventy percent of
27Cruz and Vicerra (2013) find that Filipino women do not exhibit sex preference for their children.
28One concern might be that domestic wages will rise for both male and female skilled workers,
which would increase the wage premium for both genders. Using the 2007 Philippine Labor Force
Survey (LFS), I calculate that of the top 37 domestic occupations (which represent 75% of all
employment), 22 occupations are more than 75% male or female, 26 occupations are more than 70%
male or female, and only 4 occupations are between 40% and 60% male or female. Appendix Table
A.1 shows these occupations and the percent female. Further, using phil-jobs.net, the job posting
website maintained by the Philippine government, of the 1,160 domestic job vacancies posted during
the week of September 9th, 2013, over 50% explicitly specified the gender of the applicant. This
evidence suggests that, like overseas employment, domestic occupations are highly gender specific,
and a change in the supply of skilled female workers should increase wages for females more than for
males. Even if higher domestic wages increase the wage premium for both males and females, the
increased probability of finding work abroad for females means the female expected wage premium
will increase by more.
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students report the labor market outcomes of people in their community as their
primary source of information on earnings. Thus, I assume individuals form expecta-
tions about migration demand based on the outcomes of those they observe in their
local labor market, where I define the local labor market as the province.29
A number of papers in the U.S. examine how labor market expectations affect
the decision to enroll in post-secondary education. Much of the existing literature
focuses on either the effect of contemporaneous labor market conditions on college
enrollment (Card and Lemieux, 2001; Dillon, 2012; Freeman, 1976)30 or the effect
of ex post earnings on enrollment (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Willis and Rosen,
1979). A new literature examines the effects of ex ante expected returns to schooling
on the school enrollment decision. Attanasio and Kaufmann (2010) find that ex
ante subjective expectations matter for secondary schooling decisions for youth in
Mexico. Since I do not have data on the perceived ex ante migration rate, I assume
that parents form expectations of migration demand based on the observed migration
rate, which I define empirically as the migration rate in the previous calendar year.31
As mentioned above, households will only alter investment in education in response to
changes in the expected wage premium if the change in migration demand is perceived
as reasonably permanent. In Section 1.6.1, I use a Fourier frequency decomposition to
show that changes in migration demand are overwhelmingly low frequency, implying
they are both predictable and persistent. As a result, it is reasonable for parents to
alter their expectations of the wage premium based on the observed migration rate
in the previous year since these labor market conditions likely persist.
29One key reason to use the province as the local labor market is because recruitment agencies
are granted the authority to recruit at the province level (Philippine Overseas Employment Admin-
istration, 2013).
30Survey evidence indicates that students form subjective expectations of future earnings based on
contemporaneous earnings in the labor market (Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Freeman, 1976; Manski
and Wise, 1983).
31Because the school year commences in June, the observed annual migration rate used to make
enrollment decisions at time t is the migration rate at time t− 1.
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1.4 Data
1.4.1 Migration Data
I construct an original dataset of all new migrant departures from the Philippines
between 1992 and 2009. The data are from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and the Overseas Worker Welfare Administration (OWWA).
Both under the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) of the Philippine gov-
ernment, these agencies are responsible for overseeing various aspects of the migration
process. Specifically, POEA monitors recruitment and regulates the employment pro-
gram. Prior to deployment, all contract migrants must visit POEA in order to have
their contracts approved and receive exit clearance. As a result, POEA maintains a
rich database on all new contract hires from the Philippines, encompassing 4.8 mil-
lion individual-level observations of migrant departures. The database includes the
individual’s name, date of birth, sex, marital status, occupation, destination country,
employer, recruitment agency, salary, contract duration, and date deployed.
OWWA is the agency responsible for the protection and welfare of overseas workers
and their families. Upon processing overseas labor contracts at POEA, migrants are
required to become members of OWWA.32 OWWA maintains a membership database
of new hires and rehires including information similar to that housed at POEA with
approximately 1 million observations per year. However, while the POEA database
includes information on the salary, recruitment agency, and occupation to uphold their
responsibility to monitor contracts and recruitment, because OWWA is concerned
with the welfare of both the migrant and his or her family, home address of the
migrant is one of the key variables in the OWWA database.
OWWA membership requirements have changed substantially over the sample
period. Since 2001, all contract hires are required to have active OWWA membership,
32Membership entitles workers to a number of services such as repatriation or evacuation. OWWA
also conducts mandatory Pre-Departure Orientation Seminars as well as Reintegration Seminars.
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but prior to 2001 membership was only required for new contract hires, domestic
helpers, and seafarers. In order to obtain a sample of only new hires, I match the
OWWA data to the data from POEA.33 This adds home address to the POEA data,
creating a unique dataset including both the origin and destination of all new contract
migrants from one of the world’s largest labor exporters. This paper is the first to
make use of this unique data from OWWA.
To calculate province-level migration rates, I total the number of migrant workers
in each province-year and divide by the working aged population in the province.34,35
Because OWWA did not collect home address in all years of the sample, province-level
migration rates can only be constructed in 1992, 1993, and 2004-2009. As a result,
the sample period of analysis is from 2004-2009. Table 1.3 shows summary statistics.
The average provincial-level migration rate is 0.51% and ranges from near zero to
1.59% of the population.36 I also calculate gender-specific migration rates. Women
migrate at a higher rate than men, with an average 0.28% of the female population
working as overseas migrants versus 0.22% of the male population.
1.4.2 Education Data
Data on public and private high school enrollment are from the Philippine De-
partment of Education (DepEd). To my knowledge, this paper is the first academic
33I match the data using first name, middle name, last name, date of birth, destination country,
gender, and year of departure using fuzzy matching techniques as discussed in Winkler (2004). For
the years of data used in this analysis, the match rates are approximately 90% for 1992 and 1993
and between 95% and 98% for 2004 to 2009.
34I define the working aged population as 18 to 60 since 18 is the minimum age at which one can
migrate. The age range 18 to 60 covers 99% of all migration episodes in my sample period. All
population data are from the 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2007 Philippine Censuses from the National
Statistics Office, and I linearly interpolate values for years between censuses. Overseas contract
workers are included in census population counts in the Philippines.
35The home address variable from OWWA includes only the municipality of origin, not the
province or region. Out of 1630 municipalities, 332 have ambiguous names that are used in more
than one province or region. Thus, to calculate the number of migrants in the province, I assign
municipalities with repeated names their population share of the total number of migrants across
municipalities with the same name.
36The 2% rate of migration stated earlier for the Philippines as a whole is based on both new hires
and rehires.
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research study beyond government reports to make use of these data. Public school
data are from the Basic Education Information System (BEIS). Started in 2002, it
includes school-level data on enrollment, number of dropouts, retention, number of
teachers, number of classrooms, and a variety of other variables. I aggregate school-
level data to the province level to calculate province-level public school enrollment.
Private school data are available at the division level. Divisions are a geographic
unit smaller than provinces, but larger than municipalities used for the oversight of the
education system. I aggregate divisions to calculate province-level private school en-
rollment.37 To create province-level enrollment rates, I calculate total provincial sec-
ondary enrollment from public and private numbers and divide each enrollment count
by the population in the province aged twelve to seventeen. The average province has
a total secondary school enrollment rate of approximately 57%. The range is large,
with the lowest rate of enrollment at 13% and the highest near 100%. Females are
enrolled in secondary school at a higher rate than males, and this is true both for
public and private schools. About 46% of the school-aged population is enrolled in
public schools, while approximately 11% are enrolled in private schools.
37The private school data from 2002 to 2004 are the official figures from DepEd. Unlike public
school, private schools are not required to submit enrollment counts to DepEd. Thus, for 2005 to
2010, I adjust division-level enrollment to account for non-submission. I calculate the submission
rate by dividing the number of schools that submitted by the total number of private schools in the
division. The median submission rate is 1, and the 5th percentile is 0.5, suggesting that compliance is
generally high. However, 47% of divisions do not have 100% compliance, suggesting that adjustment
is important. To adjust for compliance, I assume that complying and non-complying schools are the
same size. I then inflate enrollment by one divided by the submission rate. Further, there are 120
observations (10%) between 2005 and 2010 that are missing or have unavailable compliance rates.
For these observations, I replace enrollment with the average enrollment for the years before and
after. The results are robust to excluding missing values or non-compliers. Neither official figures
nor compliance rates are available for 2011 so I drop it from my analysis.
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1.5 Empirical Strategy
The basic specification for identifying the impact of migration demand on school
enrollment is as follows:
EnrollRatept = β0 + β1MigRatept−1 + αp + γt + pt (1.3)
where EnrollRatept is the secondary school enrollment rate, defined as the percent
of students enrolled in high school out of the total number of children aged twelve to
seventeen in province p, year t.38 MigRatept−1 is the province-specific migration rate
in year t − 1, defined as the outflow of new migrants. I define it as the percent of
migrants in province p, year t− 1 out of the total working age population in province
p, year t − 1. Province fixed effects, αp, remove province-specific effects, and year
fixed effects, γt, remove time-specific unobservables.
39 pt is the error term and is
clustered by province. There are 80 provinces in the Philippines and 4 districts of
Manila, resulting in p equal to 84.
The inclusion of province and year fixed effects resolves some concerns of omit-
ted variables bias. However, a number of threats to the validity of the identification
strategy remain. First, province-year specific omitted variables can lead to bias. For
instance, if a province had a large factory close in a given year, this could lead to both
an increase in the province-specific rate of migration abroad due to limited job oppor-
tunities at home and to an increase in the high school enrollment rate as individuals
stay in school longer due to a lower opportunity cost. As a result, β1, the coefficient
on MigRatept−1, would be biased upward. In addition to possible omitted variables,
reverse causation could also lead to upwardly biased point estimates. Specifically,
38The results are robust to other definitions of the school-aged population. I follow the Department
of Education’s definitions and Maligalig et al. (2010) in my choice. I also examine the enrollment
rates by gender and in public and private schools.
39I prefer the fixed effects estimator to the first difference estimator since a fixed effects estimator
is more likely to identify long-run effects whereas a first difference estimator tends to only estimate
short-run effects. See Baker, Benjamin and Stanger (1999) for a thorough and technical discussion.
23
high enrollment rates in a given province may cause migration rates to increase.40
1.5.1 Migration Demand Index
To address these threats to causal identification and isolate changes in migration
demand from changes in migration supply, I instrument for the migration rate using
a migration demand index. Specifically, I create a Bartik-style instrument (Bartik,
1991; Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Katz and Murphy, 1992)
by exploiting destination country-specific historic migrant networks across provinces.
However, rather than predicting employment growth as is standard in this literature,
I create an index of the predicted number of migrants in each province-year. To
predict the number of migrants, I weight the total number of migrants nationally to
32 distinct destinations by the province share of the national total to that destination
in a base period. I then sum over all 32 destinations to predict the total number of
migrants in each province-year.41 Specifically, I define the migration demand index
as follows:
Dpt =
∑
i
Mit
Mpi0
Mi0
(1.4)
where Dpt is the predicted number of migrants in province p, year t, Mit is the
number of migrants to destination i, year t in the Philippines as a whole, and
Mpi0
Mi0
is
the share of migrants at baseline in province p, destination i, out of the total number
of migrants nationally at baseline in destination i. I define baseline as 1993, but the
results are robust to the choice of other base years.42 By using these baseline shares,
40This seems less likely to be a concern given that the migration rate is lagged.
41As a robustness check, I also create two analogous indices that exploit occupation-specific historic
migration networks and occupation x destination country-specific historic migration networks rather
than destination-specific shares. For the occupation-based index, I use 38 occupations categories,
and for the destination x occupation-based index, I use 32 destination cells times 38 occupation
cells. The results are robust to the choice of index, and the main results are shown in Appendix
Table A.2.
42The results are robust to using 1992 or an average of 1992, 1993, and 1994 as the base year
instead. I use 1993 as the base year for the majority of my analyses for two reasons: 1) 1993 has the
fewest missing values for municipality and thus provides the most accurate counts of migrants at the
province level and 2) One large occupation, caregivers, only commenced as a migration opportunity
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I am implicitly assuming that the distribution of migrants to a given destination is
stable across the Philippines over time, or at least a reasonable predictor of future
distributions of migrants (Munshi, 2003; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007). If this is not
the case, the instrument will be a poor predictor of the province-specific migration
rate. I then divide the index by the working population in the base year in order to
obtain a predicted migration rate.
Panel B of Table 1.3 shows summary statistics for the Bartik-style instrument.
The constructed total migration demand index exhibits similar patterns as the actual
migration rate. The main difference between the actual rate and the demand index is
the maximum values. The Bartik-style instrument has a much larger maximum value.
This is because at baseline (1993) the four districts of metro Manila composed a much
larger share of total migration than in later periods, since migration has spread more
evenly across the Philippines over time.
I then estimate Equation (3) using the migration demand index to instrument
for the actual province-level migration rate.43 This is an improvement on the OLS
fixed effects estimation strategy for a number of reasons. First, it isolates the effects
of changes in migration demand, rather than confounding changes in demand with
changes in supply. Returning to the example of the factory closure, now if a factory
closes in province p, year t, it will not affect the predicted migration rate as long as
the factory closure does not affect the total demand for overseas migrants. I argue in
Section 1.5.2 that demand is determined by destination countries. Thus, while this
factory closure may result in a shift in the allocation of migrants across provinces,
in 1993. Thus, to accurately assign networks, I use the base year once it was established as a common
occupation.
43In a previous version of this paper, I also instrumented for the actual migration rate with a
weighted measure of destination country GDP and destination country sectoral GDP, where the
weights are based on the province-specific destination shares at baseline. However, my preferred
specification includes province-specific linear time trends, and when these are included, the weighted
GDP instrument is weak. Results are robust without the province-specific linear time trends and
are available upon request.
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it will not affect total overseas migration.44 Further, it seems highly unlikely that a
factory closure today affects shares at baseline. The index alleviates concerns from
any province-year specific omitted variables since they no longer affect the constructed
migration rate. It should be noted that this approach differs substantially from the use
of the historic migration rate as an instrument for current migration (see McKenzie
and Rapoport (2010); Woodruff and Zenteno (2007), among others). These studies
use cross sectional data, which leads to concern about the endogeneity of the historic
migration rate. Due to the panel nature of my data and the inclusion of province
fixed effects, province-specific omitted variables at baseline are not a relevant concern
in this paper for reasons I discuss below. Finally, reverse causation is also no longer a
concern unless the high school enrollment rate in a province drives destination country
demand at the national level. Given that migrants are spread across the Philippines
and that demand is from outside the country, this seems doubtful.
1.5.2 Identifying Assumptions
For this analysis to provide a causal estimate of the effect of migration demand on
secondary school enrollment, a number of identifying assumptions must hold.45 First,
to satisfy the relevance condition, there must be variation in the province-specific
destination shares at baseline. If, for instance, each province sends an equal share of
migrants to Saudi Arabia in the base period, then the instrument would explain little
of the variation in province-level migration rates. In Appendix Table A.3, I show the
quartiles, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the base shares for each of
the 32 destination countries. There is substantial variation in the size of the shares
44This potential shift in the allocation of migrants across provinces is one reason why simple OLS
may be biased despite the fact that migration demand is determined outside the Philippines.
45Blanchard and Katz (1992) discuss two identifying assumptions for the standard Bartik-style
instrument. Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift (2013) formalize their assumptions and assert
that two additional assumptions must hold in the standard case for the instrument to be valid. Since
the construction of my instrument is slightly different, the identifying assumptions are modified
accordingly.
26
that each province comprises of total migration to a given destination country, thus
satisfying this condition.
The second assumption, which is necessary for the exogeneity of the instrument,
states that the number of migrants departing from the Philippines annually is de-
termined by host country demand. I argue that there is a large potential supply of
Filipinos who want to migrate, and the number hired is determined by demand from
overseas employers. McKenzie, Theoharides and Yang (2014) suggest, based on evi-
dence from 2010 Gallup World Poll, that there may be as many as 26 million Filipinos
who would like to migrate if given the opportunity, compared to only 2 million who
currently work abroad each year. Further, they report from qualitative interviews
with recruiting agencies that there is an excess supply of Filipinos who want to work
abroad and that the overseas contract labor market is a buyer’s market.
If demand is determined outside the Philippines, then the actual number of mi-
grants in each year should not be influenced by economic conditions in the Philippines,
but rather by the economic conditions in the destination countries. McKenzie, Theo-
harides and Yang (2014) show that there is a causal link between migrant numbers
and GDP shocks in the destination country. To further show that economic conditions
in the Philippines do not influence the number of migrants, I regress the log number
of migrants in each of the 32 destination countries on log Philippine GDP, control-
ling for log GDP in the top ten destinations for Filipinos. If economic conditions in
the Philippines do not affect the number of overseas workers, then Philippine GDP
should not have an effect on migrant outflows. Appendix Table A.4 shows the results
of this analysis. Out of the 32 destinations, Philippine GDP only has a statistically
significant effect in 2 cases, roughly what would be expected due to chance. While
the coefficients are not precisely estimated zeros, they are smaller and less precisely
estimated than the point estimates on log GDP in the top ten destinations.
The final identifying assumption is that baseline shares are not correlated with
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trends in variables related to the outcome variable.46 One way to test the validity
of this exogeneity assumption is to compare provinces with low destination-specific
baseline migration rates to those with high rates and compare their trends in variables
related to education. If, for example, provinces with high baseline rates have higher
growth in enrollment than provinces with low baseline rates, I would incorrectly
estimate that an increase in demand has a positive effect on enrollment, when in
actuality the increase in enrollment was at least partly due to differing trends due,
presumably, to other factors.47
Ideally I would compare trends in education outcomes prior to the start of the
overseas migration program in areas that have high or low destination-specific migra-
tion rates at baseline. However, the overseas migration program for the Philippines
commenced in 1974, long before data on education outcomes in the Philippines were
available. In Figure 1.4, I plot the migration outflows for the 9 destinations with the
highest variation over the sample period. It seems demand for at least some of the
occupations remained relatively flat between 1993 and 2000. This suggests that the
importance of shocks to migration demand was much larger during the later years
of the sample. Thus, in provinces with high and low destination-specific migration
rates, I examine trends in the high school enrollment rate in the period from 1993 to
2000.48
In Figure 1.5, I plot the average province-level high school enrollment rates for
high and low migration provinces for each of the 9 destinations with the highest
variation in migrant counts.49 This allows for a visual evaluation of the parallel trends
assumption: in the absence of the change in migration demand, enrollment should
46Because I am using panel data, province fixed effects absorb differences in the levels of any such
omitted variables.
47This is conceptually similar to testing for pre-trends in a difference-in-differences methodology.
48I use destination-specific rates of migration at baseline to measure the level of treatment. The
baseline shares used in the construction of the index do not take into account the population of the
province, thus they are not measuring the density of migration experienced by the province.
49Since DepEd did not release enrollment data prior to 2002, I use the NSO’s quarterly Labor
Force Survey to calculate province-level high school enrollment rates.
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have remained parallel. In the pre-period, the trends in enrollment appear quite
parallel. This suggests, for example, that recruiters did not choose to locate in areas
where education was increasing at a higher rate. In the post period, enrollment in the
low migration provinces appears to be catching up, perhaps due to poverty reduction
policies or policies geared at increasing educational attainment specifically.50 While
this is concerning for the parallel trends assumption, it will lead to downward bias of
the estimates of the effect of migration demand on enrollment. Since I hypothesize
that migration demand increases enrollment, increases in education for low migration
areas compared to high migration areas will bias the estimates against finding an
effect from increased migration demand.
To more rigorously examine if there are differential trends in enrollment, I estimate
the following equation separately for each destination country in the pre period, post
period, and full sample:
∆EnrollRatept = β0 + β1MigRatep0 + γt + pt (1.5)
where ∆EnrollRatept is the percent change in the province-level high school en-
rollment rate from time t − 1 to time t, MigRatep0 is the province migration rate
at baseline, γt are year fixed effects, and pt is the error term. t is equal to 1993
to 2000 for the pre period and 2006 to 2011 for the post period. A non-zero value
for β1 would lead to concern that the enrollment rate is trending differentially for
different levels of the migration rate. Appendix Table A.5 shows the results. While
the point estimates are not precise, there is substantial variation in the magnitudes
of the coefficients. However, many of the destinations with large point estimates are
small and account for little of the variation in migrant demand over the sample pe-
riod. I highlight the 9 highest variation destination countries in grey. Other than
Lebanon and Singapore, the coefficients in the pre-period for these highest variance
50Total high school enrollment data are not available from the LFS in 2001 to 2005.
29
destinations are close to zero. Given that most of the identifying variation will come
from changes in demand in these destinations, this reduces concerns about differential
trending driving the results. The inclusion of province-specific linear time trends in
all preferred specifications further alleviates this concern.
1.5.3 Gender-Specific Demand Indices
In order to identify the mechanism through which migration affects human capital,
I examine the enrollment response to gender-specific demand for migrants as discussed
in Section 1.3.4. Estimating equation (3) with the province-level gender-specific mi-
gration rate as the key explanatory variable will suffer from the same threats to
identification as outlined for the overall migration rate. Thus, I create gender-specific
Bartik-style instruments:
Dgpt =
∑
i
Mgit
Mgpi0
Mgi0
(1.6)
where Dgpt is the predicted number of migrants of gender g in province p, year t,
Mgit is the number of migrants of gender g to destination i, year t in the Philippines
as a whole, and
Mgpi0
Mgi0
is the share of migrants at baseline of gender g in province p,
destination i, out of the total number of migrants nationally at baseline of gender g to
destination i. While occupations are highly gendered in the Philippines as shown in
Section 1.2.1, the creation of this index does not assume that the gender composition
is stable over time. Rather, it simply assumes that, given a certain number of female
migrants hired for a certain destination, the share coming from each province is
relatively stable over time. The identifying assumptions are the same as discussed in
Section 1.5.2.
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1.6 Results
1.6.1 Identifying Variation
One critique of Bartik-style instruments is that the source of underlying variation
is often unclear (Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift, 2013). To address this, in
Figure 1.4 I start by plotting total migration over time in each of the 9 destinations
with the highest variances over the sample period in order to explicitly explore the
identifying variation.51 Migrant outflows change substantially over the sample period.
Despite fluctuations in certain destination-years, in general these plots of destination-
specific migration demand suggest that migration demand increased over time and
that the variation in most destinations is fairly low frequency.
To formally test whether the variation in migrant demand is high or low frequency,
I filter the migration demand index into high and low frequency components follow-
ing Baker, Benjamin and Stanger (1999) and Bound and Turner (2006). Low fre-
quency variation suggests that changes in migration demand are persistent over time,
whereas high frequency variation would imply that changes in migration demand are
quite transitory. If demand is high frequency, it seems unlikely that individuals will
change their expectations of the wage premium in response to changes in migration
demand. If demand is instead low frequency, such labor market conditions are likely
to persist and thus may cause individuals to revise expectations of the wage premium.
First, I employ a basic decomposition following Baker, Benjamin and Stanger (1999),
which filters the migration demand index into a high frequency component and a low
frequency component:
Dpt =
1
2
(Dpt −Dpt−1) + 1
2
(Dpt +Dpt−1) (1.7)
51Incidentally, these are also 7 of the top 10 largest destinations. Figures for all 32 destinations
are available upon request.
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The first component,
1
2
(Dpt − Dpt−1), is the first difference and encompasses
high frequency changes in the migration demand index. The second component,
1
2
(Dpt +Dpt−1) or the moving average, represents low frequency changes in the index.
Because I have data on the national number of migrants by destination in all years
of the sample period, the migration demand index can be constructed from 1993 to
2009. Thus, I conduct the decomposition over the entire sample period.52 Eighty-two
percent of the variance in the migration demand index is explained by the low fre-
quency component, and when province-specific linear time trends are included, 88%
of the variance is explained by the low frequency component. This suggests that
long-run, persistent changes in migration demand will drive the results.
I next use a Fourier decomposition following Baker, Benjamin and Stanger (1999)
and Bound and Turner (2006) to divide the migration rate into orthogonal com-
ponents at varying frequencies, which more precisely determines the nature of the
variation. Using seventeen years of data from 1993 to 2009, I split the migration
demand index into nine orthogonal components of different frequencies using:
Dpt =
8∑
k=0
(
ξkcos
(
2pi
k(t− 1)
17
))
+
(
γksin
(
2pi
k(t− 1)
17
))
(1.8)
To estimate ξk and γk, I follow Bound and Turner (2006) and run separate regres-
sions for each province (84 regressions in total). I then use these parameter estimates
of ξk and γk to calculate the nine Fourier components for each province-year. Each
component is simply the term under the summation for k equals 0 to 8. Over 87%
of the variance in the migration demand index is explained by the two lowest fre-
quency components regardless of the inclusion of province-specific linear time trends.
The results of both the basic and Fourier decompositions indicate that changes in
province-specific migration demand are overwhelmingly low frequency and thus are
52While the IV results cannot be estimated over this sample period, the reduced form and IV
results are qualitatively similar. Further, it seems reasonable that households will make educational
investment decisions based on long-run variation from before my main sample period.
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stable and predictable. As a result, when individuals in the Philippines observe an in-
crease in demand for migrants, it is reasonable for them to infer that such a change is
permanent and to change their expectations about future labor market opportunities
in response.
To further explore the determinants of demand, I uncover a number of institutional
factors that drive the identifying variation for the 9 highest variance destinations
shown in Figure 1.4. Panel A shows total migration to Saudi Arabia from 1992 to
2009. During the early part of the sample period, migration fell due to the Gulf
War (United Nations, 2006). From 2003 onward, migration to Saudi Arabia grew
substantially as oil prices increased, and the hire of engineers, building caretakers,
domestic helpers, laborers, and medical workers increased substantially. The dip at
the end of the sample is due to a change in the minimum wage for domestic helpers
imposed by the Philippines in 2007 (McKenzie, Theoharides and Yang, 2014). With
a minimum wage that was double the previous rate ($400 per month from $200 per
month), the number of domestic helpers fell from 12,550 in 2006 to 3,870 in 2007,
though the hire of domestic helpers recovered by 2009.
Migrants to Japan are almost exclusively employed as Overseas Performing Artists
(OPAs). In Panel B, the large drop in the number of migrants to Japan in 2005
is due to barriers imposed on migration of OPAs in response to pressure from the
United States (Theoharides, 2014a). The dip in deployment of migrants to Japan
between 1994 and 1995 was due to more stringent requirements for OPAs imposed
by the Philippine Labor Secretary in response to exploitation of Filipinas (Philippine
General Rule 120095, 1996).
Panels C, D, and F show steady increases in the number of Filipino migrants to
the Middle East from 2003 onward. This coincides with the rise in oil prices, and
the number of migrants employed as building caretakers, cooks, domestic helpers,
engineers, plumbers, salesmen, and other service workers increases substantially in
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these destinations during this period. Similar to Saudi Arabia, the dip in the number
of migrants in 2007 is due to the increase in minimum wage for domestic helpers.
In Taiwan (Panel E), about 50% of migrants work in the production sector, which
is largely composed of factory workers. Growth in the hire of these workers over
the sample period was substantial due to growth in cell phones, computers, and other
electronics during the 1990s, and this growth remained steady through the 2000s. The
other major occupations migrating to Taiwan are caregivers and domestic helpers,
though this declined substantially in 2006 for caregivers and in 1997 for domestic
helpers, likely due to the increased hire of these migrants from Indonesia. The large
drop in the number of workers to Taiwan in 2000 was due to a hiring ban on Filipino
workers imposed by Taiwan in June, 2000 due to deteriorating relations between
Taiwan and the Philippines (Migration News, 2000).
Almost all migrants to Hong Kong (Panel G) are employed as domestic helpers.
While there are fluctuations in demand for these workers over the sample period,
the general trajectory is upward. Indeed, the number of domestic helpers increased
from about 13,500 in 1992 to 25,000 in 2009. Migrants to Lebanon (Panel I) are also
almost exclusively domestic helpers. The hire of domestic helpers grew substantially
starting in 1998 and by 2005, over 11,000 domestic helpers were employed. However,
in 2007, the Philippines imposed a two year ban on the deployment of Filipinos due
to fighting between Israel and Hezbollah (GMA News, 2011). Finally, migration to
Singapore (Panel H) is mainly for domestic helpers, engineers, and medical workers.
The growth at the end of the sample period was due to a doubling of the hire of
medical workers between 2007 and 2008.
To summarize, the majority of the variation in the migration demand index is
relatively low frequency, indicating that changes in migration demand are persistent.
Policy changes by destination countries and the Philippines, the price of oil, and
growth in the electronics field seem to be the drivers behind changes in the number
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of Filipinos migrating abroad each year overall as well as to specific destinations.
1.6.2 The Effect of Migration Demand on Enrollment
In Table 1.4, Panel A, Column 1, I report the first stage results of the effect of
the total migration demand index on the total migration rate. The index has a pos-
itive and statistically significant relationship with the endogenous variable, but the
F-statistic is less than 10, indicating that weak instruments are an issue (Stock and
Yogo, 2002).53 In column 2, I add province-specific linear time trends to alleviate
concerns about differential trending in omitted variables across provinces at baseline
as outlined in Section 1.5.2. The F-statistic increases to greater than 10, and the rela-
tionship between the endogenous variable and the instrument is larger in magnitude.
In Column 3, my preferred specification, I weight by the population in order to obtain
nationally representative results. The first stage results are much stronger with an
F-statistic of 46. Finally, in Column 4, I test if the highest migration province, the
second district of Manila, is driving the results. The first stage results appear robust.
Therefore, I proceed with Column 3 as my preferred specification, though I show the
robustness of the results to other specifications throughout.
Table 1.5, Panel A shows that total migration demand is positively related to
secondary school enrollment decisions. To interpret the point estimate in Panel A,
Column 3, my preferred specification, for a 1-percentage point increase in total mi-
gration demand, school enrollment increases by 10.3 percentage points. However, it is
important to note that, given average migration rates of 0.51% of the total province
working population, a 1-percentage point increase in the province-level migration rate
is unrealistic. Instead, I calculate the average year-to-year percentage point change
in migration demand over my sample period to be 0.12 percentage points. For an
average change in migration demand of 0.12 percentage points, enrollment increases
53When using robust standard errors, the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic is not valid. Instead, I
report the Kleibergen-Paap statistic (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006).
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by 10.3*0.12=1.2 percentage points. This results in a 2.1% increase in enrollment,
off a sample mean of 56.8% enrolled. The results without the population weights
(Column 2) are qualitatively similar, but larger in magnitude. This indicates that
the enrollment response to education is different across small and large provinces in
the Philippines. Namely provinces with smaller populations have a larger education
response to migration. In Column 4, I drop the second district of Manila. The results
are robust to this change in sample. The effects on female and male enrollment Panels
B and C are qualitatively similar to the overall results. Male and female enrollment
increase by 2.0% and 2.2% respectively, and I cannot reject that the coefficients are
the same.
In addition to the effect of migration demand on total secondary school enrollment,
another key consideration is whether households choose to send their children to
public or private school. One of the major motivations for international migration
from the Philippines is the desire to enroll children in private school (Asis, 2013).
As income increases, parents may now choose to switch to a type of schooling that
they perceive as higher quality. The effect of the expected wage premium on public
and private enrollments remains an empirical question, and I will test the channels
affecting school choice below using gender-specific migration demand. In Table 1.6,
I examine the response of public and private secondary school enrollment to changes
in total migration demand. The effects on public school enrollment are small and
imprecisely estimated. However, they suggest that increases in migration demand lead
to slightly greater public school enrollment. Private school enrollment, on the other
hand, increases statistically significantly in response to migration demand. Looking
at Panel B, Column 3, an average year-to-year increase of 0.12 percentage points
yields a 10.1% increase in private secondary school enrollment off a sample mean of
11.4%. If I assume that most individuals who enroll in private school in response
to an increase in migration demand were previously enrolled in public school, these
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results suggest that for every student switching to private school, there is another
previously unenrolled child who enrolls in public school.
1.6.3 Mechanisms
The results thus far provide evidence that total and private secondary school
enrollment increase in response to increases in total migration demand, while there
is suggestive evidence of slight increases in public school enrollment. In order to
determine the mechanisms through which these effects may occur, I examine the effect
of gender-specific migration demand on school enrollment. As discussed in Section
1.3.4, if the effects on male and female enrollment are equal in response to an increase
in, for instance, female migration demand, the income channel is dominant. If the
effects are not equal, either income, the wage premium, or some combination of the
two could be the dominant channel. Panels B and C in Table 1.4 show the first stage
results for the male- and female-specific migration demand indices. Both indices have
a positive and statistically significant relationship with the gender-specific migration
rates. However, the male migration demand index has an F-statistic below the critical
value of 10, and thus weak instruments are a problem. The higher standard errors
in the male regressions compared to the female regressions suggest that there is less
variation in the male migration rate over the sample period. As a result of the weak
first stage for male migration, I focus the gender-specific analysis on the effect of
female migration demand.
While the same identifying assumptions must hold for the gender-specific demand
indices as for the total migration demand index, by splitting demand by gender, I
introduce the potential for an additional omitted variable. Consider the effect of
female migration demand. If the provinces that are more affected by changes in the
national number of female migrants (ie., higher base share provinces) also experience
an increase in the male migration rate, and male migration also has an effect on
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school enrollment, then the results will be biased. To test for this, I first examine the
relationship between the male migration rate and the female demand index as well
as the relationship between the female migration rate and the male demand index
by regressing the gender-specific migration demand index on the migration rate for
the opposite gender. A positive relationship would suggest that the effect of gender-
specific migration demand on enrollment may be biased upward. The results are
shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table A.6. For the female demand index,
the male migration rate appears to have little effect. As such, omitted variables bias
due to the male migration rate is likely not a concern.54 I also control for the male
migration rate in the regressions that follow.
Table 1.7 reports the effect of female migration demand on total, female, and
male enrollment. Looking at my preferred specification in Panel A, Column 3, a
change in female migration demand has a positive but statistically imprecise effect
on total secondary school enrollment. In Column 5, I add a control for the male
migration rate, and the results are robust to the addition of this control. Turning
to Panel B, Column 3, female migration demand has a positive and significant effect
on female secondary school enrollment. Specifically, an average year-to-year percent-
age point increase in female migration demand of 0.05 percentage points leads to a
7.3*0.05=0.36 percentage point increase in female secondary school enrollment. This
is a 0.6% increase in enrollment off a sample mean of 60.0%. In Panel C, Column
3, the effects of female migration demand on male enrollment are smaller than the
effects on female enrollment, though I cannot reject that they are the same. If I exam-
ine the estimates without population weights shown in Column 2, the coefficients on
male and female enrollment are quite similar. This leads me to conclude that changes
54On the other hand, the female migration rate and the male demand index have an inverse
and statistically significant relationship. Thus, if female migration has a positive effect on school
enrollment, estimates of the effect of the male migration demand index on enrollment will be biased
downward. Thus, in addition to concerns about the weak first stage for men, I proceed in my analysis
using the female migration demand index due to concerns about omitted variables bias with the male
index.
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in income, rather than changes in the expected wage premium, are the dominant
channel through which migration affects school enrollment. The slight differences in
point estimates suggest that the expected wage premium may matter as well. The
differential effects could be due to either changes in the female-specific wage premium
or households preferring to invest in girls’ education when income increases. Because
the coefficient on male enrollment is non-zero, this indicates that the entire effect
could not be from the wage premium, and enrollment changes at least partially in
response to the income channel.
In Table 1.8, I examine the response of public and private enrollment to a change in
female migration demand. Comparing Column 1 to Column 2 in Panel A, the public
school enrollment results are not particularly robust to the population weights. This
suggests that while lower population provinces in the Philippines respond positively
to increases in female migration demand in terms of public school enrollment, this is
not true in Manila or other high population areas. This may be indicative of lower
income levels of migrant households outside Manila, such that the marginal student
is induced into public school, whereas in Manila a higher initial portion of children
in migrant households are enrolled. In Panel B, Column 2, private school enrollment
increases by 2.5% in response to an average year-to-year change. The results are of
a similar magnitude when both unweighted and weighted. The estimates without
weights on both public and private school enrollment are nearly identical for men
and women and slightly larger for women than for men when weights are included,
though I cannot reject that they are the same. This again suggests that the dominant
channel through which migration affects secondary school enrollment is through an
income channel, rather than through changes in the expected wage premium.
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1.6.4 Effect of Migration Demand on Enrollment by Grade
Secondary school enrollment increases in response to increased migration demand,
primarily due to changes in income rather than changes in the wage premium. How-
ever, given that the enrollment choice is sequential, aggregate enrollment results
may miss potentially interesting dynamics regarding the marginal student affected
by changes in migration demand. To examine these dynamics, I look at the effect
of both total and female migration demand on grade-level enrollment rates for each
grade of high school. The results are shown in Table 1.9.
Panel A shows the effects of total migration demand by grade level. An increase
in migration demand causes an increase in enrollment across all grades, indicating
marginal students are induced into enrollment at all grade levels. However, first year
enrollment increases by more than fourth year enrollment (3.2% compared to 2.4%),
likely due to the bunching of dropouts prior to the first year of high school. This could
be a result of limited benefits to partial completion of high school or because this is
when compulsory schooling concludes, among other reasons. Thus, while there are
marginal students in all grades, this suggests a large number of students never enroll
in high school either because of liquidity constraints or the returns on the education
investment are too low.
Panel B shows the enrollment response to female migration demand. The ef-
fects are positive and quite similar across grade levels, though imprecisely estimated.
Turning to Panels C and D, while there are equivalent effects on male and female
aggregate enrollment in response to a change in female migration demand, I find
substantial heterogeneity when comparing the male and female enrollment responses.
Specifically, for year one, I can reject that female migration demand has equal effects
on male and female enrollment, while in later years I cannot reject that the effects
are the same, though the male point estimates are consistently smaller than the fe-
male estimates. This differential response to gender-specific demand in the first year
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suggests that while the aggregate results imply that income is the dominant channel,
first year enrollment may respond to some combination of both channels.
1.6.5 Interpreting Effect Sizes
The results suggest that an average year-to-year increase in total migration de-
mand leads to a 2.1% increase in total secondary school enrollment. Given that the
average province sends 2,550 migrants and has 79,081 students enrolled in secondary
school, my main point estimate Table 1.5, Panel A, Column 3) suggests that a 1
percentage point increase in migration demand off a mean migration rate of 0.51%
would lead to a 196% increase in migration. Thus, given that the average province
sends 2,550 migrants, this results in 4,998 new migrants. A 10.3 percentage point
increase in total secondary school enrollment off a sample mean of 57.21% enrolled is
an 18% increase in enrollment. This results in 14,234 new students enrolled for every
4,498 new migrants. Every additional migrant causes 2.8 more children to enroll in
secondary school.
How does this effect size compare to previous estimates? Yang (2008) estimates
the effect of differences in exchange rate shocks faced by Filipino migrant households
in light of the Asian financial crisis on school enrollment. A 10% improvement in the
exchange rate experienced by migrant households leads to a 6% increase in remit-
tances and a 1% increase in total school enrollment. A 6% increase in remittances is
2,160 pesos in Yang’s sample. Thus, for every 216,000 additional pesos remitted, one
additional child will be enrolled in school. Using data from the 2006 Family Income
and Expenditure Survey, I determine that the average remittance receiving household
receives 76,273 pesos of remittances each year. Further, for every one migrant in a
province, four households receive remittances. Thus, a rough back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that each additional migrant results in 305,092 pesos of remit-
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tances.55 So, by Yang’s estimate, each additional migrant in my sample should cause
1.4 additional children to be enrolled in school.56
It is important to note that Yang’s paper examines the effects of an increase in
remittances on households that already have a migrant abroad (and thus are likely
already receiving remittances). For households sending a new migrant abroad, the
increase in income and the relaxation of the liquidity constraint from the initial re-
ceipt of remittances is likely more pronounced than for households that have received
remittances for some time. Further, Yang only estimates the effect of remittances on
migrant households, thus missing spillovers to non-migrant households. While it is
not possible to determine if the difference in estimates is due to a larger effect from
first time migrants or from spillovers, my results suggest that spillovers matter.
Turning to a similar calculation for private school enrollment, there are 17,465
students enrolled in private school in the average province. Following the same calcu-
lations as above, this suggests that for each additional migrant, 2.9 additional students
enroll in private school. I turn to Clemens and Tiongson (2013) to contextualize these
results. Using a regression discontinuity design, they compare the households of in-
dividuals just above and below the cutoff on a Korea proficiency exam required for
migration to Korea. They find that for each additional migrant, there are 0.41 more
children enrolled in private school. To compare this to my results, it is important
to remember that this estimate assumes that there are no effects of migration on
55Recall that the sum of direct and indirect education costs is approximately 50,000 pesos.
56One important consideration is that I only estimate the effect of new hire migration on secondary
school enrollment. If rehires are positively correlated with both new hire migration and secondary
school enrollment, I will overstate the results. McKenzie, Theoharides and Yang (2014) find that a
1% increase in GDP leads to a 2.6% increase in new hires and a 1.9% increase in rehires. Based on
their respective sample means, a 1% increase in GDP results in 121 new hires and 148 rehires. Thus,
for every 1 additional new hire as a result of a change in GDP, there are approximately 1.2 additional
rehires. I hesitate to simply split my effect size linearly as there are likely heterogeneous effects on
education depending on if a migrant is a new hire or rehire. For instance, liquidity constrained
households may find the liquidity constraint loosened enough to increase education in response to
new migration, and thus when the migrant is rehired, there is no enrollment response. Unfortunately,
I cannot test this empirically, but it is an important consideration when interpreting the magnitude
of the results.
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non-migrant households. Given the fact that each migrant on average sends remit-
tances to four households, if the effects of a given peso of remittances are equal across
migrant and non-migrant households, then each migrant would induce 4*0.41=1.64
additional students to enroll in school. The difference of 1.3 students between my es-
timate and Clemens and Tiongson’s estimate is likely due to two factors. First, these
estimates again miss potential spillovers to non-remittance receiving households. Sec-
ond, Clemens and Tiongson acknowledge that their sample is not representative of
the Philippines as a whole. Their sample is both richer and better educated than the
overall population. Thus, both migrant and non-migrant households in my sample
are likely more responsive to the loosening of liquidity constraints than households in
their sample.
While my results are large, they are comparable with results found in these previ-
ous studies in the Philippines, especially given the differences in sample and research
design. These comparisons emphasize the importance of spillovers to non-migrant
households from migration.
1.7 Analysis of Japanese Policy Change for Overseas Per-
forming Artists
I next use a natural experiment to provide evidence that complements my main
results. In 2005, Japan dramatically reduced the hire of overseas performing artists
(OPAs) in response to allegations of human trafficking from the United States. This
led to the closure of a major migration channel for Filipino women, resulting in a fall
in annual OPA migration from 71,108 to 6,696 between 2004 and 2006. This drop can
be observed in Figure 1.4, Panel B. This exogenous change in demand provides an
opportunity to conduct a complementary analysis of the results found in Section 1.6,
since this policy change caused a sudden decrease in demand for exclusively female
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migrants that is likely perceived as permanent.
To test the effect of this sudden reduction in overseas migration, I conduct a
difference-in-differences analysis with a continuous treatment variable.57 Treatment
is defined as the share of OPAs out of the population in the base year (1993) and
expressed as a percentage. I estimate the following equation:
EnrollRatept = β0 + β1Post+ β2Post ∗ ShareOPAp0 + αp + γt + pt (1.9)
where ShareOPAp0 is the number of OPAs in province p at time 0 divided by the
total population in the base period. There are 77 provinces used in the analysis. β2
estimates the effect of the OPA ban on the province-level high school enrollment rate.
For the identification to be valid, in the absence of the policy change the high school
enrollment rate in high and low OPA share provinces must be moving in parallel
during this period. Figure 1.6 plots the public high school enrollment rate for the
highest and lowest quartiles of the OPA shares.58 The trends in the pre-period appear
to be parallel.59
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 1.10. Though imprecisely estimated,
there is a negative effect of the policy on total enrollment. The total effect is driven
by a statistically significant decrease in public school enrollment in response to the
reduction in demand. Specifically, when moving from the 25th percentile of the OPA
share to the 75th percentile, this leads to a 0.8% decline in the total public school
enrollment rate. Recall from Table 1.8 that if we assume the increase in private school
57In another paper (Theoharides, 2013), I exploit this policy change with a similar methodology
to investigate the effects of migration barriers on international migrant flows, domestic labor market
outcomes, and overall welfare.
58I show public school trends since this is where I find effects.
59Appendix Table A.7 checks that the enrollment rate is not decreasing at a faster rate in the
pre-period in higher OPA share provinces. The OPA share does not have a statistically significant
effect on the change in the enrollment rate in the pre period for either total or male public school
enrollment. While the effect is statistically significant for females, it is much smaller than the effect
found as a result of the policy.
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enrollment is due to switching from public to private, then there is also a similarly
sized increase in public school enrollment in response to increases in female migration
demand. OPA migrants tend to be from the poorest migrant-sending households in
the Philippines (Theoharides, 2014a). This suggests that they are more likely to be
initially constrained in their schooling choice and thus switch from no enrollment to
public school as opposed to from public to private. The responses to this seemingly
permanent decline in demand for female migrants are similar for male and female
enrollment. This corroborates that the income channel is the dominant mechanism
through which migration affects human capital in the Philippines.
1.8 Conclusion
As international migration continues to gain prominence as a labor market out-
come, understanding the impacts of migration on migrant-sending economies can have
important implications for development. One way in which migration can affect the
home economy is by altering the human capital stock. In this paper, I estimate the
effect of migration on secondary school enrollment in the Philippines. I conduct my
analysis at the province level in order to account for spillover effects from migration
on non-migrant households. To do this, I use two large administrative datasets to
create an original dataset of all new migrant departures from the Philippines linked to
the migrant’s province of origin and calculate province-level migration rates. Simply
estimating the effect of the province-level migration rate on secondary school enroll-
ment is likely to suffer from a number of biases and confound changes in migrant
demand with changes in migrant supply. To isolate exogenous changes in demand for
migrants, I create an instrument following Bartik (1991) that exploits variation gen-
erated by shocks to destination-specific migrant networks across local labor markets
in the Philippines. As a result of these networks, provinces will vary in the degree to
which they are affected by changes in demand for migrants from certain destination
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countries.
I conclude that an average sized increase in migration demand leads to an over-
all increase in high school enrollment of 2.1%. Effects are larger for private school:
in response to an average-sized increase in female migration demand, private school
enrollment increases by 10.1%. Effects on public school enrollment are small and
imprecise. Assuming most children who enroll in private school in response to in-
creased migration demand were previously enrolled in public school, this suggests
an equal number of children switch from no schooling to public school. While my
results are larger than previous estimates of the effect of migration on human cap-
ital in the Philippines, they underscore the importance of spillovers from migration
to non-migrant households. As policy makers in migrant-sending countries seek to
understand the human capital stock in the domestic economy, omitting non-migrant
households will lead to an underestimate of the true level.
The previous literature suggests that migration may affect investment in human
capital through two key channels: the income channel and the expected wage premium
channel. I empirically test predictions laid out in a basic theoretical framework in
order to examine the relative importance of these two channels. Specifically, I test the
response of male and female enrollment to changes in female migration demand. If
the effects on male and female enrollment are equal, this suggests the income channel
is dominant, whereas if the effects are different, the channel is ambiguous. I find that
while the effects on female enrollment are slightly larger, they are not statistically
distinguishable from the effects on male enrollment. Thus, I conclude that changes
in income due to the receipt of remittances is the dominant channel through which
migration affects education. For policymakers, this suggests that there are a large
number of students who would enter school if liquidity constraints were loosened.
I also examine heterogeneity in enrollment responses by grade level. While enroll-
ment increases for all grade levels, the largest response is on year one of secondary
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school enrollment. This indicates that there are a substantial number of marginal stu-
dents who never even enter high school due to the income and liquidity constraints
in their households. The effects on female first year enrollment in response to fe-
male migration demand are larger than the effects on male enrollment. Thus, while
the aggregate specifications and the natural experiment lead to the conclusion that
the income channel dominates, the effects on first year enrollment suggest that a
combination of the two channels may matter.
While it appears that the stock of human capital increases as a result of migration,
one concern is that these students may eventually migrate away from the Philippines,
leading to brain drain. Recall that for each new migrant, there are 2.8 additional
children enrolled in school. For all of these additional students to acquire work abroad,
demand for Filipino migrants would need to increase by unprecedented proportions.
This implies that migration causes a substantial increase in the stock of high school
educated labor in the Philippines. Such increases, however, have important policy
implications and highlight the vulnerability of education levels in the Philippines to
changes in migration demand. As a result, policymakers in the Philippines and other
migrant-sending countries may want to devote some portion of their limited resources
to provide a social safety net that helps smooth educational investment in times of
reduced migration demand.
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Figure 1.1: 1993 Migration Rates by Province
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Figure 1.2: 1993 Destination-Specific Migration Rates by Province
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Education
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Figure 1.4: Total Migrants in Highest Variance Destinations
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Figure 1.5: Parallel Trends Test Across High and Low Baseline Migration Provinces
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Figure 1.6: Natural Experiment: Parallel Trends Check
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Table 1.1: Top 10 Destination Countries
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Total % of Total % Female
1. Domestic Helpers 1,139,053 23.97 97.46
2. Performing Artists 696,504 14.66 95.14
3. Production 328,486 6.91 43.99
4. Caregivers 238,408 5.02 96.07
5. Laborers 237,064 4.99 11.88
6. Medical Workers 214,832 4.52 81.25
7. Plumbers 197,508 4.16 0.35
8. Engineers 191,816 4.04 3.48
9. Cooks and Waiters 163,382 3.44 53.24
10. Building Caretakers 140,199 2.95 72.15
11. Electrical Workers 137,306 2.89 19.97
12. Carpenters 131,314 2.76 0.41
13. Machine Fitters 92,946 1.96 2.69
14. Tailors and Sewers 87,185 1.83 83.16
15. Other Service Workers 80,832 1.70 54.61
16. Freight Handlers 74,995 1.58 3.62
17. Clerical Workers 63,516 1.34 51.32
18. Transport Equipment Operators 52,664 1.11 5.39
19. Production Supervisors 43,434 0.91 5.14
20. Machine-Tool Operators 39,609 0.83 5.87
4,751,936 60.66
Occupation
Total
Notes: The sample period is from 1992 to 2009. Occupations that are shaded 
light grey are over 50% female.
Source: POEA and author's calcuations.
Table 1.2: Top 20 Occupations for Overseas Contract Workers
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Mean SD Min Max 
Panel A. Actual Migration Rate (%)
Total Migration Rate 0.51 0.23 0.04 1.59
Female Migration Rate 0.28 0.17 0.03 1.29
Male Migration Rate 0.22 0.18 0.01 1.39
Panel B. Migration Demand Index (%)
Total Migration Rate 0.64 0.64 0.01 3.62
Female Migration Rate 0.41 0.39 0.02 2.68
Male Migration Rate 0.22 0.33 0.00 1.99
Panel C. School Enrollment Rates (%)
Total 57.21 10.39 13.47 96.66
Total Female 60.30 10.28 14.39 100.00
Total Male 54.28 10.76 12.50 93.32
Total Public 45.96 8.47 12.30 79.61
Female Public 48.58 8.70 12.30 78.29
Male Public 43.51 8.59 11.34 80.81
Total Private 11.25 6.57 0.00 47.95
Female Private 11.74 6.80 0.00 52.05
Male Private 10.77 6.38 0.00 47.99
Notes: The unit of observation is the province-year, and the sample period is from 2004 to 
2009. All values are expressed as percentages. The enrollment rates are calculated using the 
population aged 12 and 17 as the denominator.
Sources: Department of Education, POEA, OWWA, and author's calculations.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics
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Table 1.4: First Stage Analysis: Effect of Instruments on Migration Demand
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Effect on Total Enrollment 6.091 16.976*** 10.324*** 12.789***
(5.988) (5.826) (3.578) (3.354)
R2 0.912 0.947 0.927 0.920
Mean Dependent Variable 56.8 56.8 56.8 56.7
Panel B. Effect on Female Enrollment 10.579 16.492*** 10.995*** 13.192***
(7.546) (5.359) (3.528) (3.393)
R2 0.892 0.945 0.912 0.907
Mean Dependent Variable 60.0 60.0 60.0 59.9
Panel C. Effect on Male Enrollment -0.381 15.488*** 9.178** 11.739***
(4.713) (5.724) (3.585) (3.275)
R2 0.932 0.954 0.943 0.936
Mean Dependent Variable 53.8 53.8 53.8 53.6
N 502 502 502 496
F-Statistic 5.04 12.57 46.12 37.39
Province-Specific Linear Time Trends No Yes Yes Yes
Population Weights No No Yes Yes
Drop Largest Province No No No Yes
Mean Change in Demand 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Total Demand Index
Notes: The sample period is from 2005 to 2010 with 1993 used as the base year in the construction 
of the instrument. All regressions include province and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the province level are in parentheses. The unit of observation is the province-year. The 
mean change in migration demand is measured in percentage points and is the average annual 
province-level change in migration demand. The migration rate and the migration demand index 
are lagged by 1 year.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  ** indicates significance at the 
5% level * indicates significance at the 10% level.    
Sources: POEA, OWWA, DepEd, and author's calculations.
Table 1.5: Effect of Total Migration Demand on Total School Enrollment
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Effect on Total Public Enrollment 1.078 5.629* 0.723 1.637
(2.938) (3.167) (1.226) (1.110)
R2 0.970 0.991 0.984 0.981
Mean Dependent Variable 45.7 45.7 45.7 45.7
Panel B. Effect on Total Private Enrollment 5.013 11.347*** 9.600*** 11.152***
(4.962) (3.815) (3.160) (3.293)
R2 0.853 0.921 0.905 0.895
Mean Dependent Variable 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4
N 502 502 502 496
F-Statistic 5.04 12.57 46.12 37.39
Province-Specific Linear Time Trends No Yes Yes Yes
Population Weights No No Yes Yes
Drop Largest Province No No No Yes
Mean Change in Demand 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Sources: POEA, OWWA, DepEd, and author's calculations.
Total Demand Index
Notes: The sample period is from 2005 to 2010 with 1993 used as the base year in the construction of the 
instrument. All regressions include province and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the province level are in parentheses. The unit of observation is the province-year. The mean change in 
migration demand is measured in percentage points and is the average annual province-level change in 
migration demand. The migration rate and the migration demand index are lagged by 1 year. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level.  ** indicates significance at the 5% level * indicates significance at 
the 10% level.    
Table 1.6: Effect of Total Migration Demand on Public & Private Secondary School
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Effect on Total Enrollment 0.842 10.043** 5.452 7.726* 6.408
(4.768) (4.416) (3.644) (4.466) (3.945)
R2 0.919 0.954 0.931 0.926 0.931
Mean Dependent Variable 56.8 56.8 56.8 56.7 56.8
Panel B. Effect on Female Enrollment 2.277 10.699** 7.291** 9.180** 8.431**
(5.330) (4.236) (3.502) (4.371) (3.811)
R2 0.909 0.952 0.917 0.914 0.917
Mean Dependent Variable 60.0 60.0 60.0 59.9 60.0
Panel C. Effect on Male Enrollment -1.347 8.516* 3.458 6.029 4.235
(4.140) (4.378) (3.804) (4.536) (4.102)
R2 0.931 0.960 0.945 0.940 0.945
Mean Dependent Variable 53.8 53.8 53.8 53.6 53.8
N 502 502 502 496 502
F-Statistic 36.54 39.71 73.64 64.38 70.02
Province-Specific Linear Time Trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population Weights No No Yes Yes Yes
Drop Largest Province No No No Yes No
Control for Male Mig. Rate No No No No Yes
Mean Change in Demand 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Sources: POEA, OWWA, DepEd, and author's calculations.
Female Migration Demand Index
Notes: The sample period is from 2005 to 2010 with 1993 used as the base year in the construction 
of the instrument. All regressions include province and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the province level are in parentheses. The unit of observation is the province-year. The 
mean change in migration demand is measured in percentage points and is the average annual 
province-level change in migration demand. The migration rate and the migration demand index are 
lagged by 1 year.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level * indicates significance at the 10% level.    
Table 1.7: Effect of Female Migration on Total School Enrollment by Gender
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(1) (2)
Panel A. Total Public Enrollment 2.937* -0.378
(1.549) (1.240)
R2 0.989 0.981
Mean Dependent Variable 45.7 45.7
Panel B. Total Private Enrollment 7.106** 5.830*
(3.590) (3.194)
R2 0.928 0.911
Mean Dependent Variable 11.4 11.4
Panel C. Female Public Enrollment 2.907* 0.012
(1.501) (1.197)
R2 0.989 0.982
Mean Dependent Variable 48.5 48.5
Panel D. Male Public Enrollment 2.959* -0.762
(1.653) (1.370)
R2 0.989 0.982
Mean Dependent Variable 43.2 43.2
Panel E. Female Private Enrollment 7.792** 7.279**
(3.518) (3.147)
R2 0.929 0.906
Mean Dependent Variable 11.6 11.6
Panel F. Male Private Enrollment 5.557 4.219
(3.479) (3.244)
R2 0.929 0.916
Mean Dependent Variable 10.7 10.7
N 502 502
F-Statistic 44.56 71.28
Population Weights No Yes
Mean Change in Demand 0.05 0.05
Female Migration Demand Index
Notes: The sample period is from 2005 to 2010 with 1993 used as the base year in the construction 
of the instrument. All regressions include province and year fixed effects and province-specific 
linear time trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. The unit 
of observation is the province-year. The mean change in migration demand is measured in 
percentage points and is the average annual province-level change in migration demand. The 
migration rate and the migration demand index are lagged by 1 year. *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level.  ** indicates significance at the 5% level * indicates significance at the 10% level.    
Sources: POEA, OWWA, DepEd, and author's calculations.
Table 1.8: Effect of Female Migration on Public and Private School Enrollment
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Total Demand on Total Enrollment 24.569*** 10.654 9.990* 14.413**
(7.922) (6.852) (5.722) (5.858)
R2 0.911 0.904 0.919 0.927
Mean Dependent Variable 91.4 88.2 80.1 72.4
N 502 502 502 502
F-Statistic 46.12 46.12 46.12 46.12
Mean Change in Demand 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Panel B. Female Demand on Total Enrollment 8.339 10.906* 8.173 4.356
(5.655) (6.193) (6.523) (6.475)
R2 0.919 0.905 0.921 0.930
Mean Dependent Variable 91.8 88.2 80.1 72.4
Panel C. Female Demand on Female Enrollment 12.479** 14.311** 10.312 5.606
(5.035) (6.215) (6.848) (7.104)
R2 0.899 0.877 0.901 0.916
Mean Dependent Variable 100.0 94.3 81.0 78.6
Panel D. Female Demand on Male Enrollment 3.230 7.075 5.980 3.207
(6.548) (6.592) (6.311) (5.984)
R2 0.937 0.926 0.936 0.941
Mean Dependent Variable 97.4 86.2 75.5 64.9
N 502 502 502 502
F-Statistic 73.64 73.64 73.64 73.64
Mean Change in Demand 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Sources: POEA, OWWA, DepEd, and author's calculations.
Notes: The sample period is from 2005 to 2010 with 1993 used as the base year in the construction of the instrument. All 
regressions are population weighted and include province and year fixed effects and province-specific linear time trends. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. The unit of observation is the province-year. The mean change in 
migration demand is measured in percentage points and is the average annual province-level change in migration demand. Grade 
level enrollment rates are calculated by dividing the total number enrolled in a given grade by 1/7th of the age 12-17 population. 
Rates are higher than total secondary enrollment rates because while on time enrollment would suggest that 12 year olds are 
enrolled in year 1, a number of individuals older or younger than 12 are also included. As a result, rates may be greater than 100. 
See Maligalig et al., (2010) for a more detailed description of enrollment rate calculations in the Philippines.  *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level.  ** indicates significance at the 5% level * indicates significance at the 10% level.    
Table 1.9: Effect of Migration Demand on School Enrollment, by Grade Level
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Table 1.10: Effect of OPA Ban on Enrollment Rate
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CHAPTER II
Distortions in the International Migrant Labor
Market: Evidence from Filipino Migration and
Wage Responses to Destination Country Economic
Shocks
2.1 Introduction
The global market for labor has some of the largest distortions of any factor
market (Clemens, 2011). The same worker can earn very different wages depending
on in which country they work (Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett, 2008; McKenzie,
Gibson and Stillman, 2013). As a result, moving from a poor country to a rich country
to work is perhaps the single act most likely to succeed in dramatically increasing
an individuals income, as well as that of remaining family members (Cox-Edwards
and Ureta, 2003; Yang, 2008; Gibson, McKenzie and Stillman, 2012). In recognition
of this fact, a number of developing countries have put in place policy measures to
help their citizens work abroad. The government of the Philippines has been on the
forefront of promoting overseas temporary contract work and making emigration part
of its national development strategy, and many other developing countries are now
seeking to emulate the Philippines in this regard.
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However, the recent global financial crisis has highlighted the potential vulnera-
bility of migrant jobs to economic conditions in destination countries. Emigration to
Ireland from the new European Union states fell 60 percent from 2008 to 2009, while
overall European Union flows to Spain fell by two-thirds. Inflows to the United States
fell in almost all legal temporary work categories, including a 50 percent decline in
visas issued to low-skilled seasonal workers (Papademetriou, Sumption and Terrazas,
2010). Net migrant outflow from Mexico to the U.S. was only 0.09 percent of the Mex-
ican population in 2010-11, compared to 0.53 percent in 2006-7 (Rodriguez, 2011).
Moreover, despite these responses at the extensive margin (the number of migrants),
immigrant employment rates among those who do migrate or remain abroad are more
sensitive to the business cycle than the employment rates of natives (Orrenius and
Zavodny, 2009). A key contribution of this paper is to show that the high vulnerabil-
ity of migrant jobs to economic shocks is intimately tied to the large gains in wages
that migration offers. The extent to which migration flows respond to shocks at des-
tination depends on the output elasticity of demand for migrant labor and on the
extent to which wage adjustment can occur through movements along the migrant
labor supply curve. However, estimating this responsiveness in the context of bilat-
eral migration flows is complicated by concerns that economic shocks also affect the
migrant origin country, thereby also shifting the labor supply curve and preventing
identification of the labor demand impact. In addition, reliable microeconomic data
on migrant flows and the wages these migrants earn are extremely rare. We overcome
both issues by using a unique database which has information on all new work con-
tracts issued to Filipino workers over the 1992 to 2009 period, including information
on the destination country and contracted wage.
The Philippines provides an excellent setting to examine how migration responds
to shocks at destination. It was the first country to implement temporary overseas
contract work on a wide scale, and Filipinos now migrate in large numbers to a
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very diverse set of countries, which have experienced substantial heterogeneity in
macroeconomic conditions over the period of our data. In 2007, 1.7 million Filipinos
were working outside of the Philippines in 181 countries, with overseas contract work
the primary channel of emigration.
Using these data, we estimate how the number of contract workers and the wages
they are paid respond to economic shocks in destination countries. We find a strong
and significant positive relationship between migrant numbers and GDP fluctuations
at destination, with the point estimate suggesting migrant quantities respond more
than one-for-one to proportional GDP changes. In contrast, we find that the wages mi-
grants are paid has no large or statistically significant relationship with GDP changes
at destination. This pattern is consistent with the existence of binding minimum
wages that lead to migrant labor supply exceeding labor demand at the contracted
wages. This occurs for both low- and high-skilled workers, suggesting the distor-
tion comes not just from national minimum wages in destination countries, but also
from restrictions on the wages that migrants of higher skill levels can be paid. For
example, the United States H1B program that many IT professionals and foreign pro-
fessors use to work in the United States requires that employers pay the “prevailing
wage” obtained from a salary survey, as do a number of other immigration categories
in the U.S.; Australia requires employers to pay their overseas workers the market
salary rate and on top of this, specifies a threshold (currently A$49,330) that skilled
migrants must make;1 and the Philippines bilateral labor contracts require workers
to be paid the prevailing wage for their positions in the destination countries. As a
result, the same market imperfection that is one reason that workers can so dramati-
cally increase their incomes by working abroad shifts all the burden of adjustment to
demand shocks onto quantities rather than wages.
As supporting evidence that minimum wages bind and to help rule out alterna-
1See http://www.immi.gov.au/skilled/temporary-skilled-migration-threshold.htm (Australian
Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2010).
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tive explanations, we also consider the impact of a 2006 law change that raised the
mandated minimum wage for overseas Filipinos working as domestic helpers (maids).
We use difference-in-difference analysis to show that this change led to a decline in
the number of Filipinos going as domestic helpers to low wage destinations, relative
to those going as domestic helpers in higher wage countries and to those going to low
wage destinations in other worker categories. In addition, we show that this increase
in the minimum wage for domestic helpers lead to increases in contracted wages for
such workers. This evidence from the single largest occupational category supports
the claim that minimum wages bind, and helps rule out concerns that workers and
employers might be able to circumvent any regulations by writing a contract for one
wage and in practice working for a different wage. The result of such a minimum wage
increase is to increase even further the gap between supply and demand for migrant
labor, thereby ensuring migrant numbers will remain vulnerable to economic shocks
at destination.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the
institutional setting and labor market for Filipino overseas workers, and its impli-
cations for modeling labor adjustment to GDP shocks at destination. Section 2.3
describes our new database. Section 2.4 provides the main results, highlighting the
response of migrant numbers and wages to GDP shocks, and examining heterogene-
ity in these responses. Section 2.5 carries out difference-in-difference analysis of a
change in the minimum wage for domestic helpers to bolster our case for a binding
minimum wage, by showing that quantities fall and wages rise when this minimum
wage is increased. Section 2.6 concludes and discusses implications for migration as
a development strategy.
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2.2 Institutional Setting and Labor Market for Filipino Over-
seas Foreign Workers
2.2.1 Institutional Setting
As the first country to implement temporary overseas contract work on a wide
scale, the Philippines provides a particularly relevant setting for testing the sensitivity
of migration to global economic shocks. In 1974, the Philippine government began
the Overseas Employment Program to aid Filipinos in finding work overseas due to
poor economic conditions in the Philippines. Since the programs inception, Filipino
migration has increased dramatically, and Filipinos now migrate in large numbers to
an extraordinarily diverse range of destination countries. The top ten destinations
account for approximately 86 percent of all new overseas Filipino worker (OFW)
hires (see Table 2.1). Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Kuwait, in the
Middle East, and Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore in East Asia are the most
common destinations, but Italy, the U.K., Canada and the U.S. are also among the top
fifteen destinations. By comparison, 98 percent of Mexican migrants are in the United
States (World Bank, 2011b). Migration from the Philippines is largely temporary and
legal, and occurs through licensed private recruitment agencies. Overseas temporary
contract work is the primary channel through which Filipinos migrate, and in order
to be cleared to leave the Philippines, an OFW must have a job contract in hand.
Between 1992 and 2000, 83 percent of Filipinos abroad were engaged in contract
work,2 with most of the rest being non-temporary workers migrating through family
reunification policies or other permanent migration channels. This form of legal
temporary work is likely to become more common in future years as countries like
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and India seek to follow the Philippine
model, and destination countries consider how to balance demands for labor with
2Authors calculation from the Survey of Overseas Filipinos (SOF), an offshoot of the Labor Force
Survey in the Philippines.
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public concerns about migrant settlement.
2.2.2 Large Potential Supply
Data from the 2010 Gallup World Poll suggest that there are many individuals
in the Philippines who would like to work abroad but who are not currently doing
so. This poll asked a representative sample of 1000 adults in the Philippines the
question “Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to go to another country
for temporary work, or not?” Overall, 51.1 percent of adults aged 15 and over said
they would like to work abroad in temporary work (and 18.6 percent said they would
like to migrate permanently abroad). Desire to migrate temporarily abroad is highest
for individuals in the 15-34 age range, for individuals in urban areas, and for more
educated individuals. The voting age population (18+) in the Philippines is approxi-
mately 52 million, so taking 51 percent of this gives approximately 26 million people
who say they would like to migrate temporarily. This is ten times the magnitude of
the 2.0 million who actually did work abroad as overseas foreign workers in 2010.3
Even allowing for the likelihood that many more people express an interest in migrat-
ing abroad than would actually migrate if given the opportunity, these numbers still
suggest large interest in migration.
Our qualitative interviews with employment agencies in the Philippines also sup-
port the notion of excess supply; it is common to hear reports that the market for over-
seas contract labor “is a buyers market.” In particular, they note that the emergence
of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan as competing labor-sending
countries has made it more difficult for them to find jobs for Filipinos.
3See http://www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2011/of10tx.html (National Statistics Office,
2011).
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2.2.3 Wage Setting and Minimum Wages
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) regulates the re-
cruitment and employment of Filipinos for work abroad. Their rules and regulations
dictate that there be “guaranteed wages for regular work hours and overtime pay,
which shall not be lower than the prescribed minimum wage in the host country
or not lower than the appropriate minimum wage standards set forth in a bilateral
agreement or international convention, if applicable, or not lower than the minimum
wage in the country [the Philippines], whichever is highest.”4 This rule effectively
sets a minimum wage for legal overseas work, since the Philippines Government will
not process work contracts which have wages set at a level below that set out in this
law. Such minimum wage setting for overseas migration is a direct result of the 1974
Philippine Labor Code and was instated for the primary purpose of ensuring that
overseas workers are not exploited or discriminated against (Philippine Labor Code,
1974).5
In practice only some of the host countries for Filipino workers have their own
minimum wages that apply to foreign labor. Thus, for example, Filipino workers in
the United States, Canada and Korea are covered by minimum wage laws in those
countries, whereas other destinations like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Malaysia do not have minimum wage laws. Yet, as will
be discussed below, although they do not have minimum wage laws, the immigration
laws of most of these countries require migrants to be paid wages no less than those
offered to nationals, effectively imposing a minimum wage for migrants. Furthermore,
for a number of destination countries, the Philippine Government negotiates bilateral
agreements, which in some cases set additional minimum wage requirements.
4See http://www.poea.gov.ph/rules/POEA%20Rules.pdf [accessed July 19, 2011] (Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, 2002).
5OFWs are often quite vulnerable. For instance, in 2011, welfare assistance, such as psychological
counseling, legal assistance, and conciliation, was provided to 268,026 overseas workers (Overseas
Worker Welfare Administration, 2011).
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As stipulated in POEAs Rules and Regulations, prior to deployment of an OFW,
work contracts must be verified by the Philippine Overseas Labor Offices (POLOs)
to ensure that the contract conforms both with the minimum standards set forth
by POEA and the labor laws and legislation of the host country. For each occu-
pation, POLOs determine the prevailing market wages in the host country and will
not approve contracts that set wages below these levels.6 Thus even more skilled
occupations, whose incomes are above the Philippine minimum wage and above the
overseas minimum wage for low-skilled occupations, still have limits on how low their
contracted wages can be. In addition to these steps, in 2006 the Philippine govern-
ment enacted the Household Service Workers Reform, which set a universal minimum
of US$400 for overseas work in the domestic service sector. We examine the impact
of this reform in Section 2.5 below.
A natural question is then whether these minimum wages set by the Philippines
are enforced. It appears that for the most part they are. Since the establishment of
the POEA in 1982, there has been some system for employees to file complaints if
contracted wages are not received. This system of complaints was formally written
into law with the passage of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
(RA 8042) by the Congress of the Philippines. It was amended in 2010 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 amended , RA 10022) and maintains
regulations for enforcement of wages.
In the event that an OFW does not receive his or her contracted wages, he or
she can file a complaint against the employer and the recruiting agency. The POLO
initially tries to settle the dispute directly between the employer and worker. If this
is unsuccessful, there is a dispute settlement in the labor courts of the host country.
Should this procedure fail, POEA tries to resolve the dispute with the recruiting
6To determine prevailing market rates, POLO officers use available information from both the
government and private sector in the host country as a reference. They also refer to rates previously
approved by POEA for the destination country and occupation (Casco, 2013).
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agency through internal conciliation services. As a last resort, the worker can file
a claim against the recruiting agency in the Philippine labor courts. In addition to
monetary punishment including the payment of contracted wages as well as fines,
recruitment agencies with labor contracts found to be in violation may face other
sanctions such as having their operating licenses suspended or cancelled.
OFWs are widely aware of the procedures surrounding contract disputes. As part
of their mandatory Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar (PDOS), OFWs receive infor-
mation about their rights and responsibilities within their employment contract and
what to do in the case of contract violations. In addition to a large Legal Assistance
Fund for migrant workers, the president of the Philippines appoints a Legal Assistant
for Migrant Workers to assist with these contract violations. Additionally, Philippine
embassies and POLOs in common destination countries have 24-hour resource centers
providing legal services.
2.2.4 Quotas, wages, and migration policies around the world
Although there is no global database of migration policies which details which
countries impose migration quotas or minimum wage restrictions on migrants, there
have been a couple of attempts by international organizations to examine these issues.
A review by the OECD (2006) found that “migration quotas per se tend to be the
exception in OECD countries” (p. 113) but that in contrast “in many OECD coun-
tries, work permits for potential cross-border recruits are subject to an employment
test” (p. 114). For example, Japan, Canada, Australia, Greece, Belgium, Finland,
and France were some of the OECD countries with no quotas during the period of our
study, relying on labor market tests and/or points systems. These employment tests
typically require employers to show that there is no qualified candidate available to
fill the job, and can require advertising the job first to natives at the prevailing wage.
A more systematic and comprehensive effort occurred via an ILO (2004) survey
70
which surveyed migration policies at that time, getting replies from 93 member states.
While one-third of countries replied that they had specific quotas for migrant workers
admitted for certain reasons, these were almost always partial in nature, applying
only to certain sectors or types of firms, such as quotas for seasonal workers or, in
some countries, restrictions at an enterprise level on a maximum ratio of foreign
to local workers. The only country in our sample that had a national level quota is
Switzerland, which has quotas on the number of non-EU nationals entering. Moreover,
quotas were not always binding. For example, the United States has no quotas, only
a labor market test, for seasonal agricultural workers coming under the H2A policy;
has a quota of 66,000 seasonal non-agricultural workers coming in under the H2B
policy which has not been met in many years; and a quota for high-skilled temporary
workers coming under the H1B policy which was not filled between its establishment
in 1990 and 1997, or between 1999 and 2002, but has been filled since then (OECD,
1998; NFAP, 2010).
In contrast, the vast majority of countries use a labor market test requiring em-
ployers to show that there is a lack of qualified applicants and/or requiring that
migrant workers be offered a wage no less than the prevailing wage offered to nation-
als in that occupation. In the ILO survey, 84 percent of countries reported such a
requirement, and the only countries in our studys sample that didnt report having
that requirement were Saudi Arabia and Singapore. However, Singapore does charge
employers of low and medium-skilled workers a monthly levy for each foreign worker
employed, with this levy ranging from US$123 to US$362 per month (Yeoh and Lin,
2012), which acts to increase the effective wage paid by employers of foreign workers.
These labor market tests and requirements that migrant workers be offered a wage
no less than that of nationals often occur alongside any partial quotas countries may
have, and can be a reason quotas do not bind.
As a result of these policies, there is effectively a minimum wage that needs to
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be paid to be able to bring a migrant worker into most countries, with the labor
market test requirement meaning this minimum wage varies with occupation and
skill level. Thus when we refer to minimum wages, we are referring to a more general
phenomenon than is typically considered in the labor literature, which focuses on a
single minimum wage that is the least every worker must be paid. In the Philippines
migration context, minimum wages can vary by destination country, skill level, and
occupation.
2.2.5 Model of the Labor Market and Response to GDP Shocks Abroad
Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett (2008) estimate that a low-skilled Filipino
worker would earn 3.5 to 3.8 times as much working in the U.S. as they do in the
Philippines, even after accounting for differences in costs of living. However, the wages
Filipino workers are paid for the same occupation differ a great deal across destination
countries. For example, in 2005, domestic helpers earned a median monthly wage
of $1,527 in Australia versus $200 in Malaysia. Similarly, production workers in
the United Kingdom in 2005 earned $1,742 per month, whereas in the United Arab
Emirates, the corresponding figure was only $275. A model of the migrant labor
market should explain why (a) there is variation across destinations in the wages
migrants earn; and (b) more people dont migrate despite the much higher wages to
be earned abroad. We consider three potential models of the labor market that might
explain these facts, and consider the implications of each for the response to a GDP
shock in the destination country. Market clearing model
The most basic model is one in which the labor market clears in each destination
country, and the higher wages earned abroad are just enough to offset workers disu-
tility of leaving their home country and spending time away from family, with this
disutility varying across destination countries. In such a model, a positive output
shock in the destination country will shift out the labor demand curve, leading to an
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increase in wages and an increase in the quantity of migrants. However, this model is
not realistic for several reasons. First, it does not accord with the evidence for excess
supply of migrants and institutional rules on wages detailed above. Second, it would
require that migrants experience much less disutility going to Saudi Arabia (which
has relatively low wages) than Canada (which has relatively high wages), which does
not accord with the preferences migrants give when asked about destinations. This is
particularly the case for destinations in the Middle East, in which mostly Christian
Filipino workers often experience difficulties in practicing their religion. The same
critique would apply for explanations based on a flat (perfectly elastic) labor supply
curve: it would require migrants to prefer low-wage destinations in the Middle East
to Canada, Europe, and the U.S., requiring an offsetting higher wage premium to
overcome the disutility of going to these locations.
A more likely model therefore includes distortions which prevent the migrant labor
market from clearing, and which lead to wages above the level which would equate
supply and demand for migrant labor. The two most probable sources of distortions
are minimum wage requirements and quotas. We discuss each in turn.
Binding minimum wages
The discussion above of how wages are set through bilateral agreements and desti-
nation country laws suggests that an appropriate model of the international migration,
for a particular overseas labor market, could be that set out in Figure 2.1. There is a
binding minimum wage, Wm, and the willing supply of Filipino workers at this wage
greatly exceeds market demand. Market demand is given by the market demand
curve, LD(GDP1, X), where demand depends on the level of GDP in the destina-
tion country economy, and on characteristics, X, of the occupation and destination
country. The result is then that the number of individuals who get to migrate, M1,
is purely determined by labor demand. Variation in wages across destinations then
arises from variation in these minimum wages.
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Consider then the impact of a positive shock to GDP in the destination country,
which increases GDP from GDP1 to GDP2. If the minimum wage still continues to
bind, all adjustment will be through migration quantities the number of migrants
will increase to M2, while wages will remain at the minimum wage, Wm. This leads
to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 : If binding minimum wages are the main distortion, international
migration flows will be positively correlated with changes in GDP in destination
countries, while wages will not be.
This analysis assumes that the minimum wage itself does not change with the
business cycle. This seems a plausible assumption in the case where wage contracts
are negotiated for several years or where the Philippines itself has set the minimum
wage. However, if minimum wages (or the minimum allowed in work contracts)
are determined with reference to prevailing market wages, the minimum wage may
increase at the same time as labor demand, thereby increasing wages and reducing the
extent to which the increase in labor demand increases employment. This seems more
likely in skilled occupations, suggesting we may see heterogeneity in the response to
GDP shocks by skill.
Dube, Naidu and Reich (2010) note that this prediction that a rise in minimum
wages will reduce employment need not hold in the standard competitive labor model
if product demand is not price elastic and input substitution possibilities are not
present. Adjustment then occurs through goods prices. In our setting it seems likely
that on average products being produced by migrants have some price elasticity, and,
furthermore, that employers have some scope for substituting Filipino workers for
other inputs (including workers from other migrant nations, a topic we return to in
Section 2.5), so that higher minimum wages would lower migrant employment.
However, a rise in minimum wages need not reduce employment under some non-
competitive labor market models. For example, under dynamic monopsony models,
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labor market frictions from matching and hiring workers result in an equilibrium
with positive unemployment and positive quit rates (Manning, 2004). A rise in the
minimum wage can then result in reductions in quitting and/or vacancy rates, which
can potentially increase net employment while reducing the flow into and out of
employment. The standard contract length terms of Filipino workers may make this
model less relevant in our setting, but to check this we will examine how contract
duration and rehires of migrants change.
Binding Migration Quotas
An alternative form of distortions could arise from binding migration quotas.
A binding quota restricts labor demand to a maximum of the quota amount MQ,
leading to a wage W1 above the market clearing level (Figure 2.2). Countries with
more binding quotas will then pay higher wages. In such a model, the prediction is an
increase in output in the destination country will cause firms to compete harder for
the same number of quota spaces, leading to an increase in wages, and no adjustment
in the quantity of migrants.
Of course the quota itself might be endogenous to economic conditions at des-
tination, with quotas increasing during economic expansions and being reduced in
recessions. This would lead to some procyclicality in both quantities and wages, since
it seems unlikely that quotas would be adjusted frequently and finely enough to keep
wages fixed.
Whilst plausible in some contexts, we believe it unlikely that binding quotas is
the main distortion in the global market for Filipino migrant labor given the evidence
discussed above which shows that the majority of countries do not have quotas, and
those that do typically only have them for some categories of migrants. Nevertheless,
it remains an empirical question as to whether wages or quantities see the majority
of the adjustment to GDP shocks, shedding light on which distortion is more likely
to be underlying the high wage gains to be had through migration. Since the above
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theory suggests responses are likely to vary with migration policy, we will also examine
heterogeneity in responses to whether or not destination countries use some form of
a migration quota. Matching models
In matching models of the labor market (e.g., the canonical Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994) model), equilibrium unemployment can occur without minimum wage
laws or quotas. It is common for theoretical macroeconomic models to assume some
form of wage rigidity (Hall, 2005; Shimer, 2005), so as to replicate the empirical vari-
ability in unemployment. But the empirical evidence (in particular Solon, Barsky
and Parker (1994) and Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012)) actually reveals substan-
tial wage responses to macro fluctuations,7 and in particular this is true for hiring
(starting) wages. Taking the observed business-cycle procyclicality of hiring wages as
a departure point, the model of Pissarides (2009) matches the empirical variability
in unemployment by modifying the specification of matching costs, while allowing
flexibility in hiring wages. Such a model predicts, in accord with the empirical facts,
procyclicality in both new hires and hiring wages. This prediction will be directly
tested in our empirical analysis, which will examine new hires and hiring wages in
the international migrant labor market.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 POEA Micro Data
The data are from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administrations (POEA)
database of departing OFWs. Created in 1982, POEA is a Philippine government
agency within the Department of Labor and Employment. POEA has a multifaceted
agenda: it monitors recruitment agencies, monitors worker protection, and conducts
a variety of other tasks relating to the oversight of the overseas worker program.
7See also Bils (1985); Shin (1994); Devereux and Hart (2006); Martins (2007); Carneiro,
Guimaraes and Portugal (2012).
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Further, as a final step prior to departure, all OFWs are required to receive POEA
clearance. Since all OFWs are required to pass through POEA, the agency has a rich
dataset composed of all migrant departures from the Philippines. This is the first
paper to utilize this rich data resource.
Since all OFWs must pass through POEA, the dataset contains data on depar-
tures for all land-based new hires leaving the Philippines between 1992 and 2009 for
temporary contract work. New hires are defined as OFWs who are starting a contract
with a new employer. These migrants may have previously worked overseas, but the
contract that they are presently departing on is new, rather than renewed. For each
OFW departure from the Philippines, the database includes name, birthdate, gender,
civil status, destination, employer, recruitment agency, contract duration, occupa-
tion, date deployed, and salary. Typical contracts are of one or two year durations,
with an average duration of 17.7 months over our sample period. Female workers
account for 60.6 percent of new hires during this period. The most common occupa-
tions are in production (e.g., laborers, plumbers), services (domestic helpers, cooks)
and professional occupations (nurses, engineers, entertainers).
To study the flows of migrants in response to fluctuations in GDP, individual
migration records are grouped by year and destination country and combined to
create a count of the number of migrants to each destination country annually between
1992 and 2009. Table 2.1 displays the top twenty OFW destinations averaged over
the sample period, along with their average annual flow. Saudi Arabia is the most
common destination, accounting for 33% of new hires. It also shows the average
monthly wage in US dollars by destination, showing wide differences in the wages
Filipinos earn in different locations. Since the micro data contain a few outliers on
wages, we trim at the 1st and 99th percentiles before taking means.
Since the micro data from POEA does not include skill levels, we calculate aver-
age education levels by occupation using the 1992-2003 Survey of Overseas Filipinos
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(SOF),8 and assign each occupation the average education level. We use this to then
construct skill quartiles of aggregated occupational cells in our data. The average
years of education for occupations in the first quartile is 11.6 years, 12.8 years for the
second quartile, 13.8 years for the third quartile, and 15.1 years of education for the
fourth quartile. One sees notable differences in the wages that a worker of a given
skill level can earn across destination countries. For instance, OFWs in the first skill
quartile in Saudi Arabia receive an average wage of $336 per month, whereas OFWs
of the same skill level in Japan earn an average monthly wage of $1,505. This large
variation across destination countries holds for the more skilled quartiles as well. The
highest skilled workers in Saudi Arabia earn $553 per month, whereas in Japan these
OFWs earn $1,661 on average each month.
2.3.2 Macro Data
Data on annual real GDP (constant 2000 US$) over the sample period were ob-
tained from the World Development Indicators database and the World Factbook
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2008-2009). These data are then matched to the POEA
data based on destination country and year of departure. Over the sample period,
destination countries in our sample experience vastly different rates of GDP growth
as well as varied fluctuations in growth. For instance, during the Asian Financial Cri-
sis, Asian countries such as Japan or South Korea faced dramatic reductions in GDP
growth, whereas Middle Eastern destinations such as Bahrain or Kuwait maintained
fairly stable growth. Online appendix Figure 1 plots real GDP growth in the top 10
destinations for OFWs. In addition to the differences in growth rates in 1997 during
the Asian Financial Crisis, another period of high volatility was during the Global
Financial Crisis, which by 2009 had affected some destinations more than others.
8The Philippine Labor Force Survey is administered annually to a nationally-representative sam-
ple of households. The SOF is administered as a rider to the LFS if the household reports having any
members working overseas, and contains information on migrant demographics, overseas occupation
and location, and remittances (all reported by the household remaining behind in the Philippines).
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2.3.3 Sample Restrictions
The sample is restricted to include only countries with a positive number of OFWs
in every year and to countries with GDP data available in each year, in order to create
a balanced panel. These sample restrictions result in 54 destinations included in the
analysis. Online appendix Table 1 presents a list of all included destination countries.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Aggregate Impacts
In order to measure the impact of fluctuations in GDP at destination on the
flows of Filipino migrants and the wages paid, we estimate the following equation for
destinations j=1, 2, . . . , 54 and time periods t=1992, . . . , 2009:
log(Mjt) = β0 + β1log(GDPjt) + αj + γt + jt (2.1)
where Mjt is the number of Filipino migrants leaving on new contracts to country
j in year t; GDPjt is the level of real GDP in country j in year t; αj are destination
country fixed effects; γt are time period fixed effects; and jt is the error term for
country j in year t. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the destination
country. Mjt is replaced with mean or median wages in order to test the response of
wages earned by these migrants to GDP. We estimate equation (1) for all migrants,
and then separately by gender.
Time fixed effects control for any aggregate changes occurring in the world econ-
omy, as well as for any Philippines-specific changes that are affecting the overall
supply of migrants.9 Country fixed effects remove time-invariant effects in destina-
9Note this also controls for any overall devaluation or appreciation in the Philippines exchange
rate as well.
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tion countries, such as their overall policies towards migrant labor. The resulting
identifying variation then comes from differences across destination countries in how
GDP fluctuates over time. Since Filipino labor supply is small relative to the total
labor forces of destination countries and we are looking at new contract labor move-
ments, it seems reasonable to assume there is no reverse causation whereby changes in
Filipino migrant numbers are driving GDP changes at destination. Online appendix
Figures 2 and 3 provide scatterplots of the underlying data.
We use these data to estimate equation (1), which differs from the scatterplots
in also including year fixed effects in the regression. The results are shown in Table
2.2. Column 1, Panel A shows the impact of GDP in a destination country on
the total quantity of migrants going to that destination. For Filipino migrants as
a whole this coefficient is 1.5 and significant at the 1 percent level. This elasticity
suggests that if a destination country has 1 percent higher growth in output than
other destination countries, 1.5 percent more Filipinos migrate on new contracts to
this destination than migrate to other destinations. We can also not reject unit
elasticity, whereby migrant numbers increase proportionately with GDP. Panels B
and C then examine this elasticity separately by gender. The point estimates suggest
slightly higher elasticity of migrant flows for females than males, but we cannot reject
equality of the two.
By way of comparison, Kapsos (2005) estimates the aggregate national employ-
ment elasticities of growth in different regions around the world. He finds globally
employment has an elasticity of between 0.3 and 0.4 with GDP, but is higher in ser-
vices (0.6), and in the Middle East (1.1), with the elasticity for women in the Middle
East being 2.2. Since migrant labor is likely to be easier for firms to adjust than
native labor, it seems reasonable that our estimates are more on average higher than
those of natives, and more similar to the Middle East estimates (where much of the
labor force is foreign workers). In contrast, columns 3 and 5 of Table 2.2 show no sig-
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nificant response of migrant wages at destination to changes in GDP at destination.
The coefficients are all close to zero, and in five out of six cases, slightly negative.
Taken together, our results suggest all adjustment to GDP shocks occurs through
quantities and not wages, which is consistent with hypothesis 1 and the binding
minimum wages model. This pattern is not consistent with the aggregate volatility
of employment and hiring wages in developed countries, because both employment
and hiring wages are procyclical to a similar degree. Therefore matching models of
the macroeconomy that incorporate such procyclicality (e.g., Pissarides 2009) cannot
account for the patterns in our data.
The results above show a strong elasticity of migrant numbers to GDP, with no
responsiveness of migrant wages. In columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 2.2, we check
whether our results are being driven by the occupational mix of workers changing
with the business cycle at destination. To do this, we control for the share of Filipino
migrants that are in each of the 10 most common occupations plus the residual share
for each country-year. We see that the point estimates and their significance are very
similar to the baseline results, so that we still obtain the same results even holding
occupation fixed.
We consider several additional checks on the robustness of these results, which
are reported in detail in the online appendix. In particular, we show that quantity
elasticities look similar if we use total hires or rehires instead of just new contracts;
that contract length does not vary with GDP at destination; that the results are
robust to using up to 5 lags of log GDP; that impacts are not different in recessions;
and that the results are robust to a number of alternative criteria for which countries
we include in the regressions. In addition, we show in US Census data that Filipino
workers in the US typically earn at least as much as native-born workers in the top
Filipino migrant occupations, consistent with our claim that migrants face binding
minimum wages in destination labor markets.
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2.4.2 Heterogeneity of Impacts by Skill Level
Legally specified minimum wages in destination countries provide a reason why the
market for legal low-skilled migrant labor does not clear, and for the large wage gains
for low-skilled migrants documented in Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett (2008).
However, the absolute income gains from emigration are even larger for high-skilled
workers, with Gibson and McKenzie (2011) showing that very high-skilled workers
from four developing countries increased their annual incomes by US$40,000-75,000
by emigrating. Together with the institutional practices of restricting high-skilled
immigrants to earn the prevailing wage, this suggests that the labor market for high-
skilled workers also faces binding minimum wages, and that we may therefore also
see most of the adjustment to output shocks at destination occurring via quantities
rather than wages even for high-skilled workers.
We investigate this in Table 2.3, which estimates equation (1) separately by skill
quartile. The lowest skill quartile includes occupations like construction work, farm-
ing, and welding; the second includes occupations like domestic helpers (maids), shop
assistants, and cooks; the third occupations like supervisors, caregivers, and electri-
cians; and the highest skill quartile includes occupations like engineers, teachers and
accountants. Panel A shows that the quantity of all four skill groups has a positive
relationship with GDP, with no monotonic relationship in the point estimates across
skill levels, and we cannot reject equality of impacts across the four skill groups.
Low, medium, and high skilled workers therefore all seem to experience a reduction
in migrant numbers when GDP falls and increase when it rises.
Panels B and C of Table 2.3 examine the responsiveness of median and mean
wages respectively to GDP by skill quartile. Again we cannot reject equality of
coefficients across the four skill categories at conventional skill levels and find point
estimates which are mostly small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. An
exception is the second quartile, in which we see a significant negative coefficient on
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median wages of -0.31, and a similar-sized, but statistically insignificant coefficient on
mean wages. This suggests wages for individuals in this skill range may actually fall
when economic conditions at destination improve, although if we control for multiple
hypothesis testing by multiplying the p-values by the number of separate outcome-
group results being tested here for wages, then this result also would not be significant.
2.4.3 Does who migrates change over the business cycle?
An alternative explanation for our results could be that the selection of who
migrates is changing over the business cycle. In particular, in a market-clearing
model with wages falling in a recession, we could observe in our data a reduction in
the quantity of individuals migrating with no change in mean wage paid to migrants if
low-skilled, lesser-paid, individuals experience more of a reduction in migrant numbers
than higher skilled individuals do during recessions. Indeed Solon, Barsky and Parker
(1994) show that such a change in composition leads aggregate wages in the U.S. to
be less procyclical than indicated by longitudinal microdata.
We have shown above that our results are robust to controlling for occupational
categories, and that we cannot reject that the elasticity of migrant quantities to
GDP changes at destination is constant across skill quantiles. Nevertheless, as a
further check, we use the Survey of Overseas Filipinos to directly examine whether
the observable characteristics of who is migrating varies over the destination business
cycle.
The Survey of Overseas Filipinos is an annual survey which asks a nationally-
representative sample of households in the Philippines about members of the house-
hold who left for overseas in the past five years (see Yang (2008)). Since it is remaining
members of the household who are reporting on the absent migrants, only basic de-
tails of the characteristics of these migrants are available. However, it is the most
comprehensive source available on the characteristics of new Filipino migrants, and
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importantly, does contain information on the destination country and whether this is
the first time an individual is migrating or not for contract work. We use data from
the 1992-2003 surveys.
In Table 2.4 we use this data to test whether the age, sex, marital status, place
of origin in the Philippines, and education of new migrants going to a particular
destination varies with GDP shocks at destination. To do this, we estimate equation
(1) with these characteristics as the dependent variables. We find no statistically
significant relationships between GDP changes at destination and the characteristics
of the migrants going to that destination. The dependent variables are in levels, and
GDP is in logs, so to interpret the magnitude of the coefficients, we divide them by
100 to get the impact of 1 percent change in GDP at destination. Thus not only
are the coefficients not statistically significant, but we also see they are very small in
magnitude. For example, 1 percent higher GDP at destination is associated with a
decrease of 0.049 years in the mean age of migrants going to that destination and an
increase of 0.024 years in the mean education of migrants going to that destination.
Thus we find no evidence of large selectivity in which individuals migrate over the
business cycle, at least in terms of these observable characteristics. We speculate that
this composition effect is much less important for the type of migrant labor examined
here than it is for examining the procyclicality to domestic business cycles of native
wages because of the much greater distortions in global labor markets.
2.5 Analysis of a Change in the Minimum Wage for Domestic
Helpers
The results presented thus far are consistent with the case of binding minimum
wages presented in Section ?? above. To bolster this interpretation of the results, we
provide direct evidence (via a natural experiment) that minimum wages bind for an
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important subset of overseas jobs, domestic helpers (maids). In addition, this analysis
will also rule out the possibility that true wages paid to OFWs are in fact changing
in response to GDP shocks, but overseas employers are simply misreporting (failing
to report changes in wages).
On December 16, 2006, the Philippine government implemented the Household
Service Workers Reform, aimed at improving working conditions for Filipino migrants
working as domestic helpers (maids).10 New policies associated with the reform in-
cluded worker skill assessments, country-specific language and culture training, and
the elimination of placement fees. One of the main components of the policy change
was an increase in the minimum wage to $400 per month for domestic helpers. This
doubled the prevailing wage rate of $200, especially in Middle Eastern countries. All
employers hiring domestic helpers with visas issued after December 16, 2006 were
required to pay a minimum wage of $400 per month.11
Ezquerra (2008) describes the political economy of this reform, noting that it was
sparked by the Israeli-Lebanon war of 2006, in which the Philippines government
acted to repatriate quickly its migrant workers, including a large number of domestic
workers. This brought attention to the exploitative conditions that some of these
workers experienced, with media accounts of a worker saying the war gave her the
chance to escape a master who repeatedly raped her; a worker dying when trying
to escape from her employer who wouldnt let her leave by tying together bedsheets
and attempting to escape from a fourth floor balcony; and other returnees telling
how they were made to sleep in little rooms with dogs, eat leftovers, and work until
midnight.
However, the increase in minimum wages proposed under the reform also met
10In the context of overseas Filipino work, individuals employed by a private household overseas
for childcare and/or general household work are typically referred to as “domestic workers,” “maids,”
“domestic helpers,” or “household service workers.”
11see www.poea.gov.ph/hsw/hswadvisory1.html for details about all new regulations [accessed
July 19, 2011].
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strong resistance from recruitment agencies, arguing that this would have strong neg-
ative impacts on migrant numbers. Ezquerra (2009, p.148) describes how “Recruiting
agencies and aspiring domestic workers held rallies in Metro Manila, in which the lat-
ter protested the upcoming reforms and expressed their willingness to work for less
than $400.” In response to this pressure the government dropped a plan to raise the
minimum age for recruitment as a domestic employee to 25, and delayed the imple-
mentation of the reform until March 2007, but the reform was still implemented.
For a number of countries, this policy change thus led to an exogenous and large
increase in wages for domestic helpers. Many destinations, such as Canada and Italy,
already paid domestic helpers wages above $400 per month, and the reform had no
effect on the wages paid in these locations. Similarly, even in countries facing a binding
minimum wage for domestic helpers due to the policy change, this wage increase did
not have a binding effect on the minimum wage paid to Filipino workers in other
industries. Thus, using either countries or industries not subject to the minimum
wage change as a control group, we can conduct a difference-in-difference analysis to
test the effect of the increase in the minimum wage on the quantity of OFWs and on
OFW wages.
2.5.1 Estimation Strategy
The treatment group in this analysis is composed of domestic helpers in 18 desti-
nation countries that faced a new binding minimum wage after the policy change.12
We create two comparison groups for the difference-in-difference analysis. First, we
use domestic helpers in countries where the median wage prior to 2007 was greater
than $400 (i.e., countries not affected by the policy change). 21 countries are included
12Countries included in the treatment group are Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, China, Cuba,
Cyprus, India, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South
Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, and Republic of Yemen.
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in this comparison group.13 Alternatively, we restrict the sample to include only the
18 destinations in which domestic helpers faced a higher minimum wage as a result
of the policy change. We then create a comparison group of the other occupations in
these countries.14 Our difference-in-difference analysis compares the treatment and
control groups before and after the policy change in 2007.
When other countries not facing a binding minimum wage change are the com-
parison group, we measure the effect of the minimum wage change by estimating the
following equation for destinations j=1, 2, . . . , 39 and time periods t=2001, . . . , 2009:
Mjt = β0 + β1 ∗BindingMinimumWageChangejt + αj + γt + jt (2.2)
where Mjt is the number of Filipino domestic helper migrants leaving on new
contracts to country j in year t; BindingMinimumWageChangejt is an indicator
equal to 1 if the country j is one of the 18 countries facing a binding change in
the minimum wage for domestic helpers, and t is 2007, 2008, or 2009 (after the
introduction of the wage increase). αj are destination country fixed effects; γt are
year fixed effects; and jt is the error term for country j in year t. Standard errors
are clustered at the destination country level. The sample is restricted to the period
2001 to 2009.
When the comparison group is other occupations in these same low-wage coun-
tries, we estimate the following equation for destinationj=1, 2, . . . , 18, occupation
s=1,2,. . . ,17 and time periods t=2001, . . . , 2009:
13Countries included in this comparison group are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, and United States. Of the 22,380 domestic
helpers in the comparison group in 2006, only 7 workers have wages less than $400.
14There are 17 main occupations that encompass 88.7 percent of OFWs. We compare domestic
helpers to these OFWs in the other 16 occupation groups.
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Msjt = γ0 + γ1DomesticHelpers + γ2BindingMinimumWageChangesjt + αj + δsjt + jt
(2.3)
Where BindingMinimumWageChangesjt takes value 1 for the domestic helper
occupation after the domestic helper wage increase (years 2007-2009) and zero oth-
erwise. DomesticHelpers is a binary variable equal to 1 for domestic helpers and 0
for all other occupations. αj are destination country fixed effects; δt are year fixed
effects; and jt is the error term for country j in year t. Standard errors are clustered
at the destination country level.
2.5.2 Results
Prior to estimating equations (2) and (3), we first confirm that our previous em-
pirical results from estimation of equation (1) for all jobs in aggregate also holds for
domestic helpers. Re-estimating equation (1) for only domestic helper jobs, we find
that the coefficient on log GDP in the regression for log counts, 1.138, is very sim-
ilar to the corresponding coefficient in Table 2.2 and statistically significant at the
10 percent level. By contrast, the coefficient on log GDP in the wage regression is
small in magnitude (-0.079) and not statistically significantly different from zero at
conventional significance levels. This also corresponds to the wage result in Table 2.2
for all jobs in aggregate.
We then turn to estimation of equations (2) and (3); results are in Table 2.5.
Column 1 shows the results for the full sample, including destination and year fixed
effects. The coefficient on the indicator for a binding increase in the minimum wage
is the causal impact of the minimum wage change on the quantity of migrants. When
the comparison group is countries with a non-binding minimum wage for domestic
helpers (Panel A), the impact of the minimum wage change is a reduction in em-
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ployment of Filipino domestic helpers by 54.6% (exp(-0.605)). When the comparison
group is occupations other than domestic helpers (Panel B), the impact is a 56.8%
(exp(-0.565)) reduction in employment of Filipino domestic helpers compared to other
unaffected occupations.
Column 2 shows that this reduction in employment was accompanied by an in-
crease in wages, both relative to the wages of domestic workers in countries which
werent affected by the new law, and relative to the wages of Filipino migrant work-
ers in other occupations in the same destination country who were not affected by
the new law. The increase in wages is estimated to be between 27 and 46 percent,
depending on which comparison group is used. To test the robustness of our results,
in the last two columns we restrict the sample to only destination countries that hire
domestic helpers in every year of the sample period (2001-2009). These results are
similar to the full sample results: an increase in the minimum wage led to a decrease
in the quantity of domestic helpers in countries where the minimum wage was binding
and an increase in the wage paid to these workers.
If employers and workers were able to evade these regulations by reporting different
wages on their official contracts to those paid in practice, then we would expect to
see only a change in the stated wage, with no reduction in employment. The fact
that we find a reduction in employment therefore provides clear support that the
minimum wage binds in practice as well as in theory, and that setting high minimum
wages increases the wages migrants earn at a cost of a reduction in the number of
jobs available to them.
2.5.3 Substitutability of Filipino workers with other nationalities
The large quantity response to a change in minimum wages here is in contrast
to many studies in the labor literature which have found zero or relatively limited
employment responses to changes in the minimum wages (e.g. Card and Krueger
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(2000); Neumark and Wascher (2000); Dube, Lester and Reich (2010)). There are
two possible reasons for this difference. First, the change we are examining is a much
larger change, doubling the wage; by contrast, other studies have examined more
marginal changes in minimum wages. If there are some fixed costs to firing workers,
we might expect quantity responses to be more than proportionately larger for large
changes in minimum wages. Secondly, and likely more important, ours is a context
in which only some workers (Filipinos) are subject to the minimum wage change.
If Filipino workers were perfect substitutes for either native workers of the desti-
nation country, or for immigrant workers from other countries, then we would expect
to see no Filipinos hired at all if minimum wage requirements imposed by the gov-
ernment of the Philippines were binding. However, there are reasons to think that
Filipino workers are not perfect substitutes for either natives or migrants from other
countries, so that the Philippine government is effectively engaging in monopolistic
competition, and can charge a higher wage for its workers without losing all demand
for these workers.
Policies that require employers of migrants to show that there is a lack of qualified
local applicants at the prevailing wage are one reason that migrant workers are not
perfect substitutes for local workers in the types of jobs for which migrant workers
get hired. Indeed imperfect substitution between native workers and immigrants has
been found in several recent empirical studies, and has been used to help explain the
relatively limited impacts of immigration on the wages of native workers (Ottaviano
and Peri, 2012; Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth, 2012). As such, we should not
expect Filipino workers to be completely replaced by native workers if the Philippine
government increases the wages its migrants must be paid.
It seems more likely that Filipino workers will be substitutable with immigrant
workers from other countries than with native workers. We are unaware of any data
comparable to the Philippine data we have which would enable us to look at how
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migrant numbers from competitor countries like Indonesia or Bangladesh reacted to
the change made in Philippine policy. However, it does appear that the drop in Fil-
ipino numbers was at least in part made up by recruitment from other countries, with
newspaper reports from countries like Qatar and the U.A.E. discussing recruitment
efforts to bring in workers from non-traditional source countries like Bosnia, Morocco,
and Sudan.15
Nonetheless, statements by recruiters and foreign government officials suggest that
Filipino workers are seen to have certain desirable attributes which make them less
than perfect substitutes with immigrant workers from other countries. First, Filipinos
have English language proficiency, so that, for example, Hong Kong employers of
housemaids are said to prefer Filipino workers over Malaysian and Indonesian workers
(GMA News, 2009). Second, worker training in the Philippines is often done with
an overseas market in mind, so Filipino workers skills are often more easily adapted
to overseas markets (Visa Workforce, n.d.). Third, Filipino workers are often touted
as having better work ethics, being more sociable, and being better able to adapt to
working abroad than nationals of many other countries (Karim, 2008). As a result, we
might not expect all Filipino workers to be replaced by workers from other countries
when their relative wages rise, but still expect the quantity response to be larger than
would be the case when the minimum wage change applied to all workers.
2.6 Conclusions
The view that very large distortions exist in the global market for migrant labor
is widespread among economists (Clemens, 2011; Rodrik, 2011). However, empirical
work that identifies the specific nature of the distortions is scarce, in part due to severe
data limitations. This papers main contribution is to shed light on key distortions in
15E.g. http://dohanews.co/post/15124268586/qatar-to-cast-wider-net-for-domestic-workers [ac-
cessed February 5, 2013] (Khatri, 2012).
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the international market for migrant labor via analysis of migrant flows and contracted
wages in a unique data resource: the Philippine governments database of contracted
migrant worker jobs.
We estimate the impact of economic shocks in Filipino migrant destination coun-
tries on migrant flows to and the wages that migrants are paid in those destinations,
from 1992-2009. We find that percent changes in destination country GDP have a
large (roughly one-to-one) impact on percent changes in Filipino migrant flows, but,
by contrast, essentially zero impact on migrant wages. This pattern is consistent
with the existence of a particular type of distortion in the market for international
migrant labor: binding minimum wages. This pattern would not be predicted by
market-clearing models of the labor market or binding immigration quotas.16
These minimum wages appear to be occupation-specific; we cannot reject that
the effect of GDP fluctuations is similar across higher- and lower-skilled migrant
occupational categories. We also provide direct evidence of the existence and impact
of binding minimum wages for an important occupational category (domestic helpers),
via analysis of a natural experiment that raised the mandated minimum wage for
Filipino domestic helpers. This minimum wage increase led to increases in wages and
reductions in migrant flows in this occupational category.
Direct evidence on the nature of distortions in the market for international migrant
labor is important, because it clarifies the nature and interconnectedness of the welfare
gains and losses associated with international migration. Wage floors for international
migrant work mean that the wage gains for migrants that are able to secure work
overseas are magnified. But at the same time, the total quantity of migrant labor
is smaller than the market-clearing level. Furthermore, these same wage floors also
lead migrant flows to be more sensitive to economic shocks in destination countries
16The pattern is also contrary to the empirical procyclicality of both employment and hiring wages
observed in a variety of developed economies (the destinations for many migrant workers), indicating
that models of the macroeconomy that properly incorporate such procyclicality also cannot explain
our results.
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than they would be if markets cleared, since they lead all labor market adjustment
to occur via quantities rather than wages.
Second, our evidence reveals important welfare consequences of policies instituted
by destination countries as well as by the migrant-source countries that set wage
floors for international migrant work. On the destination country side, the policies
in question include the U.S. federally-mandated minimum wage as well as H1-B rules
requiring immigrant workers be paid the prevailing wage for the workers occupation.
On the migrant-source country side, the key policy relevant for our analysis is the
Philippine governments regulation of labor contracts to ensure wages paid are above
occupation-specific minimums. Our results reveal that these policies lead to higher
wages for workers able to secure jobs, but reduce the number of jobs available and lead
the burden of adjustment to destination-country economic shocks to fall entirely on
the employment rather than the wage margin. Migrant-source countries such as the
Philippines are for the most part powerless to change regulations setting minimum
wages for migrants in destination countries, but they clearly can change their own
regulatory practices related to migrant labor. Our results underline the negative
economic consequences of source-country government efforts to impose wage floors
for migrant workers.17
Our results are most directly relevant for international migrant labor from a par-
ticular source country, the Philippines. That said, the Philippines is one of the
most important global sources of workers for the international contract labor market,
and several other countries such as India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are seeking to
emulate Philippine government policies regulating and promoting international mi-
grant work (Ray, Sinha and Chaudhuri, 2007). Our results documenting the negative
17That said, another rationale given for imposition of wage floors for occupational categories such
as domestic helpers is that they lead lower-quality employers to exit the market, resulting in less
physical, sexual, or mental abuse of workers. Our results cannot directly speak to such potential
benefits of minimum wages in this context, and thus we cannot say whether this reform increased
or reduced welfare.
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economic consequences of minimum-wage regulations on the part of migrant source
countries should be an important input in these countries policy-setting process.
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Figure 2.1:
Response of Demand for Filipino Workers to GDP Shock with Binding
Minimum Wages
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Figure 2.2:
Response of Demand for Filipino Workers to GDP Shock with Binding
Quotas
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Table 2.1: Top 20 Migrant Destinations
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Table 2.3: Responsiveness of Quantities and Wages to GDP by Skill Quartile
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Table 2.4: Does who migrates vary with economic conditions at destination?
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Panel A: Non-Minimum Wage Countries as Control
Log Count Log Wages Log Count Log Wage
Binding Increase in Minimum Wage -0.605* 0.238*** -0.642 0.289***
(0.341) (0.073) (0.392) (0.074)
Observations 327 324 279 276
R2 0.918 0.907 0.910 0.942
Panel B: Other Industries as Control
Binding Increase in Minimum Wage -0.565** 0.377*** -0.641** 0.413***
(0.225) (0.057) (0.240) (0.058)
Domestic Helper 2.172*** -0.711*** 2.717*** -0.710***
(0.521) (0.068) (0.510) (0.068)
Observations 1828 1814 1487 1481
R2 0.648 0.377 0.649 0.370
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: POEA, WDI, and authors' calculations
Full Sample Balanced Panel
Notes: The sample period is from 2001-2009. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. In Panel A, columns 1 and 2 have 39 jobsites 
included in the estimates, and columns 3 and 4 use 31  jobsites. In Panel B, 18 jobsites are included in the 
estimates in columns 1 and 2, and columns 3 and 4 use 14 jobsites. Destination countries are included in the 
treatment group if they have a median wage less than $400 in 2006 (implying that the minimum wage change in 
2007 would be binding for these destinations). Industries are included in the control group if they fall in one of the 
other top 16 occupations. Each of these occupations has >55,000 OFWs over the sample period, and together 
comprise 89% of all migration episodes over the sample period. All wages are trimmed at the 1st and 99th 
percentile to remove outliers.
Table 2.5:
Effect of a Change in Domestic Helper Minimum Wage on Domestic Helper
Hiring
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CHAPTER III
Banned from the Band: The Effect of Migration
Barriers on Origin-Country Labor Market
Decisions
3.1 Introduction
Global labor mobility is far from free. Immigration policies in destination coun-
tries serve as a major determinant of emigration flows (Clemens, 2011; Ortega and
Peri, 2014), and policy debates around the globe currently focus on how to control the
flow of migrants, be it through quotas, point systems, or border fences. Yet, interna-
tional migration provides substantial benefits to poor countries, leading to increases
in schooling (Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Dinkelman and Mariotti, 2014; Theo-
harides, 2014b) and household investment (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007; Yang, 2008)
as well as reductions in risk (Yang and Choi, 2007). Further, Clemens, Montenegro
and Pritchett (2008) show that the same worker earns substantially different wages
depending on the country of employment.
Despite the benefits of migration for migrant-sending countries, the migration
literature primarily has focused on the effect of immigration policies on native workers
(Borjas, 2003; Card, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012), and very few studies examine
the implications of such policies on the migrant-sending country. Clemens (2011)
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asserts that gains from reducing barriers to international migration are much larger
than gains from reducing barriers to trade or capital flows. The majority of evidence
is restricted to the effects on world GDP; studies estimate that eliminating migration
barriers could lead to gains in world GDP of 50 to 150 percent (Klein and Ventura,
2007; Moses and Letnes, 2004; Hamilton and Whalley, 1984; Iregui, 2001). The
evidence on the microeconomic effects is even more limited. Dinkelman and Mariotti
(2014) find reduced investment in education in response to a migration ban imposed
by the Malawian government that halted migration of Malawians to South Africa.
At a microeconomic level, migration barriers can have a number of effects on
migrant-sending countries. Understanding the consequences of such policies is of par-
ticular importance for policymakers in migrant-sending countries. As barriers are
imposed, remittances from the affected destinations will halt. This reduction in in-
come may lead to more binding credit constraints for households. As a result, house-
holds may change their labor market choices both domestically and internationally.
For instance, household members that were not previously working may now seek
employment, potentially causing employment or unemployment rates to rise. Child
labor may also rise in response. Internal and international migration may change,
though the direction is ambiguous depending on whether credit constraints prevent
migration or whether fewer labor market opportunities at home encourage migration.
While previous studies have examined changes in demand for migrants or changes
in remittances on a variety of sending-country outcomes, migration barriers imposed
by immigration policy differ from changes in host-country demand for migrants in
that they typically represent a more permanent change. If households are able to
adjust their employment decisions to perfectly compensate for lost income from mi-
grants, then there should not be effects on things like consumption or education. If,
on the other hand, unemployment rises, this suggests that households are not able
to perfectly adjust and there will likely be adverse implications on other outcomes as
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well. Thus, understanding labor market responses provides a window into the overall
disruptiveness of the policy change.
In this paper, I provide empirical evidence on the effects of migration barriers
imposed by the host country on migrant-sending countries. Specifically, I answer the
causal question: What is the effect of the closure of a major migration channel on the
labor market decisions of households in the country of origin? To answer this question,
I use a policy change in Japan that imposed significant barriers to the migration of
Filipino Overseas Performing Artists (OPAs) as a natural experiment. OPAs are
primarily women working as hostesses in nightclubs and gentlemen’s clubs. The
nature of OPA migration is historically controversial. In 2005, in response to claims
from the United States that OPAs were victims of trafficking, Japan dramatically
raised the education and experience requirements for Filipinos migrating to Japan as
OPAs. This effectively closed this migration channel, with Filipino OPA migration
to Japan falling from 71,108 in 2004 to 6,696 in 2006 and to 925 by 2011.
Yet, not all geographic regions of the Philippines were affected equally by this
policy change. Migrant networks matter in terms of where individuals migrate and
what they do there (Munshi, 2003), and the Philippines is no exception. Certain
areas of the Philippines historically send migrants to certain destinations and in
certain occupations (Theoharides, 2014b). As a result, provinces that specialize in
OPA migration receive a larger treatment dosage from the policy change than those
that do not. Exploiting this natural experiment, I employ a difference-in-differences
estimation strategy using the percent of OPA employment in the province population
in a base year as a continuous policy variable to define the treatment dosage. The
magnitude of the point estimates sheds light on if there is a multiplier effect for
migration. If I find a reduction in migrants from treated provinces that is larger than
the reduction imposed by the ban itself, this suggests that there are spillover effects
from the policy change. If, on the other hand, I find that the reduction in migrants
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is smaller than what would occur as a result of the ban, this suggests that OPAs are
able to easily switch into new occupations overseas.
I find that in response to the policy change, migration decreases more for provinces
with a higher baseline OPA share. Specifically, moving from the 25th to 75th per-
centile of the baseline OPA share is associated with a 1.2% greater decrease in mi-
gration after the policy change. The effects are larger for new hires, suggesting that
new migrant contracts are more vulnerable to policy shocks. I also find a substantial
multiplier effect, with migration declining by more than the amount of the policy
change. The multiplier effects are larger for new migrants, and current migrants ap-
pear to crowd out new migrants by renewing contracts at a higher rate. The spillover
effects of this policy lead to reductions in both female and male migration. Domestic
helpers, plumbers, laborers, and production workers all are hired at a lower rate than
prior to the policy change in high OPA share provinces. Domestically, the unemploy-
ment rate for women rises by 1.7% more in high OPA share provinces after the policy
change than in low OPA share provinces. Child labor increases differentially by 1.3%,
and 1.8% more individuals are now engaged in short-term work. The domestic labor
market results suggest that when migration is reduced and remittances are no longer
available, the domestic labor market choices are substantially different in order to
cope with these changes, but that households cannot fully compensate for lost mi-
gration opportunities and would like to work more domestically. Robustness checks
that define a treated group of provinces and construct a synthetic control group of
provinces corroborate the main results.
This paper provides the first microeconomic estimates of the effects of a migration
barrier on labor market decisions. It is also the first paper to examine the effects of a
migration barrier imposed by the receiving country rather than the sending country.
This is an important distinction because, while the effects on households may be
similar, the government engagement may be vastly different. I also provide the first
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estimates of the migration multiplier. This will help policy makers in migrant-sending
countries predict the resiliency of their overseas workforce to changes in the migration
policy of destination countries.
Finally, not only does this policy result in the closure of a major migration channel
for Filipinos, but it also halts migration in a controversial migration channel. Restric-
tions on labor mobility are perhaps greatest when an occupation is deemed exploitive.
The economics literature on trafficking is limited, and in particular the literature is
silent on the implications of policies that regulate this type of employment for sending
countries. My paper is the first to provide empirical estimates of the economic in-
centives for individuals to undertake employment opportunities in occupations often
perceived as vulnerable or exploitive. Such estimates are important when considering
the necessary social safety nets for households when individuals are removed from
controversial employment environments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides back-
ground on migration from the Philippines with a focus on overseas performing artists
in Japan and the subsequent anti-trafficking campaign that led to their decline. Sec-
tion 3.3 discusses the data used in the analysis. The methodology is discussed in
Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the results, followed by robustness checks in Section
3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Filipino Migration
International migration is a common labor market option in the Philippines.
Started in 1974, the Philippine Overseas Employment Program promotes contract
migration of its citizens, and approximately 2% of the population migrates annually
in a variety of occupations. This is legal and temporary migration through licensed
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recruitment agencies, and contract duration is about two years on average. Workers
are classified as either new hires who are working abroad on a new labor contract
or as rehires renewing an existing contract. Family members of migrants typically
remain at home in the Philippines. Contract migration is an increasingly common
global phenomenon, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. While the Philippines
was the first country to establish temporary contract migration as a labor market
alternative, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, and Tajikistan, among others,
have all adopted or are in the process of adopting similar programs (Asis and Agunias,
2012; Rajan and Misha, 2007; Ray, Sinha and Chaudhuri, 2007; World Bank, 2011a).
Table 3.1 shows the top 10 occupations for new overseas Filipino workers in 2004,
the year prior to the Japanese policy change. Overseas Performing Artists (OPAs)
and domestic helpers are overwhelmingly the largest occupations and predominantly
employ women. Migrants also go to a wide range of destination countries. For women,
the largest destination in 2004 was Japan, though destinations throughout Asia and
the Middle East are common. Approximately 50% of men work in Saudi Arabia.
Likely due to migrant networks, location of origin in the Philippines is an impor-
tant determinant of where and in what occupations migrants work while abroad.
Stories of success abroad circulate in communities, and prospective migrants trust
the experiences of those in their neighborhoods and choose to follow similar migra-
tion trajectories in terms of chosen recruitment agency, destination, and occupation
(Barayuga, 2014). Theoharides (2014b) shows that province-level historic destina-
tion and occupation shares are a strong predictor of variation in contemporaneous
province-level migration rates. This emphasizes the importance of migrant networks,
whether through social networks or agglomeration effects, such as the prevalence of
middlemen to facilitate the migration process to certain destinations or in certain
occupations. In Section 3.4, I will explore the strength of OPA migrant networks in
particular.
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3.2.2 Overseas Performing Artist Migration
As shown in Table 3.1, OPAs compose 25.5% of new hire migration from the
Philippines in 2004. Approximately 96% of OPAs are female, and 98.8% of OPAs work
in Japan. In Table 3.2, I compare the characteristics of OPAs to the characteristics of
all other new contract migrants in 2004. OPAs are overwhelmingly more female than
the average non-OPA contract migrant. They are also younger, with an average age of
25 years compared to 32 years. This is primarily because the maximum age for OPAs
hired by Japan is 35 years of age (Parrenas, 2008). OPA wages are high. Average
monthly wages are $1,857 compared to $417 for other contract migrants. The contract
durations are also much shorter, with an average duration of 4.6 months compared to
20.5 months. Migrants from the Philippines on average are quite well educated when
compared with the Philippine population as a whole (Theoharides, 2014b), yet OPAs
remain the exception. With a 10-year primary and secondary education system in
the Philippines, the average contract worker has 13.3 years of education, or almost
a college degree. OPAs, on the other hand, have 9.4 years of education on average,
meaning that the average OPA is not a high school graduate.
The term “Overseas Performing Artist” is an umbrella term encompassing women
employed as choreographers, dancers, composers, musicians, and singers. The nature
of the employment of these women is work as hostesses in gentlemens clubs in Japan,
where the dress code is “high heels and ‘sexy’ dresses” (Parrenas, 2008). Prior to 2005,
before OPAs were hired recruiting agencies typically sent a photograph to prospective
Japanese employers to aid their selection of OPAs. While POEA conducted an audi-
tion prior to deployment, this process was often tainted because recruitment agencies
would find a way for selected OPAs to pass the audition, often through impersonation
(Barayuga, 2014).1
1Selected OPAs without performance talent would send someone else to engage in the audition for
them. Prior to the policy change in Japan, POEA was in the process of implementing a fingerprint
scanning system in order to combat issues of impersonation in the interview process. The system
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The actual work of OPAs in Japan is largely debated. Media reports and a number
of studies assert that OPA employment is exploitive and essentially forced prostitution
(Douglass, 2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2004). Alternatively, Parrenas
(2011) contends that while a certain level of intimacy is expected of OPAs, forced
prostitution is uncommon. In addition to the controversial nature of employment,
many OPAs become attached to the Yakuza (Japanese organized crime) and are often
victims of debt bondage through fees incurred during training or the confiscation of
passports. OPAs typically do not receive their salaries until the end of the contract
in order to ensure they do not leave prior to the completion of the contract (Parrenas,
2008).
Starting in 2000 with the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Pro-
tection Act, the U.S. began a campaign to crack down on human trafficking world-
wide. In the 2004 and 2005 U.S. Trafficking in Persons Reports, Filipino OPAs in
Japan were identified as victims trafficked into forced prostitution. In response, Japan
adopted the Action Plan of Measures to Combat Trafficking in Persons (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2004). This dramatically altered the requirements for hiring
OPAs bound for Japan. Before 2005 applicants were eligible for OPA employment as
long as they met the requirements of a government agency in their country of origin
(Parrenas, 2008).2 Through a bilateral agreement with Japan, the Philippines only
required OPAs to complete a training certificate of 6 months or less in duration and
pass an audition. In response to the trafficking accusations, Japan revised their pol-
icy to require all OPAs to have 2 years of education or training in performance, and
the Philippine government was no longer eligible to evaluate performers (Parrenas,
2008).3 Because the population of OPAs from the Philippines is historically poorly
was scrapped once OPA migration fell in response to the policy change (Barayuga, 2014).
2Applicants were also eligible for OPA employment in Japan if they had 2 years of either training
or work experience as a performing artist.
3While higher education standards for migrants may cause long run increases in education through
aspirational effects of a higher expected wage premium (Shrestha, 2012), in the case of OPAs, poverty
is believed to be the major impetus for migration for OPAs, and stigmas attached to OPA migration
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educated, these policy changes imposed huge barriers to migration for traditional
OPAs. Most experienced OPAs were not able to return to Japan for employment,
and with limited economic opportunities at home, took part in migrant reintegration
programs sponsored by the Philippine government (Parrenas, 2008).
The changes in outmigration of OPAs in response to the policy change can easily
be seen from the plot of new OPA contracts over time shown in Figure 3.1. In response
to the ban, annual OPA migration to Japan plummeted from 71,108 in 2004 to 6,698
workers in 2006. Overall OPA migration fell from 25.5% of all Filipino migration
annually to 2.4%. It should be noted that concern over the work of Filipino OPAs in
Japan was not a new phenomenon. The dip in deployment between 1994 and 1995
was in response to more stringent requirements imposed by the Philippine Labor
Secretary to combat perceived exploitation of Filipinas. Upon her resignation, OPA
migration returned to and surpassed its previous levels.
OPA migration is not distributed evenly across the Philippines. Figure 3.2 plots
the province-level OPA migration rates in 1993 and shows that there is substantial
variation in which provinces send OPAs. OPA migration was concentrated in the
provinces surrounding Manila as well as a few provinces in the Visayas and in southern
Mindanao. Figure 3.3 plots the OPA migration rates in 2004 and highlights the
importance of geographic migrant networks for OPAs. Provinces that have high
rates of OPA migration in 1993 continue to in 2004, whereas provinces that had low
rates of OPA migration in 1993 still have very few OPA migrants as a portion of
the population in 2004. Anecdotally, migrant networks are particularly important
for OPAs. As for most contract migrants, word of mouth and trust play significant
roles in where individuals migrate. As noted above, contract duration of OPAs is
much shorter than for other contract migrants. As a result, OPAs return to the
Philippines much more frequently (4 times as often) compared to other migrants, and
limit the aspirational effects.
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the monetary benefits of OPA migration are thus much more visible to those still
in the Philippines (Barayuga, 2014). Further, since OPAs are required to attend a
training center prior to deployment, Filipinas from one province will typically enroll
in a training center together, often one that is recommended by a person related to
the trainee (Barayuga, 2014).
3.2.3 Multiplier Effects
While the OPA policy change only directly affected the migration of OPAs, in
theory the ban may affect migration in other occupations and destinations. This
would result in effects on migration that are larger or smaller than the magnitude of
the ban itself. Contextualizing the magnitude of the effects of the OPA ban provides
the first estimates of a “migration multiplier.” Since many quotas or points systems
refer specifically to migrants in certain occupations and are of course destination
specific, this multiplier quantifies the importance of spillover effects and switching
behavior across migration channels in determining migration outcomes.
Multiplier effects may matter for a number of reasons. First, spillover effects may
occur that reduce migration in occupations other than the OPAs directly affected
by the policy change. When opportunities are reduced due to migration barriers,
this will lead to the elimination of remittances from that channel. If households
are credit constrained, they may no longer be able to afford the migration fees for
other household members to migrate to other destinations or in other occupations.
This would cause migration to decline by more than the magnitude of the migration
barrier. Further, the multiplier may also be larger due to changes in the presence of
recruitment agencies or off-site recruiting. Recruiting agencies typically recruit for
possible OPAs as well as several other occupations. After the policy change, recruiting
agencies may choose to close or no longer hold off-site recruitment in the towns where
they typically recruited OPAs. As a result, OPA recruitment will decline as suggested
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by the policy change, but employment in other occupations will fall as the workers
are recruited from other locations in the Philippines.
On the other hand, we might expect effects smaller than the magnitude of the
ban if potential OPA migrants can easily switch between occupation categories and
destinations. For instance, a prospective OPA migrant may instead move abroad as
a domestic helper. In the case of migration from the Philippines, switching behavior
seems less likely for two reasons. First, the importance of migrant networks results
in rigidity in the local labor market that makes it more difficult for “OPA provinces”
to easily become “domestic helper provinces.” Second, there is an excess supply of
migrants from the Philippines (McKenzie, Theoharides and Yang, 2014; Theoharides,
2014b), and so it seems unlikely that OPAs can easily switch when their employment
opportunities are no longer available since a surplus of potential migrants already
exists.
3.3 Data
To calculate the baseline share of OPAs, I use an original dataset of all new mi-
grant departures from the Philippines between 1992 and 2009. I use probabilistic
matching to combine two government administrative datasets from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) and the Overseas Worker Welfare Adminis-
tration (OWWA). POEA records all new migration episodes from the Philippines in
order to verify that workers are being paid wages as stipulated by their contract. The
data include name and demographics, as well as destination, occupation, employer,
and wages. OWWA, on the other hand, is concerned with the welfare of the workers
and their families. While recording similar identifying information and demograph-
ics, OWWAs key variables of interest are the home address of the migrant so that in
the event of natural disasters or other turmoil, they can contact the migrants family.
Combining these two datasets creates a dataset that includes both the occupation
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and destination of the migrant as well as their home address in the Philippines.4,5 I
then aggregate individual records annually by occupation and province to determine
the number of new OPAs in each province in the base year. I divide by the work-
ing population at baseline as calculated from the Philippine Census of Population
in order to calculate the baseline share of OPAs. I also use this original dataset to
calculate both the overall number of new migrants and the number of new migrants
by occupation and gender at the province level.
Figure 3.4 plots the baseline shares for each province as circles. There is substan-
tial variation in the OPA shares at baseline, indicating that provinces will experience
different dosages of treatment in response to the OPA policy change. To be clear, the
shares are low, and the average OPA share at baseline is 0.05% of the population.
Yet, compared to an average province-level migration rate at baseline of 0.44%, OPA
migration clearly represents a significant portion of all overseas migration episodes.
I use the 1992-2011 Labor Force Surveys (LFS) from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) to calculate both total province level migration rates as well as domestic labor
market outcomes and a number of covariates. The LFS is a quarterly household
survey conducted on a rotating panel of households. The survey asks about the
recent employment status and work history of all members of the household of twelve
or more years of age, including overseas members of the household. I use these
data to construct employment and unemployment rates, the fraction of working aged
individuals looking for work or looking for additional work, and the fraction of child
aged 10 to 14 engaged in at least one or more hours of work per week.
Table 3.3 shows summary statistics for all three datasets. The new hire migration
rate from the POEA data (0.44%) is much lower than the overall migration rate from
4I match the data using first name, middle name, last name, date of birth, destination country,
gender, and year of departure using probabilistic or fuzzy matching techniques as discussed by
Winkler (2004). The match rate is approximately 90% for 1993, the year in which the baseline
values are calculated. See Theoharides (2014b) for further details.
5Unfortunately, home address of the migrant was not recorded by OWWA between 1999 and
2003.
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the LFS (2.44%).6 Using the POEA data, I can also calculate occupation-specific
migration rates. For OPAs, the rate is on average 0.05% in 2004, the year before the
policy change, and 0.01% of the population in 2006, the year after the policy change.
8.6% of the working population is currently unemployed.7 9.8% of children between
the ages of 10 and 14 worked at least one hour in the past week. 1.5% of the working
population is actively looking for work, while 4.9% of the population reports looking
for additional work to supplement their current employment. Almost 12% of people
report that their jobs are not permanent.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
To obtain a causal estimate of the effect of the OPA policy change on migration
and employment outcomes, I exploit the fact that, due to historic migration networks,
provinces with a larger share of OPAs as a portion of their population will experience
a larger reduction in migration as a result of the ban compared to provinces with
a smaller share of OPAs. This can be seen in Figure 3.4, which plots the OPA
migration rates in 1993 (baseline) and in 2009. The dosage that each province receives
in response to the policy change is the vertical distance between the circle and the
triangle for each province. The further right a province is in the figure, the largest
the effect of the policy change in the province.
Formally, I implement a difference-in-differences style analysis with a continuous
treatment variable. I estimate the following equation:
6Most new hires go abroad on two-year contracts. The new hire migration rate as calculate here
only includes the outflow in the current year. Thus, the LFS migration rate will include both these
new hires, as well as new hires who are in the second year of their contract. As such, rehires as not
simply the residual of the total LFS migration rate and the reported new hire migration rate, but
will rather be less than this residual.
7The LFS defines unemployment as either those looking for work or discouraged workers.
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MigrationRatept = β0 + β1Postt ∗ ShareOPAp0 + β2Xpt + αp + γt + pt (3.1)
where MigrationRatept is the migration rate for province p in year t. Postt is
a dummy variable equal to 1 for the years 2006 to 2011 and equal to 0 for 1998 to
2004. I exclude 2005 from the analysis since the ban occurred halfway through 2005.
ShareOPAp0 is the number of OPAs in province p in some base period divided by
the total working population in the base period. I define the base period as 1993,
though the results are also robust to using 1992 as the base year. αp are province
fixed effects, γt are year fixed effects, and pt is the error term, which I cluster at the
province level. There 80 provinces used in the analysis.8 β1 estimates the effect of the
policy change for OPA provinces with different baseline shares on the province-level
migration rate, among other outcomes.
The identifying assumption for β1 to be a valid estimate of the causal effect of the
OPA ban is that in the absence of the policy change, the migration rates in provinces
with different baseline shares are parallel. I test this assumption by plotting the
average total province-level migration rates before and after the policy change by
quartile of the baseline OPA shares. Figure 3.5 shows the results. The trends appear
parallel in the pre-period, though there does not appear to be much of an effect of the
policy in the post-period. I will formally test the parallel trends assumption while
controlling for covariates in Section 3.5.
In the ideal experiment, OPA migration rates would be randomly assigned at
baseline across provinces. In the case of the continuous difference-in-differences iden-
tification strategy, the province fixed effects remove concern about time-invariant
differences in provinces with varying baseline shares. However, a lingering question
is why certain provinces historically sent a high share of OPAs while others did not.
8I drop four provinces that were not yet established in 1998 in order to have a balanced panel.
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If these differences result in differential trending of variables related to the migration
rate, this may lead to potential bias. Turning to the data, in order to determine
what explains the high or low base share OPA migration rates in certain provinces, I
regress the OPA share in 1993 on a vector of covariates.
The results are shown in Table 3.4, Column 1. Most of the point estimates are
quite small in magnitude, and the covariates do not have a statistically significant
relationship with the share OPA, suggesting that there are not systematic differences
in demographics across high and low OPA share provinces. However, the percent of
the population with some high school and the percent urban have precisely estimated
correlations with the share OPA at baseline. High OPA share provinces are less likely
to have a higher portion of the population with some high school education and are
more likely to live in urban areas. Thus, while some covariates are correlated with
the OPA shares, the number of statistically significant characteristics is similar to
what would be found due to chance. However, to alleviate concern that differences
in provinces at baseline may lead to differential trending in omitted variables related
to the outcome variable, I will control for these covariates in all specifications.
Assigning baseline OPA shares 10 years before the policy change occurred reduces
concern that these shares are formed endogenously. For the baseline OPA share to
make sense as a measure of treatment dosage, high OPA provinces at baseline must
remain high OPA sending provinces in later years prior to the policy change. In
Section 3.2, I discussed the importance of both destination and occupation-specific
migrant networks in explaining outmigration rates across the Philippines. I formalize
this with respect to OPA migration in Table 3.4. Specifically, I regress the province-
level share of OPAs in 1997, 2004, and 2009 on the share of OPAs at baseline in 1993
and a vector of covariates. In Columns 3 and 5, it is clear that baseline OPA shares
are a strong predictor of later OPA migration rates. The magnitude in absolute value
of the 1993 baseline share point estimate is over 250 times greater in 1997 (over 70
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times greater in 2004) than the next largest point estimate, and is extremely precisely
estimated. 2009 is five years after the policy change, and we can see that following
the policy change, a high OPA migration rate at baseline is no longer predictive of
the remaining OPA migration rate.
Figure 3.6 shows the importance of these networks graphically by plotting the
province-level OPA migration rate in 1993 against the province-level OPA migration
rate in 2004 along with a 45-degree line, shown as a solid line. While a best fit line
(dashed) does not lie directly on the 45-degree line, suggesting that there is some
movement in OPA shares over time, this figure further supports the importance of
historic OPA migration rates in determining OPA migration rates over time. The
main differences are due to four outliers, the four districts of Manila. In 1993, these
districts composed much larger shares of OPA migration, but over time some of the
migration opportunities spread across the provinces.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Effects on Migration
In Table 3.5, Column 1, I estimate the effect of the OPA policy change on the total
province-level contract migration rate, which includes both new hires and rehires and
is calculated using the LFS. For a one percentage point increase in the fraction of
OPAs in a province at baseline, the total migration rate decreased by -1.07 percentage
points. Recall from Table 3.3 that the average fraction of OPAs out of the province
population at baseline is 0.05% of the province population. Thus, interpreting the
effects in terms of a one-percentage point increase is unrealistic given the magnitude
of the OPA migration rate. Instead, I scale the results by the magnitude of the
interquartile range of the fraction OPA, which is 0.03. As a result, the effect of
moving from the 25th percentile of OPA shares at baseline to the 75th percentile
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leads to a 0.03*1.07=0.03 percentage point decrease in the total migration rate. Off
a migration rate with a sample mean of 2.44%, this leads to a 1.2% decline in the
total migration rate in the 75th percentile of OPA provinces compared to the 25th
percentile.
In Column 2, I estimate the same equation, instead calculating the total over-
seas migration rate using the Philippines Census of Population. Because the Census
is conducted every ten years, I estimate a basic two period difference-in-differences
analysis using 2000 as the pre period and 2010 as the post period. Since all Filipino
households are asked in the Census about the number of international migrants in the
household, using census data provides a check on the estimates using the LFS in Col-
umn 1, though the sample period is limited. When moving from the 25th percentile
of baseline OPA migration to the 75th percentile, total international migration falls
by 0.04 percentage points, or 1.7%, though it is not precisely estimated due to limited
power from the small sample size. Though imprecisely estimated, the magnitudes of
the estimated effects across the two data sources are similar.
One concern with this estimation strategy is potential differential trending of the
total migration rate by baseline OPA share. While Figure 3.5 suggests that the pre-
trends between high and low OPA provinces are parallel, I formally test for differential
trends in the migration rate by estimating the relationship between the baseline OPA
share and the change in the migration rate in the pre-period. I estimate the following
equation:
∆(MigrationRatept) = β0 + β1ShareOPAp0 + β2∆(Xpt) + γt + pt (3.2)
where t is the pre-period, ∆(MigrationRatept) is the change in the province-level
migration rate in province p from year t − 1 to year t, and ∆(Xpt) is the change in
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province-year level covariates from year t− 1 to t. The results are shown in row 2 of
Table 3.5. For the LFS results, I find that a 1 percentage point increase in the OPA
migration rate at baseline leads to a 0.001 percentage point increase in the change
in the total migration rate, and the coefficient is not statistically different from zero.
The magnitude of the point estimate is quite small, suggesting that the migration
rate in provinces with higher OPA shares is not changing differentially compared to
lower share provinces, and the trends in the pre-period are in fact parallel. Using
Census data, the coefficient is larger than when using the LFS, but it is statistically
imprecise and small relative to the estimated effect in row 1. Further, the positive
trending in the pre-period would bias against the estimated effect, suggesting that
the results are actually an underestimate.
Second, I also check for differential trends in the pre period using a falsification
exercise. Using the LFS data, I estimate equation 1, instead using 1998 and 1999 as
pre-periods, and 2000 to 2004 as the post period.9 I find that when moving from the
pre-period to the “post” period, a one percentage point increase in the OPA migration
rate at baseline leads to a 0.24 percentage point increase in the total migration rate,
though the coefficient is imprecisely estimated.10
Next, in Table 3.5, Column 3, I turn to the effect of the policy change on new con-
tract hires only. Examining the results by just new hires rather than the aggregation
of new hires and rehires allows me to examine if new employment is more responsive
to policy changes than renewed employment.11 Shifting from the 25th to 75th per-
centile of the OPA baseline share results in a 9.6% decline in the province-level new
9Because in the Census data I only have two periods in the pre-period (1990 and 2000), the
results of the falsification exercise will be the same as estimating equation (2) above.
10One might also be concerned that the negative effects of the policy change on the migration rate
are simply a result of mean reversion. For instance, high OPA provinces at baseline could be low
OPA provinces in later years, causing the negative effects to be driven by this. However, the high
correlation of baseline shares and later OPA migration rates shown in Table 3.4 indicates that this
is unlikely to be the case. As discussed in Section 3.4, provinces that were high OPA provinces at
baseline continue to be in later years as well, and thus mean reversion is not the cause of the effects.
11Due to lack of data, I cannot examine the effect of the policy change on rehires only. Data are
only available on total migration from the LFS (rehires plus new hires) and new hires from POEA.
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hire migration rate after the ban. Comparing the point estimate for total migration
to the point estimate for new hire migration, magnitudes differ substantially. This
indicates that new hires are more adversely affected by the policy change than total
migration, which suggests that rehires are less vulnerable to policy shocks than those
potential migrants seeking a new contract. I again check for parallel trends, estimat-
ing equation 1 on the pre-period of 1996 to 1997. I find that for a one-percentage
point increase in the OPA migration rate, the change in the migration rate is 0.27
percentage points and statistically significant. This positive result, while concerning,
implies that the effect I find is a lower bound of the true estimate, and its magnitude
is much smaller than the overall result shown in Row 1.
3.5.2 Multiplier Effect
The magnitude of the point estimates provides an estimate of the migration multi-
plier as discussed in Section 3.2.3. The effects on outmigration may be exactly equal
to the effects of the ban itself, indicating that for each OPA affected by the ban,
there is one fewer migrant. Intuitively, with perfectly predictive migrant networks
such that the assigned treatment dosage from the base share is exactly the treatment
dosage realized, a one percentage point increase in the baseline OPA share should
lead to a one percentage point decline in the total migration rate if the effect of the
ban is realized without a multiplier effect.
However, while historically high OPA provinces remain high OPA provinces over
time, base shares are an imperfect predictor of the future migration rate. Turning
back to Table 3.4, Column 5, we see that a one-percentage point higher OPA share at
baseline leads to a 0.4 percentage point higher OPA migration rate in 2004, the year
prior to the policy change. Thus, while high OPA provinces still have higher OPA
migration rates right before the policy change occurred, the treatment dosage actually
experienced by these provinces will be less in reality than the baseline share would
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suggest. Comparing the point estimates to 1 in order to determine the multiplier effect
is thus incorrect given that base shares are not perfectly predictive. Specifically, a one-
percentage point increase in the baseline OPA migration rate implies a 0.4 percentage
point higher OPA migration rate in 2004. Thus, for the effect of the ban to be fully
realized, the total migration rate should decline by -0.4 percentage points.
While multiplier effects may exist in the total migration rate, they should not
be present in the OPA migration rate itself. Thus, to first examine the accuracy of
this type of test for a multiplier effect, I first look at the effect of the policy change
on the OPA migration rate. Shown in Table 3.6, Column 1, a one percentage point
increase in the baseline OPA share causes a 0.4 percentage point decline in the OPA
migration rate when moving from the pre to post period. Given that a one-percentage
point increase in the baseline OPA share implies a 0.4 percentage point higher OPA
migration rate in the year prior to the policy change, this indicates that the effect of
the ban is fully realized. Higher OPA provinces have lower OPA migration rates by
exactly the differential amount of OPAs in the province.
Turning back to Table 3.5, I can compare the point estimates to 0.4 in order to
determine if there is a multiplier effect. In Column 1, while I cannot reject that
1.07 is equal to 0.4, the magnitudes are clearly quite different. This suggests that
there is a substantial migration multiplier, and prospective migrants besides OPAs
are differentially affected by the policy change in high OPA provinces compared to
low OPA provinces. While OPAs clearly can no longer migrate, these multiplier
effects may be due to recruitment agencies closing, binding credit constraints as OPA
remittances are no longer received, or weakening of migrant networks, among other
explanations.
An even larger multiplier can be seen for new hire migration. For the total migra-
tion rate to fall by less than the new hire migration rate, rehires must be declining
at a slower rate than new hires. This suggests that households may be able to at
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least partially adjust to the loss of employment opportunities from OPA migration
by renewing existing contracts. As a result, given demand is rigid and determined
outside the Philippines, fewer potential new migrants in the province are able to go
abroad on new contracts relative to lower OPA provinces.
3.5.3 By Occupation
Above, I showed that there is a large and statistically significant multiplier effect
of the policy change on new hire migration. This means that migration in occupations
other than OPAs must be affected by the policy change. Using the new hire micro
data from POEA, I can further explore this to see which occupations are affected. In
Table 3.6, I estimate the effect of the ban on occupation-specific new hire migration
rates for the top 38 occupations for Filipino contract migrants.12 A number of other
occupations appear to experience a decline as a result of the OPA ban. These declines
could occur for two reaSons: first because of multiplier effects leading to spillovers
from the policy change on other occupations or second because rehires increase in
certain occupations in response to the policy change, thus crowding out new hires.
Essentially all of the 38 occupations experience a decrease in higher OPA provinces
when moving from the pre to post period, though the magnitude of the effects varies
substantially across occupations. Domestic helpers experience by far the largest de-
cline in response to the policy change.13 Production workers, laborers, and plumbers
and welders also experience quite large declines in new hire migration in high OPA
provinces relative to low OPA provinces. These declines help shed light on who is
affected by the multiplier effect.
12These 38 occupations make up 96% of all new contract migration.
13This result for domestic helpers, however, should be discounted as the parallel trends assumption
is violated in the pre-period as determined by the two checks shown in Table 3.5, making it difficult
to ascertain the true casual effect. For all other occupations, the data do not reject the parallel
trends assumption.
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3.5.4 By Gender
While OPA migration is a historically overwhelmingly female occupation, the
occupations that decline in response to the OPA policy change are both predominantly
female (in the case of domestic helpers), mixed gendered (such as production workers),
and predominantly male (laborers). Because OPA migration is largely female, the
direct effect of the ban should be felt exclusively by females, yet the occupation results
suggest that there are some spillover effects onto male migration as well. I examine
this explicitly by looking at the response of the male and female migration rates to
the OPA policy change. If I find a non-zero point estimate for males, this suggests
that there are spillover effects for men from the ban on female OPA migration.
As shown in Table 3.7, this is in fact what I find in both the case of total migration
and new hire migration. After the policy change, male migration declines in high OPA
provinces compared to low OPA provinces. Scaling the effects by the interquartile
range of the OPA base share, total male migration decreases by 0.9%. This suggests
that despite the fact that the policy change only affected women, there were spillover
effects on the migration of men as well, and after the policy change, in high OPA
provinces compared to low OPA provinces, fewer males are migrating. For females,
on the other hand, the magnitude of the ban would again be fully realized if the
point estimate is equal to -0.4. In the case of total female migration, while the
point estimate is larger in absolute value than the 0.4, statistically I cannot reject
that they are the same. Total female migration declines by the anticipated amount
from the policy change. For female new hire migration, I can reject that the point
estimate, -0.85, is equal to -0.4. Fewer females are able to migrate from high OPA
provinces after the policy change compared to low OPA provinces than just the OPA
policy would suggest. Thus, to reconcile the total female and new hire female results,
females in high OPA provinces in occupations other than OPAs must be renewing
their contracts at a higher rate than in low OPA provinces. Overall, these results by
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gender suggest that this barrier to migration for females had spillovers to both male
and female migration.
3.5.5 Domestic Employment
I next turn to examining the domestic employment choices of individuals in the
Philippines in response to the OPA policy change.14 Due to the high wages of OPAs
compared to domestic employment, when OPA migration is no longer an option,
households may have to reallocate labor market choices within the household. For
instance, individuals who were not previously part of the labor force may seek em-
ployment or currently employed household members may try to work more hours.
In Table 3.8, I examine the effect of the OPA policy change on the province-level
unemployment rate. Unemployment is defined in the LFS as persons who are either
currently looking for work or who would like to work, but have given up searching. I
calculate this rate of unemployment out of the total working-aged population in the
province. When moving from the pre-period to the post-period, the unemployment
rate increases by 0.4% more in the 75th percentile of OPA share provinces compared
to the 25th percentile. While the point estimate has the anticipated sign, it is not
statistically different than zero.
Examining the unemployment rate by gender, the female unemployment rate rises
by 1.7% over the interquartile range of OPA provinces from the pre to post period.
Given a province-level average of 57,754 women who report being unemployed in
the LFS, this means there are 982 more women who are looking for work or are
discouraged workers after the policy change in high OPA provinces compared to low
14I also examine the effects of the OPA ban on internal migration. Internal migration may either
increase or decrease in response to the ban. It may increase if, for instance, households now need to
seek domestic employment somewhere else in the Philippines as international opportunities are no
longer available, or it may decrease if households are now more credit constrained and cannot afford
internal migration. I use the 1990, 2000, and 2010 Census of Population to determine the rates of
out-migration and in-migration for each province. Unfortunately, the pre-trends for high and low
OPA share provinces are far from parallel and so it is impossible to discern what effect is due to the
policy and what effect is due to differential trending. Thus, I omit the results from the paper.
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OPA provinces. The average province has 429 OPAs prior to the policy change, and
these displaced workers likely account for part of the increase. The other 553 are
likely migrants displaced from other occupations due to the migration multiplier or
women who were not previously working that now must enter the labor force as a
result of the lost OPA income.
Next, I examine a number of other domestic labor market outcomes inTable 3.9.
First, I look at the response of child labor. The child labor rate of employment is
defined as the number of children aged 10 to 14 working at least 1 hour per week
out of the total population aged 10 to 14.15 Moving from the pre to post period,
provinces in the 75th percentile of baseline OPA migration have a 1.3% higher rate
of child labor than those provinces in the 25th percentile. Given there were 10,430
children aged 10 to 14 working in a province in 2004, this means 135.6 more children
are engaged in at least one hour of work per week in high OPA provinces compared
to low OPA provinces. For each OPA who can no longer go abroad, 0.3 more children
are now engaged in paid work. To be clear, one hour of work is not synonymous with
school dropout, but it is indicative of adjustment of domestic labor market choices in
response to the policy change.
Column 2 shows that 6.3% more of those currently employed in the 75th percentile
of OPA provinces say they are looking for additional work when compared to those in
the 25th percentile of provinces. This is not surprising since households now need to
compensate for lost remittances from high salaries abroad with lower domestic wages.
Column 3 shows that 3.6% fewer people are looking for work in high OPA provinces
compared to low OPA provinces after the policy change. While at first glance this
seems like a positive sign of the health of labor market, in reality, this may suggest
that the number of discouraged workers has risen and fewer individuals are actually
looking for work. Finally, individuals are more likely to be engaged in short-term
15On-time graduation is at age 15 or 16.
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employment rather than permanent employment. 1.8% more individuals are working
in short term contracts in high OPA provinces compared to low OPA provinces after
the policy change.
3.6 Robustness Checks
To further alleviate concern that the results are due to differential trending across
high and low base share provinces, one might still be concerned that this drives the
results, I create a new counterfactual group following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)
and Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010). This synthetic control group is made
up of the convex combination of the provinces that most closely resemble the highest
OPA share provinces prior to the policy change.
The aforementioned papers consider the case of a binary treatment variable. How-
ever, in the case of the OPA policy change, provinces were not treated or untreated,
but rather received different treatment dosages depending on their historic migrant
networks. To conduct the analysis using the synthetic control group, I assign the 9
provinces with the highest OPA base share to the treatment group. This can be seen
in Figure 3.7. These provinces all have a baseline OPA migration rate of 0.15% or
greater, and I refer to them as OPA provinces. Also shown in Figure 3.7, 64 provinces
with a base share less than 0.07% are designated as possible controls. I exclude the
provinces that are not circled since their treatment dosage is somewhat similar to
those designated as the treatment group. Following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003),
I then assign weights to minimize the pre-treatment difference in total migration
between the OPA and synthetic OPA groups.
Table 3.10 shows summary statistics for OPA provinces, all potential control
provinces, and synthetic OPA provinces. Compared to OPA provinces, the provinces
in the potential control group are married at a higher rate, much less educated, more
likely to be employed, less likely to live in urban areas, and have a much higher in-
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cidence of child labor. The working age population in these provinces is also much
smaller, which is not surprising since the 4 districts of Metro Manila are included as
OPA provinces. Turning to the synthetic OPA provinces, while the balance is not
perfect, particularly with regards to the size of the working population, the balance
is substantially improved in terms of education levels, employment rates, and child
labor rates, and most covariates are balanced between the OPA provinces and the
synthetic OPA provinces. While the synthetic OPA provinces are still less urban, the
balance is much better than when compared to the overall potential control group.
The assigned weights are shown in Table 3.11. Four provinces make up the syn-
thetic control with the majority of the weight placed on the province of Bataan. The
rest of the weight is split between Batangas, Cebu, and South Cotabato provinces.
Figure 3.8 shows the results. While Bataan province has much of the weight in order
to balance the covariates, the total migration rate from Bataan is higher than in the
OPA provinces. Thus, in the pre-period, the trends appear similar, but the level of
migration differs across the OPA provinces and the synthetic control. Following the
OPA policy change in 2005, the gap between the migration rates grows substantially.
Migration in OPA provinces increases at a much slower rate than in the synthetic
control group. Specifically, the total migration rate in OPA provinces decreases by
-1.17 percentage points compared to the synthetic control group. With a standard
error of 0.24, this is statistically significant at the 1% level. I cannot reject that
this point estimate is statistically the same as -1.07, the main result shown in Table
3.5. Thus, the synthetic cohort analysis corroborates the robustness of the main re-
sults and further assuages concerns that differential trending over time may drive the
results.
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3.7 Conclusion
Migration policies imposed by destination countries substantially limit global la-
bor mobility. While numerous papers have addressed the effects of such policies on
native workers in destination countries, the literature is largely silent on the effects on
migrant-sending countries. Using a policy change in Japan that imposed significant
barriers to the migration of Overseas Performing Artists (OPAs) from the Philippines
as a natural experiment, this paper provides the first estimates of the causal effects
of migration barriers on labor market choices in migrant-sending countries. Exploit-
ing this natural experiment, I employ a difference-in-differences estimation strategy
using the percent of OPA employment in the province population in a base year
as a continuous policy variable to define the treatment dosage. Because the policy
change occurred in response to accusations of trafficking, the results also provide the
first estimates of the effects of limiting migration in occupations deemed exploitive
or controversial.
I find that in response to the policy change, total migration decreases more for
provinces with a higher baseline OPA share. Specifically, moving from the 25th to
75th percentile of the baseline OPA share is associated with a 1.2% greater decrease
in total migration. The effects are larger for new hires, suggesting that new migrant
contracts are more vulnerable to policy shocks. I also find a substantial multiplier
effect, with migration declining by more than the amount of the policy change. The
multiplier effects are larger for new migrants, and current migrants appear to crowd
out new migrants by renewing contracts at a higher rate. The spillover effects of
this policy lead to reductions in both female and male migration. Domestic helpers,
plumbers, laborers, and production workers all are hired at a lower rate than prior
to the policy change in high OPA share provinces. Domestically, the unemployment
rate for women rises by 1.7% more in high OPA share provinces after the policy
change than in low OPA share provinces. Child labor increases differentially by 1.3%,
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and 1.8% more individuals are now engaged in short-term work. Robustness checks
that define a treated group of provinces and construct a synthetic control group of
provinces corroborate the main results.
The results suggest that immigration policies imposed by destination countries
have substantial implications for migrant-sending countries. Not only are OPA oppor-
tunities reduced, but there are also large spillover effects that reduce other migration
opportunities. The domestic labor market results suggest that when migration is re-
duced and remittances are no longer available, the domestic labor market choices are
substantially different in order to cope with these changes. However, higher rates of
unemployment and more people looking for additional work suggest that households
are not able to fully compensate for lost migration opportunities and remittances
through domestic employment. Thus, while migration is a lucrative employment op-
tion, relying on these opportunities makes migrant-sending countries vulnerable to
destination country policy shocks. As more quotas are imposed and anti-trafficking
campaigns increase, such policies will continue to have important implications for
poor, migrant-sending countries. Policymakers in these countries would do well to
use their limited social safety nets to help households in the presence of such policy
changes.
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Figure 3.1: OPA Migration Over Time
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Figure 3.2: 1993 OPA Migration Rates by Province
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Figure 3.3: 2004 OPA Migration Rates by Province
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Figure 3.4: Treatment Dosage: OPA Migration Rates in 1993 and 2009
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Figure 3.5: Parallel Trends across OPA Provinces by Base Share Quartile
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Figure 3.6: Migrant Networks: 1993 and 2004 OPA Shares
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Figure 3.7: Assignment of “Treated” and Potential Control Provinces
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Figure 3.8: Synthetic Control Results
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Table 3.1: Top 10 Occupations for Contract Migrants
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OPA	  Migrants Non-­‐OPA	  Migrants
Female	  (%) 95.7 67.0
Age	  (Years) 25.2 32.2
Monthly	  Salary	  (USD) 1857.3 417.3
Contract	  Duration	  (Months) 4.6 20.5
Years	  of	  Education 9.4 13.3
Source:	  POEA,	  SOF,	  and	  authors'	  calculations.
Table 3.2: OPA and Non-OPA Characteristics in 2004
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N Mean Std.	  Dev. Min Max
Migration	  Variables
OPA	  Migration	  Rate	  (1993-­‐Base	  share) 80 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.60
Total	  Migration	  Rate	  (LFS) 1040 2.44 1.61 0.00 8.84
Total	  Migration	  Rate	  (Census) 160 2.53 1.25 0.50 6.19
New	  Hires	  Migration	  Rate 480 0.44 0.28 0.01 1.59
OPA	  Migration	  Rate	  (2004) 80 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.28
OPA	  Migration	  Rate	  (2006) 80 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
Domestic	  Labor	  Market	  Variables
Unemployment	  Rate 1040 8.58 3.79 0.00 20.02
Child	  Employment	  Rate	   1040 9.75 10.18 0.00 77.30
Looking	  for	  Work 1040 1.52 1.42 0.00 7.13
Looking	  for	  Additional	  Work 1040 4.88 4.23 0.00 24.28
Short	  Term	  Job 1040 11.97 5.75 1.81 59.90
Internal	  Migration	  Variables
Out	  Migration	  Rate 160 2.85 1.49 0.68 11.44
In	  Migration	  Rate 160 2.67 1.80 0.06 11.12
Net	  Migration	  Rate 160 -­‐0.17 1.74 -­‐6.60 8.69
Working	  Population 1027 505,450.8 448,410.9 7,523.7 2,417,697.0
Source:	  POEA,	  OWWA,	  LFS,	  and	  Census	  of	  Population.
Notes:	  Summary	  statistics	  are	  not	  population	  weighted.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
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1993 1997 1997 2004 2004 2009 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share	  OPA	  (1993) 0.5340*** 0.4382*** 0.0056
(0.0264) (0.0519) (0.0037)
Female 0.0027 0.0046 0.0021* -­‐0.0050 -­‐0.0077* 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0071) (0.0056) (0.0013) (0.0091) (0.0046) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Age -­‐0.0013 -­‐0.0041 -­‐0.0024** -­‐0.0193* -­‐0.0083 -­‐0.0003 -­‐0.0001
(0.0090) (0.0047) (0.0011) (0.0110) (0.0081) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Married 0.0016 0.0037* -­‐0.0001 0.0040 0.0034* 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0005) (0.0039) (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Elementary	  Graduate 0.0010 -­‐0.0005 -­‐0.0004 -­‐0.0004 0.0005 0.0002* 0.0002*
(0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Some	  High	  School -­‐0.0078** -­‐0.0021 -­‐0.0002 0.0047 0.0048* 0.0002* 0.0002**
(0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0006) (0.0045) (0.0028) (0.0001) (0.0001)
High	  School	  Graduate -­‐0.0021 0.0002 0.0005** 0.0029 0.0021** 0.0001** 0.0001**
(0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Some	  College 0.0071 0.0002 -­‐0.0011*** -­‐0.0066** -­‐0.0022 -­‐0.0002* -­‐0.0002
(0.0043) (0.0026) (0.0004) (0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0001)
College	  Graduate 0.0040 0.0073** 0.0006 0.0117** 0.0039 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0039) (0.0031) (0.0006) (0.0051) (0.0029) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Employment	  Rate 0.0011 -­‐0.0002 0.0010** 0.0026 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0005) (0.0026) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Urban 0.0036*** 0.0015*** 0.0000 0.0017*** 0.0007** 0.0001** 0.0000
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Child	  Unemployment	  Rate -­‐0.0004 0.0004 -­‐0.0004** -­‐0.0024* -­‐0.0013 -­‐0.0001** -­‐0.0001**
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment	  Rate -­‐0.0035 -­‐0.0067 0.0000 -­‐0.0027 -­‐0.0052* -­‐0.0000 -­‐0.0001
(0.0064) (0.0046) (0.0011) (0.0047) (0.0027) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Looking	  for	  Additional	  Work 0.0265 0.0193* -­‐0.0012 0.0020 0.0000 -­‐0.0001 -­‐0.0001**
(0.0170) (0.0102) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Short	  Term	  Job -­‐0.0003 -­‐0.0009 -­‐0.0001 -­‐0.0022* 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Obs 77 80 80 80 80 80 80
R2 0.865 0.860 0.994 0.740 0.888 0.539 0.579
Mean	  Dep.	  Var 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00
Source:	  POEA,	  OWWA,	  LFS,	  Census	  of	  Population.
Notes:	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  at	  the	  province	  level.	  All	  regressions	  weighted	  by	  1990	  working	  
population.
Table 3.4: Effect of Covariates and Migrant Networks on OPA Migration Rates
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Total	  Migration	  Rate	  
(LFS)
Total	  Migration	  Rate	  
(Census) New	  Hire	  Migration	  Rate
Main	  Results (1) (2) (3)
Post*OPA	  Share -­‐1.073*** -­‐1.376 -­‐1.443***
(0.380) (1.126) (0.179)
Scaled	  by	  IQR	  (%) (-­‐1.073*0.03)/2.44=-­‐1.2% -­‐1.7% -­‐9.6%
Check	  for	  Pre-­‐Trends
OPA	  Share 0.001 0.163 0.270***
(0.154) (0.743) (0.058)
Falsification	  Test
"Post"*OPA	  Share 0.235 0.277***
(0.413) (0.059)
N 1040 160 477
R2 0.902 0.971 0.920
Mean	  Dep.	  Var	  (%) 2.44 2.53 0.45
Source:	  POEA,	  OWWA,	  LFS,	  Census	  of	  Population.
Notes:	  The	  pre-­‐period	  in	  Column	  1	  is	  from	  1998	  to	  2004;	  in	  Column	  2,	  it	  is	  2000;	  in	  Column	  3,	  it	  is	  1996-­‐
1997.	  The	  post-­‐period	  in	  Column	  1	  is	  2006	  to	  2011;	  in	  Column	  2,	  it	  is	  2010;	  in	  Column	  3	  it	  is	  2006-­‐2009.	  
Observations	  and	  R2	  are	  reported	  for	  Row	  1.	  For	  the	  falsification	  test	  in	  Column	  1,	  the	  "pre"	  period	  is	  
defined	  as	  1998-­‐1999.	  All	  regressions	  include	  province	  and	  year	  fixed	  effects,	  as	  well	  as	  controls	  for	  
fraction	  female,	  average	  age,	  fraction	  married,	  average	  education	  levels,	  fraction	  employed,	  fraction	  
unemployed,	  fraction	  urban,	  fraction	  looking	  for	  additional	  work,	  and	  the	  fraction	  working	  in	  short	  term	  
work.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  at	  the	  province	  level.	  All	  regressions	  weighted	  by	  1990	  working	  
population.	  ***	  indicates	  significance	  at	  the	  1%	  level.	  	  **	  indicates	  significance	  at	  the	  5%	  level	  *	  indicates	  
significance	  at	  the	  10%	  level.	  	  	  	  
Table 3.5: Effect of OPA Ban on Total and New Hire Migration Rate
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Post*ShareOPA Post*ShareOPA
OPAs -­‐0.404*** Manufacturing -­‐0.013***
(0.014) (0.002)
Agriculture -­‐0.004*** Material-­‐Handling -­‐0.013**
(0.001) (0.006)
Engineers -­‐0.056*** Medical -­‐0.056***
(0.013) (0.012)
Machine-­‐Tool	  Operators -­‐0.013*** Painters -­‐0.011***
(0.003) (0.002)
Cashiers -­‐0.001 Plumbers,	  Welders -­‐0.072***
(0.002) (0.019)
Carpenters -­‐0.043*** Processors -­‐0.003**
(0.010) (0.001)
Building	  Caretakers -­‐0.011 Production	  NEC -­‐0.120***
(0.013) (0.013)
Caregivers -­‐0.059*** Production	  Supervisors -­‐0.012***
(0.016) (0.004)
Clerical -­‐0.005*** Professional	  NEC -­‐0.006**
(0.002) (0.003)
Clerical	  NEC -­‐0.003 Protective	  Services -­‐0.003**
(0.007) (0.001)
Construction -­‐0.002* Sales -­‐0.003*
(0.001) (0.002)
Cooks,	  Waiters -­‐0.013 Sales	  Workers	  NEC 0.000
(0.014) (0.001)
Domestic	  Helpers -­‐0.284*** Salesmen -­‐0.001
(0.045) (0.004)
Electrical -­‐0.052*** Scientists -­‐0.015***
(0.009) (0.002)
Food	  Processors -­‐0.000 Service	  NEC -­‐0.007
(0.002) (0.009)
Hairdressers 0.000 Spinners,	  Weavers -­‐0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
Laborers -­‐0.093*** Typists -­‐0.004***
(0.011) (0.001)
Machine	  Fitters -­‐0.030*** Tailors -­‐0.017**
(0.006) (0.008)
Managers	  NEC -­‐0.003** Transport	  Operators -­‐0.005***
(0.001) (0.002)
Obs 477 477
Source:	  POEA,	  OWWA,	  and	  LFS.
Notes:	  The	  pre	  period	  is	  from	  1995	  to	  1997,	  and	  the	  post	  period	  is	  from	  2006	  to	  2009.	  All	  
regressions	  include	  province	  and	  year	  fixed	  effects,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  province-­‐year	  
level	  covariates	  listed	  in	  Table	  5.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  province	  level.	  
The	  unit	  of	  observation	  is	  the	  province-­‐year.	  ***	  indicates	  significance	  at	  the	  1%	  level.	  	  **	  
indicates	  significance	  at	  the	  5%	  level	  *	  indicates	  significance	  at	  the	  10%	  level.	  	  	  	  
Table 3.6: Effect of OPA Ban on Occupation-Specific Migration Rates
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Total	  Female	  
Migration	  Rate
Total	  Male	  
Migration	  Rate
Female	  New	  Hire	  
Migration	  Rate
Male	  New	  Hire	  
Migration	  Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post*OPA	  Share -­‐0.603** -­‐0.470** -­‐0.853*** -­‐0.589***
(0.268) (0.194) (0.099) (0.096)
Scaled	  by	  IQR	  (%) -­‐1.4% -­‐1.25% -­‐9.8% -­‐8.9%
N 1040 1040 477 477
R2 0.872 0.919 0.879 0.946
Mean	  Dep.	  Var 1.32 1.12 0.26 0.19
Source:	  POEA,	  OWWA,	  LFS,	  Census	  of	  Population.
Notes:	  The	  pre-­‐period	  in	  Columns	  1	  and	  2	  is	  from	  1998	  to	  2004;	  in	  Column	  2,	  it	  is	  1996	  to	  1997.	  
The	  post-­‐period	  in	  Columns	  1	  and	  2	  is	  2006	  to	  2011;	  in	  Column	  2,	  it	  is	  2006	  to	  2009.	  Observations	  
and	  R2	  are	  reported	  for	  Row	  1.	  For	  the	  falsification	  test	  in	  Column	  1,	  the	  "pre"	  period	  is	  defined	  
as	  1998-­‐1999.	  All	  regressions	  include	  province	  and	  year	  fixed	  effects,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  
province-­‐year	  covariates	  listed	  in	  Table	  5.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  at	  the	  province	  level.	  
All	  regressions	  weighted	  by	  1990	  working	  population.
Table 3.7: Effect of OPA Ban on Migration Rates, By Gender
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Total	  Unemployment Female	  Unemployment Male	  Unemployment
(1) (2) (3)
Post*OPA	  Share 0.893 1.485*** -­‐0.592
(0.609) (0.301) (0.405)
Scaled	  by	  IQR	  (%) 0.4% 1.7% -­‐0.6%
N 1040 1040 1040
R2 0.900 0.783 0.911
Mean	  Dep.	  Var 6.19 2.59 3.59
Source:	  POEA,	  OWWA,	  LFS,	  Census	  of	  Population.
Notes:	  The	  pre-­‐period	  is	  from	  1998	  to	  2004.	  All	  regressions	  include	  province	  and	  year	  
fixed	  effects,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  province-­‐year	  covariates	  listed	  in	  Table	  5	  but	  
excluding	  all	  employment	  controls.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  at	  the	  province	  
level.	  All	  regressions	  weighted	  by	  1990	  working	  population.	  The	  dependent	  variables	  is	  
defined	  as	  the	  total	  number	  of	  unemployed	  or	  discouraged	  workers	  out	  of	  the	  total	  
working-­‐aged	  population	  (age	  18-­‐65).
Table 3.8: Effect on Domestic Unemployment Rate
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Child	  Labor	  (Aged	  
10-­‐14)
Looking	  for	  
Additional	  Work Looking	  for	  Work
Short-­‐Term	  
Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post*OPA	  Share 4.384** 3.186*** -­‐5.810*** 7.145***
(2.023) (0.384) (1.972) (1.776)
Scaled	  by	  IQR	  (%) 1.40% 6.30% -­‐3.56% 1.80%
N 1040 1040 1040 1040
R2 0.868 0.872 0.696 0.760
Mean	  Dep.	  Var 9.75 1.52 4.88 11.97
Source:	  POEA,	  OWWA,	  LFS,	  Census	  of	  Population.
Notes:	  The	  pre-­‐period	  is	  from	  1998	  to	  2004.	  All	  regressions	  include	  province	  and	  year	  fixed	  
effects,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  province-­‐year	  covariates	  listed	  in	  Table	  5	  but	  excluding	  all	  
employment	  controls.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  at	  the	  province	  level.	  All	  regressions	  
weighted	  by	  1990	  working	  population.	  The	  rate	  of	  child	  labor	  is	  the	  number	  of	  children	  aged	  
10	  to	  14	  working	  at	  least	  one	  hour	  in	  the	  past	  week	  out	  ofthe	  total	  population	  aged	  10	  to	  14.	  
Those	  looking	  for	  additional	  work	  are	  employed,	  but	  seeking	  additional	  hours.
Table 3.9: Effect of OPA Ban on Domestic Labor Market Outcomes
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OPA	  Provinces
All	  Potential	  Control	  
Provinces
Synthetic	  OPA	  
Provinces
(1) (2) (3)
Female	  (%) 51.49 49.36 49.83
Age	  (%) 35.30 36.92 35.53
Married	  (%) 60.73 66.97 63.68
Education
Elementary	  graduate	  (%) 12.78 20.77 17.58
Some	  high	  school	  (%) 11.25 13.61 10.59
High	  school	  graduate	  (%) 29.96 18.70 29.20
Some	  college	  (%) 21.63 14.54 20.49
College	  graduate	  (%) 17.30 10.11 11.52
Employed	  (%) 59.93 68.33 59.18
Urban	  (%) 88.49 30.96 65.18
Working	  Population 1,272,158 368,864 404,376
Unemployed	  (%) 9.28 5.26 9.14
Child	  Labor	  (%) 2.31 12.70 3.05
Looking	  for	  Work	  (%) 2.02 0.72 1.56
Looking	  for	  Additional	  Work	  (%) 3.15 2.83 3.07
Short-­‐Term	  Employment	  (%) 8.50 13.32 12.67
Number	  of	  Provinces	   9 64 4
Source:	  LFS	  and	  author's	  calculations.
Notes:	  Summary	  statistics	  are	  calculated	  for	  the	  pre-­‐period,	  1996	  to	  2004.
Table 3.10: Summary Statistics for OPA, Synthetic OPA, and Control Provinces
146
Province Weight
Batangas 0.036
Bataan 0.881
Cebu 0.067
South	  Cotabato 0.017
Source:	  LFS	  and	  author's	  calculations.
Table 3.11: Weights for Synthetic Control Group
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APPENDIX
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APPENDIX A
Heterogeneity by Grade Level
In Section 1.3, I assume that parents make the decision whether or not to enroll
their child in high school and consider two levels of schooling, high school gradu-
ate and less than a high school graduate. I test this empirically by examining the
effects of migration demand on aggregate secondary school enrollment. However, ex-
amining the effects on aggregate enrollment across all grades may miss potentially
interesting dynamics. By testing for differential responses of grade level enrollments
to migration demand, it is possible to further shed light on the mechanisms through
which migration affects overall secondary school enrollment, namely by identifying
the marginal students induced into schooling by changes in migration demand. Un-
derstanding both the location of the marginal student in the education distribution
and the mechanisms through which they are induced in can help policymakers design
policies to increase human capital that are targeted at these students. The responses
to migration demand depend on the distribution across grades of unenrolled students
from both unconstrained and constrained households as well as the benefits to partial
completion of high school. Thus far, by comparing the wage premium for high school
graduates compared to non-high school graduates, I have essentially assumed there
is no benefit to partial completion of high school. I relax this assumption below.
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First, however, consider the case where there is no benefit to partial completion
of high school. There will be a reduced probability of drop out in each subsequent
year of high school, with the bulk of unenrolled students dropping out prior to year
one. Unconstrained households may revise their education decision in response to a
change in income or the expected wage premium. Constrained households may revise
their decision in response to a change in the expected wage premium or a negative
income shock, but they will only be able to respond positively through the income
channel if they experience a loosening of liquidity constraints. Since most unenrolled
students will drop out prior to year one of high school, I anticipate that there will be
a bunching on year one enrollment from either the income channel or the expected
wage premium channel.1
Now assume there are benefits to partial completion of high school, and stu-
dents may drop out in any grade. Dropout rates in the Philippines decline by grade
level.2 Thus, I anticipate that the enrollment response for both constrained and
unconstrained households to the income channel will simply follow where marginal
students are located in the education distribution and will have the largest effect on
year one with smaller effects on each subsequent year.3 Again, the wage premium
can only increase education for constrained households if they also experience a loos-
ening of the liquidity constraint. One might expect changes in the wage premium to
have the largest effect on those entering the fourth year of high school, since labor
market conditions are more likely to persist until these students graduate and enter
the labor force than for first year students. However, since dropout rates decline by
grade level, depending on the probability that parents assign to the chance that labor
1Such bunching at year one could also occur due to fixed costs of high school that force a number
of students to drop out at this point in their education.
2Author’s calculations from Philippine Department of Education data.
3This could, however, be more nuanced for parents with more than one child. In the event that
the household receives just enough extra income to send one child to school for one more year,
sheepskin effects may mean that the parent may enroll the older student rather than the younger
student.
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market conditions will persist, any pattern of enrollment responses is possible. Based
on these potential scenarios, the location in the education distribution of marginal
students induced into schooling by increased migration demand is ambiguous. I test
these predictions empirically in Section 6.4.
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Occupation % of Total % Female
Farmhand and Laborers 18.17 39.9
General Managers in Wholesale and Retail Trade 6.74 73.5
Rice Farmer 5.96 7.85
Salesperson 4.27 62.0
Corn Farmer 3.39 9.59
Domestic Helper 3.18 88.6
Motorcycle Driver 2.76 1.20
Fisherman 2.05 2.40
Coconut Farmer 1.95 10.6
Market and Sidewalk Stall Vendor 1.93 64.1
Car Driver 1.84 0.75
Carpenter 1.62 40.3
Street Vendor 1.56 0.54
Elementary Teacher 1.36 87.0
Hand Packer 1.30 40.3
Hog Farmer 1.24 71.2
Protective Service Worker 1.17 5.61
Vegetable Farmer 1.11 31.0
Fishery Laborer 1.05 17.1
Hand Launderers 1.03 97.2
Hotel Cleaner 0.94 25.9
Building Construction Laborer 0.89 1.30
Waiter 0.89 51.0
Root Crop Farmer 0.86 33.9
Construction and Maintenance (Roads) 0.77 1.96
Deep Sea Fisherman 0.73 0.87
General Manager (Transport) 0.66 7.80
Messenger 0.66 12.5
Cashiers and Ticket Clerks 0.63 81.4
Sewers 0.62 83.1
Hairdresser 0.60 66.9
Heavy Truck Driver 0.55 0.75
Office Clerk (Other) 0.54 58.2
Bricklayer 0.54 0.76
Secondary Teacher 0.53 73.7
General Managers (Restaurant) 0.52 69.1
Electronics Fitter 0.51 12.9
Source: LFS and author's calculations.
Notes: This table lists the top occupations for domestically employed 
Filipinos in 2007.
Table A.1: Top Domestic Occupations
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Destination Occupation Occupation x Destination
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Total Migration Demand Index 10.324*** 6.038 4.858
(3.578) (5.815) (3.354)
N 502 502 502
R2 0.927 0.930 0.930
F-Statistic 46.12 24.06 38.06
Panel B. Female Migration Demand Index 5.452 8.430*** 7.875***
(3.644) (2.770) (2.611)
N 502 502 502
R2 0.931 0.931 0.931
F-Statistic 73.64 71.38 145.74
Index Type
Notes: The sample period is from 2004 to 2009 with 1993 used as the base year in the construction of the instrument. 
Column 1 uses the destination-based index which is used for the main analysis. Column 2 creates the index in the same 
manner, but instead of destinations, it uses 38 occupation categories. Column 3 uses 38 x 32 occupation-destination groups 
to create the instrument. All regressions include province and year fixed effects as well as province-specific linear time 
trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. The unit of observation is the province-
year. The mean change in migration demand is measured in percentage points and is the average annual province-level 
change in migration demand. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  ** indicates significance at the 5% level * 
indicates significance at the 10% level.    
Sources: POEA, OWWA, DepEd, and author's calculations.
Table A.2:
Effect of Total and Female Migration Demand on Total Secondary Enroll-
ment, by Index Type
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25th 50th 75th SD Min Max
Algeria 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.47 0.00 17.39
Angola 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.03 0.00 14.00
Australia 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.18 0.00 60.00
Bahrain 0.14 0.26 1.30 2.10 0.00 10.22
Brunei 0.14 0.39 1.13 1.96 0.00 10.34
Canada 0.00 0.08 1.32 2.43 0.00 13.25
Cyprus 0.00 0.00 1.43 2.71 0.00 15.71
Guam 0.00 0.05 0.48 4.21 0.00 35.48
Hong Kong 0.11 0.24 1.60 1.95 0.00 9.48
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.91 0.00 100.00
Israel 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.74 0.00 10.09
Italy 0.02 0.24 1.27 2.41 0.00 15.55
Japan 0.03 0.08 0.47 3.46 0.00 21.38
Jordan 0.00 0.00 0.66 2.99 0.00 19.10
South Korea 0.00 0.23 1.48 2.21 0.00 12.27
Kuwait 0.06 0.17 0.84 2.64 0.00 14.20
Lebanon 0.13 0.36 1.07 2.14 0.00 10.31
Libya 0.02 0.15 0.65 2.72 0.00 16.40
Malaysia 0.11 0.31 1.75 1.90 0.00 1.19
Nigeria 0.00 0.14 0.69 3.13 0.00 21.73
Northern Mariana Islands 0.06 0.12 0.85 2.86 0.00 16.62
Oman 0.13 0.38 1.29 2.26 0.00 14.27
Other 0.02 0.12 0.59 2.67 0.00 12.64
Papua New Guinea 0.00 0.03 1.09 2.82 0.00 18.92
Qatar 0.10 0.31 1.17 2.35 0.00 13.24
Russia 0.00 0.08 0.94 2.97 0.00 1.19
Saudi Arabia 0.10 0.21 0.83 2.60 0.00 1.19
Singapore 0.12 0.40 1.22 1.95 0.00 9.96
Taiwan 0.07 0.15 0.95 2.57 0.00 15.14
United Arab Emirates 0.15 0.49 1.43 1.94 0.00 10.09
United Kingdom 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.29 0.00 25.00
United States 0.04 0.18 0.94 3.08 0.00 20.96
Percentile
Notes: The baseline shares are defined as Mpi0/Mi0. Summary statistics for the baseline shares are presented for 
each of the 32 destinations (expressed as percentages). The base year is defined as 1993. The unit of observation 
is the province, and 84 provinces are included in the analysis. The category "Other" includes migrants to all 
destination countries besides the 31 listed here. 2% of observations fall in the "Other" category.
Source: POEA, OWWA, and author's calculations.
Table A.3:
Summary Statistics for Base Shares used in Construction of the Bartik-
Style Instrument
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Log GDP Log GDP
Algeria -20.245 Lebanon 9.793
(14.886) (9.783)
Angola 5.131 Libya -1.185
(4.112) (0.739)
Australia -0.029 Malaysia -14.327
(5.566) (7.395)
Bahrain -2.570 Nigeria 0.077
(4.884) (3.323)
Brunei 2.457 Northern Mariana Islands 0.096
(2.562) (4.808)
Canada -6.720 Oman -12.982
(3.549) (8.091)
Cyprus 6.306 Other -1.793
(10.446) (1.276)
Guam -7.734 Papua New Guinea -0.505
(7.315) (0.926)
Hong Kong -6.380 Qatar -0.323
(3.437) (5.842)
Ireland -3.445 Russia -4.955
(4.084) (5.512)
Israel -0.889 Saudi Arabia 0.954
(1.732) (6.155)
Italy 0.181 Singapore -9.278*
(2.319) (4.258)
Japan 18.597* Taiwan -3.765
(9.272) (7.071)
Jordan 7.113 UAE 4.541
(3.987) (2.817)
South Korea -13.429 United Kingdom -3.559
(10.367) (4.397)
Kuwait 0.976 United States -19.170*
(1.871) (7.849)
Source: POEA, OWWA, WDI, and author's calculations.
Notes:  Each cell represents a separate regression of the log number of migrants on log 
GDP in the Philippines and the top 10 destination countries for OFWS in each of the 
32 destinations used in construction of the migration demand index. The time series is 
from 1992 to 2009. 
Table A.4:
Effect of Philippine GDP on Number of Departing Migrants by Occupa-
tion Category
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Table A.5:
Effect of Baseline Destination-Specific Migration Rate on Change in High
School Enrollment Rate
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(1) (2)
0.066 -0.196*
(0.109) (0.104)
N 501 501
R2 0.982 0.985
Notes: The sample period is from 2005 to 2010 with 1993 used as the base year in 
the construction of the instrument. All regressions include province and year fixed 
effects as well as province-specific linear time trends. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the province level are in parentheses. The unit of observation is the 
province-year. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level * indicates significance at the 10% level.    
Sources: POEA, OWWA, DepEd, and author's calculations.
Effect of Male Migration 
Rate on Female Index
Effect of Female Migration 
Rate on Male Index
Table A.6: Identification Check for Gender-Specific Demand Indices
157
Total Public Female Public Male Public
Share OPA -0.868 -1.487** -0.326
(0.600) (0.629) (0.668)
N 154 154 154
R2 0.238 0.225 0.234
Sources:  DepEd, OWWA, POEA, and author's calculations.
Change in Enrollment Rate
Notes: The sample period is from 2002 to 2004, and the dependent variable is the change in the enrollment rate. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the province level. The unit of 
observation is the province-year. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  ** indicates significance at the 5% level 
* indicates significance at the 10% level.    
Table A.7: Check for Pre-trends in the Enrollment Rate
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